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The European Observatory on National Family Policies was established by the 
Commission of the European Communities to monitor changes in  family forms 
and family policies (and other policies which impact on the family) in all member 
states of the European Union.  Each year two Reports are produced:  they are 
complementary and seek to achieve different objectives.  The Synthesis Report 
analyses, on a comparative basis, the development of family policies and focuses 
on key themes and questions;  emergent policy questions are identified and a 
contribution made to shaping the policy agenda. 
A companion volume serves a separate purpose and reports, descriptively and 
schematically, on trends and developments within each country.  The information 
reported relates to the period January 1994 - March 1995 and has been mostly 
obtained from experts in each member state using a  pro forma questionnaire. 
Inevitably there is variation in the extent and detail of coverage.  Attempting to 
describe developments which are so recent  brings many challenges:  the absence 
of comparable statistical data and the need for perspective on events are the two 
most obvious examples. 
It is our firm hope and expectation that taken together these volumes will make a 
helpful contribution to  the analysis and development of contemporary family 
policy. They are written with a commitment to the improvement of quality of life 
for all families: we hope to have made a small contribution to making that goal a 
reality. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This  report  would  not  have  been  possible  without  the  contributions  from 
members of the Observatory.  We are grateful to Lorna Foster and Barry Nicol for 
help in text editing. Hazel Parker, administrative secretary to the Observatory, 
was responsible for typing the final text: we are especially grateful to her. 
It is to be emphasized that the contents are the responsibility of the authors alone. CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
The  European  Observatory  on  National  Family  Policies  is  one  of  several 
organisations and research projects charged to monitor and report on changes in 
family policy.  The purpose of this chapter is to place the work of the European 
Observatory on National Family Policies in a wider context.  The development of 
the European Commission's responsibilities and objectives in the field of family 
policy  will  be  reviewed.  The  role  and  contribution  of  other  international 
organisations active in the field of European family policy, especially the Council 
of Europe, will then be described.  The United Nations designated 1994 as the 
International Year of the Family and there will be brief review of its activities and 
achievements.  The chapter will conclude by looking forward to the next Inter-
Governmental Conference to revise the Treaty of Maastricht.  Debates around this 
issue, both within and outside the Council chamber, will provide an important 
opportunity to stimulate further the alignment of family policies with European 
citizenship in the context of the developing Union. 
The European Union has no formal responsibility or powers in the field of family 
policy.  However, this does not mean that there is a lack of interest; on the contrary, 
there is a long established interest in many facets of family life.  The absence of an 
explicit mention of the family or family policy in any of the founding Treaties of 
the Union has inhibited but not excluded consideration of these matters.  The first 
formal discussion took place at a  Council of Ministers meeting in 1986  when 
consultation between officials from appropriate national ministries was proposed. 
The European Parliament and the French Government ensured that the issue was 
not forgotten and in August 1989 the Commission submitted to the Council of 
Ministers a communication on family policy [COM(89) 363 final].  Predominantly 
a review of demographic and socio-economic data in relation to the family,  the 
document  nevertheless  outlined  the  basis  for  Community  action.  The 
Communication concluded (para.37) that 
'  .. the family assumes an essential role and place in the cohesion and 
future  of  society.  Therefore  it should  be  protected  and  specific 
measures adopted in recognition of the services it renders society.' 
The conclusion continued (para.52), 
'The legitimacy of Community interest is based not on ideology but 
on acknowledgement and methods of a Community action at family 
level;  the appropriateness of such Community interest is based less 
on ideological  grounds but more  on  such  objective  facts  as  the 
economic  role  of  the  family,  the  importance  of  the  family  as  a 
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touchstone for solidarity between generations, the irreversible desire 
for equality between men and women and the wish of women to 
have complete access to working life.  Community action will have 
to be pragmatic in order to respect the special features of different 
national  policies  already created  and the varying socio-economic 
contexts in which such policies play a role.' 
This recognition and sensitivity to the primacy of national responsibilities in the 
context of family policy is reflected in the prudent actions taken by the European 
Commission in subsequent years:  that the Observatory is for National Family 
Policies  is  further  indication  of  the  need  to  balance  European and  national 
perspectives. 
In the intervening years the Commission has continued to develop its interest and 
capacity in relation  to family  policy.  The  Networks on Childcare and Equal 
Opportunities, a  range of specialist working parties on female  labour supply, 
work incentives and family living standards, have all contributed to generating 
valuable information and policy debate.  Most recently, in 1994, the Commission's 
interest in the family has been exemplified in the first report on the Demographic 
Situation in the European Union produced in accordance with Article 7 of the 
Maastricht  Treaty's  Social  Protocol.  This  report  analyzed  the  changing 
demographic structure of Europe and examined its causes and effects, noting its 
implications for social and economic organisation (See Chapter 3).  The report 
analyses the nature and causes of family transformation and explains why this 
transformation cannot be detached from the evolution of social solidarities and 
dynamics of societal ageing.  As the report will be updated every year, there is a 
consequent need for more accurate and detailed data on families and households, 
and this request has already been made to the Statistical Office of the European 
Communities. 
The fundamental prerogatives of member state governments in relation to family 
policy were confirmed in the Commission Communication of 1989 and have been 
affirmed in many subsequent statements.  It is axiomatic that there is recognition 
of the diversity of conceptions of family policy throughout Europe.  Following 
discussion at the Council of Ministers in 1988,  the Commission was asked to 
promote the  sharing of information about family  policy and to  that end the 
European Observatory on National Family Policies was established in 1989. The 
primary objective is to monitor developments in family forms and family policies 
across  the Union.  By  preparing two annual reports and disseminating them 
widely,  the Observatory is able to contribute to heightening awareness of the 
family dimension in a range of policy areas including migration, labour market 
policy, social protection and equal opportunities. 
In addition to the work of the Observatory, the Commission created an inter-
service  group  of  officials  which  is  charged  with  ensuring  that  the  family 
dimension is recognised in the development and implementation of Community 
policies.  Officials from across the Commission meet each year to  co-ordinate 
activities in relation to the family.  Whereas members of the inter-service group are 
internal to the Commission, there is a parallel, but external, group consisting of 
senior officials drawn from each of the member states of the Union.  This group 
meets twice each year, shares information and has been pro-active in promoting 
major conferences on aspects of family policy.  These ventures have usually been Introduction  9 
linked to the rotating Presidency of the Community and during 1994, for example, 
a  conference on 'The Future of the Family'  was held in  Bonn.  Immediately 
following that conference, an informal meeting of the European Union ministers 
responsible for the family was held in Berlin in September 1994.  Conclusions on 
demographic trends, changing family structures and their implications for social 
protection system were agreed:  there was no programme for action, however. 
During 1994 the Commission established a new Network with an explicit remit to 
examine 'Families and Work'.  It is composed of 12 independent experts, mostly 
from private companies or trades unions and with a background in the field of 
industrial relations.  Their task is to identify, monitor, analyze and disseminate 
European experience which seeks to  achieve a  humane and sensitive balance 
between work and family life. 
Also during 1994, the Commission made a special contribution to the work of the 
International Year  of  the  Family  and  undertook  several  initiatives.  First,  it 
published the results of the Eurobarometer on the European Family, conducted 
during April 1993, which provides an overview of social attitudes to the family 
and family policy in Europe (See Chapter 2).  The Commission, together with the 
German Presidency organised a large conference on the Future of the Family in 
Bonn.  In addition, the Commission was involved in promoting and organising a 
number of conferences and seminars, within member states, on many aspects of 
family policy. 
Of course, the Commission is not the only EU body with an interest in family 
policy.  The European Parliament has shown increasing commitment to this area 
and during 1994 adopted a resolution 'on the protection of families and family 
units at the close of the International Year  of the Family' (14  December 1994). 
Having referred to all the resolutions and commitments relating to  the family 
previously entered into by the Parliament, and noting the context of rising levels 
of social exclusion, unemployment and general social change, a long declaration 
was made which, inter  alia,  endorsed the principle of equal opportunities for 
women by calling for better child care, training, social protection and continuing 
education.  The  Parliament  condemned  the  non-implementation  of  draft 
directives on part-time work and parental leave;  they expressed regret at the 
absence of a directive on child care and called for progress on this matter during 
1995.  They encouraged fair and flexible work opportunities without reduction in 
either  employment  rights  or  status  and  wanted  social  security  systems  to 
recognise the unpaid work of the one parent who remained at home to look after 
children.  They called for more research on the changing nature of families and 
family policy and proposed a series of conferences, involving the social partners, 
with a view to adopting practical proposals which would reconcile the spheres of 
work and family life. 
1994 was a very active year for worldwide initiatives on the family.  Designated 
by the United Nations as the International Year of the Family (IYF)  there were 
many  events  and  developments  which  drew  attention  to  the  changes  and 
challenges which are being faced by families.  The European Union, individual 
member states  and  a  host  of  not-for-profit  organisations,  big  and  small,  all 
contributed  to  the  international  programme.  The  United  Nations  has  long 
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International  Covenant  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural  Rights  (General 
Assembly Resolution 2200  A)  in Article 10,  provides that 'the widest possible 
protection and assistance should be accorded to the family, which is the natural 
and fundamental group unit of society,  particularly for  its  establishment and 
while it is  responsible for  the care and education of dependent children'.  In 
recognition of this, the objectives of IYF were: 
a)  To increase awareness of family issues among Governments as well as in the 
private sector; 
b)  To  strengthen national institutions  to  formulate,  implement and monitor 
policies in respect of families; 
c)  To  stimulate efforts to respond to  problems affecting, and affected by,  the 
situation of families; 
d)  To enhance the effectiveness of local, national and regional efforts to carry out 
specific programmes concerning families; 
e)  To  improve  the  collaboration  between  national  and  international 
organisations in support of multisectoral activities; 
f)  To  build  upon  the  results  of  international  activities  concerning  women, 
children, youth, the aged and the disabled, as well as of other major events of 
concern to the family to its individual members. 
(Guide for a National Action Programme on the IYF, United Nations, 1994) 
A Committee to coordinate IYF activities, and representative of all interests, was 
established within each country of the European Union.  The Committees, which 
were supposed to have high visibility and credibility within  their own countries, 
were to be the focal point and source of information about IYF.  Each Committee 
was encouraged to arrange a programme of events, generate publicity, stimulate 
research and encourage the evaluation of family impacts in all areas of public and 
social policy.  The UN Guidance literature provided a long list of questions around 
which national debates were to be encouraged:  the choice and balance of topics 
may  have  varied  from  country  to  country  but  will  have  covered  the 
appropriateness and adequacy of law and services to protect children; the rights 
of partners in relation to marriage, divorce, inheritance and property; the need for 
training and education in personal and life skills; material support for families of 
differing  composition and at different  income  levels;  the  responsibilities  and 
obligations of fathers. 
Linked  to  the  International  Year  of the  Family,  the  UN  organised  the  third 
International Conference on Population and Development which was held in 
Cairo, Egypt.  An EU delegation, with Germany acting as spokesperson, attended 
and played an important role in contributing to the conference's final compromise 
agreement.  Among the basic principles that were agreed in Cairo as the basis for 
a Programme of Action for the future was the statement that The family is the 
basic unit of society and, whatever its  composition, must receive  appropriate 
protection and support.'  It is to be hoped that this results in firm commitments 
and policy innovation. 
At this time, in late 1995,  it  is  difficult  to  be certain about the immediate or 
medium term impact of the IYF.  Unquestionably it will have raised awareness 
and policy debate; it may have contributed to the formation of new groups to Introduction  11 
support families; it is less clear that living standards or opportunities for families 
will have been significantly altered for the better.  But the long-term implications 
and benefits of seeding ideas and promoting models of good practice have always 
been difficult to establish. 
With a wider scope but less interventionist remit, the Council of Europe, based in 
Strasbourg, was founded in 1949 and now consists of 25 member states.  The main 
institutions  of  the  Council  of  Europe  are  the  Committee  of  Ministers,  a 
Parliamentary Assembly and the Court of Human Rights.  The Council's interest 
in family policy is split between no less than 11 Steering Committees: 
Steering Committee for Human Rights 
Steering Committee on Social Policy 
Steering Committee for Employment and Labour 
Steering Committee for Social Security 
European Population Committee 
European Health Committee 
European Committee on Migration 
European Committee on Legal Co-operation 
European Committee on Crime Problems 
Council for Cultural Co-operation 
European Committee for Equality between Women and Men 
The Standing Conference of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe also deals 
with social problems including youth unemployment and the circumstances of 
young people in urban environments. 
A series of key documents in the field of social policy have been wholly (or in part) 
adopted  and ratified  by member states.  These  include  the  European Social 
Charter which was drafted in 1961  and the European Code of Social Security 
(1964).  A cornerstone of the European Social Charter is  a  commitment to the 
family as articulated in Article 16: 
'With  a  view  to  ensuring  the  necessary  conditions  for  the  full 
development of the family,  which is a fundamental unit of society, 
the Contracting Parties undertake to promote the economic, legal 
and social  protection of family  life  by such means as  social and 
family  benefits, fiscal  arrangements, provision of family  housing, 
benefits for the newly married, and other appropriate means.' 
Of course the concern of the Council extends beyond the 'traditional' family and 
embraces a concern for lone parents and their children.  A special concern of the 
Council  of  Europe  has  been  to  facilitate  and  preserve  family  unity  across 
international  borders  by  guaranteeing  migrant  workers  the  right  to  family 
reunion.  During 1994  a  Committee of Independent Experts for the European 
Social Charter, charged with proposing revisions to its basic terms, dedicated the 
general introduction to the Conclusions to the family, as its contribution to the 
celebration in 1994 of the International Year of the Family (See Council of Europe: 
Conference of European Ministers responsible for  Family Affairs:  MMF-XXIV 
[95] 4). 
During 1994 the Committee of Ministers (to the Council of Europe) responsible for 
the Family adopted the following Recommendation (R  [94]  14 on coherent and 
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i.  'The significance of preventive family policy must be emphasised: a family 
may need guidance, counselling and services at different stages of its life, by 
means of which its vulnerability can be greatly diminished. 
ii.  The concept for a coherent and integrated family policy is that the role of the 
public authorities is to create the circumstances conducive to the emergence 
of a family unit in which the individual can develop in safety, self-respect and 
solidarity,  enjoying  fundamental  rights,  in  a  legal,  social,  cultural  and 
economic context.  Special needs of different  types of families  at various 
stages of family life cycles must be allowed for here. 
iii.  The concept of a coherent and integrated family policy must be applied in 
examining all stages of policy with reference to the interests of the family and 
all its members. 
iv.  The objective is that a coherent and integrated family policy should function 
across administrative boundaries as a factor co-ordinating all action taken 
affecting families. 
v.  In practice this means co-ordinating and reconciling the various sectors which 
affect members of families as citizens, for example social security, working 
life,  education,  environment,  consumer  interests,  housing,  traffic,  mass 
media, tourism.' 
The  fundamental  documents  prescribe  rights  and  standards,  and  the 
recommendations represent aspirations rather than reality. Overall, the Council of 
Europe seeks to ensure that there is a careful monitoring of developments and 
progress. In addition to the formal collation and exchange of information between 
member states the Council of Europe also sponsors conferences and supports 
comparative studies including work, most recently,  on 'the social  and family 
consequences and costs of the unemployment of young people'. 
Conclusion 
There has been clear evidence of the importance of families, children and family 
policies moving closer to the heart of European public policy.  In part this was 
stimulated, during 1994,  by the International Year  of the Family, to which the 
European Union made a distinguished and distinctive contribution.  But it was 
the  salience,  above  all,  of  continuing  demographic  change,  labour  market 
restructuring and other social changes which applied pressure on policy makers, 
opinion formers, researchers and practitioners to address the needs of families.  In 
this Report we examine some of the changes which are occurring as a contribution 
to the developing debate. CHAPTER TWO 
Building the Socio-Political Status of the 
Family in the European Union 
A picture of the family and family policy in the countries of the European Union 
can  be  gained  from  the  detailed  account  given  in  the  companion  volume 
(European  Observatory  on  National  Family  Policies,  1995)  of  indicators  of 
behaviour, measures and mechanisms as far as 1994 and the beginning of 1995 are 
concerned.  Yet the family in the countries of the European Union is also being 
built through the values it brings into play and the ways it is perceived socially. 
These are revealed, in particular, in the opinions expressed by citizens of the 
various  countries,  in  family  behaviour  itself,  in  the  content  of  the  policies 
implemented and in the legal mechanisms put in place. 
The purpose of this chapter is to try to draw out some of these values and social 
perceptions within the framework of a sociological approach relying on both the 
information provided in the national report (EONFP, 1995) and the other chapters 
of this Volume and on publications beyond the scope of the Observatory, mainly 
the Eurobarometer report on Europeans and the family (CEC, 1993).  We shall not try 
to fudge the difficulties involved, which are mainly related to the time frame of 
the Observatory's work and handling the comparative dimension. 
The bulk of the Observatory's activity is devoted to observing the status and 
development of family behaviour and policies.  We shall call this a sociography of 
the family and family policies within the framework of the European Union, 
which fits in quite well with annual report production.  This is certainly less true 
as far as analysis is concerned, which cannot be easily restricted to the frame of 
one year.  Any interpretation of what the developments mean or what makes up 
the socio-political status of the family in the countries of the European Union, 
observed here on the basis of the values and social perceptions connected with the 
family, is undertaken with reference to factors which, for the most part, are more 
of a structural nature (i.e. occurring over time or during the course of history), than 
related to the economic climate.  However, observations made over one year refer 
above all to economic considerations. 
There is  thus a  discrepancy which must not be neglected.  It is,  moreover,  a 
discrepancy with which one must come to terms, inasmuch as the work of the 
Observatory cannot be merely descriptive, but must also be analytical. It  is the key 
objective of the Observatory to make comparisons between the different European 
Union countries.  Recently,  we have been led to  reflect  on the potential and 
limitations of such comparative work (Commaille and de Singly, 1995).  This ties 
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in with new developments which the Observatory might have to take on board in 
future.  What comes out strongly is the need to get away from simply contrasting 
the convergences and divergences  of circumstances  and developments in  the 
different  European  Union  countries.  Observations  in  this  regard  should be 
relativized, while their interpretation should become more complex.  Analysis 
often  stresses  clear-cut  differences  between  certain  countries  or  displays  a 
powerful trend towards homogenization.  Perhaps it would be more appropriate 
to imagine the European family sphere as an area of tension between different 
types of logic which may each take greater significance in one or other country 
depending on its history or traditions, a particular context or economic climate. 
We shall come back to this viewpoint on comparison and give examples in our 
subsequent remarks, which are organized in the following manner. 
Over and above the transformation in family behaviour which could suggest not 
only that the family is being redefined but that the very notion of the family is 
being undermined, the family continues to  represent a  value in opinions and 
prescriptive references.  This is  what can be demonstrated initially,  based on 
observations of legal mechanisms and on the results of opinion surveys (CEC, 
1993). 
However, placing the family in perspective at European level has at least the 
virtue of reminding us that what we call  'the family'  is  in no way a  natural 
phenomenon. It  is a social construct which establishes itself on the basis of factors 
that can be listed and defined.  The values and social perceptions connected with 
the  family  derive  from  that  social  construct  and  the,  possibly  different, 
combinations which make it up from country to country.  This is what we shall 
deal with in the second section. 
The family,  the product of a  social construct, is also the product of a  political 
construct.  It will be argued in the third part of this chapter that society and the 
state in the various countries operate in the family sphere according to broad aims 
laid out as a series of alternatives.  These form the basis for family policies, which 
interact with the values and social perceptions which make up the reality of the 
family in the European Union countries just as much as behaviour. 
The family as a value 
There is nothing better than legal mechanisms to show that the family continues 
to  represent an important value in the European Union.  The law here is not 
necessarily a reflection of behaviour and how it is evolving.  It also bears witness 
to a kind of ideal that a society sets itself or wishes to preserve - or which certain 
fractions of society wish to preserve.  This is what has been called the symbolic 
function of law, which does indeed, in this case in the family sphere, sometimes 
aim more to convey a certain image of the family rather than to claim to control or 
modify real behaviour. 
It  is therefore not surprising that one can observe stability in European legislation 
governing  what  constitutes  a  couple.  The  legal  status  of  marriage  is  not 
undergoing any major transformation.  Marriage remains the principal reference 
in what might be called the mechanisms for social control of the family.  As if to 
echo this, social perceptions of marriage remain extremely positive if one refers to 
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matter of  'giving  into  social  pressure',  'getting bogged  down in routine',  or 
'unnecessarily  turning  a  private  matter  into  something  official',  than  of 
'committing oneself to be faithful',  'being the best way to guarantee children's 
rights' or 'proving one's love for the other person' (CEC, 1993). 
A kind of symbolic reference to the couple and the family is thus maintained both 
in formal mechanisms and social perceptions.  This constancy is,  of course, in 
contrast  to  the  marked  shift  in  behaviour,  showing  up  especially  in  the 
pronounced  decrease  in  the  number  of  marriages  (600,000  fewer  marriages 
throughout the European Union between 1970 and 1992), which is  only partly 
explained by the trend towards later marriages and a constantly rising average 
age for  getting married; the major increase in the number of divorces  (from 
150,000 in 1960 to 550,000 in 1991); and the development of types of relationships 
which are not sanctioned by marriage (Begeot and Fernandez-Cardon, 1995). 
It seems as if all the member states of the European Union are facing a kind of 
dilemma: preserving meta-references for the family and, at the same time, taking 
account  of  the  shift  in  behaviour.  Being  faced  with a  dilemma  may mean 
hesitating.  The lack of legal sanction for the so-called 'reconstituted' family seems 
to be one of the manifestations, illustrated in particular by the lack of legal status 
for the 'step parent'  (Meulders-Klein, 1995). 
However, the existence of new family configurations is a fact which states can no 
longer evade.  Mary-Ann Glendon, on the basis of a comparative approach to 
western countries, has observed that legal mechanisms are made up less and less 
of prescriptive rules regarding family behaviour (for example, on divorce, which 
is increasingly the subject of a simple declaration rather than based on attributing 
blame),  while  increasingly  being  called  upon  to  take  account  of  the  social 
consequences of family situations chosen by individuals (Glendon, 1989). 
This is certainly the case for unions which are not sanctioned by marriage, i.e. 
people living together outside marriage. It  is not a matter of making a judgement, 
but rather of facing up to the move from principled prescriptiveness to managerial 
prescriptiveness.  This could be the meaning of European opinion on the matter 
on the one hand and, on the other, policies implemented on the basis of legal 
mechanisms. 
When asked to give their opinion on such relationships, more than three out of 
five Europeans reply that 'it is not for others to judge' (CEC, 1993, pp 85-89).  As 
for legislation, this seems to be mainly invoked with a view to social coherence. 
Liberalities between cohabitees are thus generally accepted, which is, moreover, in 
accordance  with  the  recommendation  of  the  Ministerial  Committee  of  the 
European Council dated 7 March 1988 (Rubellin-Devichi, 1995).  The extension of 
social benefits (for instance in terms of social security, pension rights or housing) 
is increasingly common.  Along the same lines, the very marked growth in births 
outside marriage (from 4.6 per cent of live births in 1965 to 19.5 per cent in 1991) 
(Begeot  and  Fernandez-Cardon,  1995)  has  parallelled  the  almost  universal 
granting of equality to  children born within and outside marriage (Rubellin-
Devichi, 1995). 
Yet this increasingly extensive recognition of cohabitation outside marriage does 
not seem to signify that this type of relationship is genuinely being placed on the 
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in all countries of the European Union are taxed separately and have the same 
rights as married couples in respect of adoption or medically assisted fertility 
treatment). 
Even though the expansion of these types of relationships seems to have provided 
an opportunity for some countries to recall the pre-eminence of the rights of the 
individual (we shall come back to this aspect later), the general tendency does 
seem to derive first of all from a concern socially to manage all the consequences 
of these choices made by individuals in organizing their private lives. 
The status of the family in Europe which emerges from the opinions of citizens 
and the rules which govern it thus seems to be full of ambiguity.  The societies 
concerned  take  note  of  the  changes  in  family  behaviour,  but  rather  than 
sanctioning or even promoting the new models implied by such new behaviour, 
they tolerate it.  It is not yet quite clear what position to take in relation to these 
models, as if the changes, beyond the concern they may arouse as to their social 
effects, have taken away all certainty about what the family is and should be. 
This leaves us with founding  principles  such as the rules of marriage and social 
perceptions of the family, which in general still have a strong positive connotation: 
96 per cent of Europeans place the family high on the list of 'quite important' areas 
of life, although there are slight variations depending on sex (women are more 
likely than men to place the family first), age (the family is mentioned more often 
with advancing age), family circumstances (parents are more inclined to stress the 
importance of the family than non-parents), or matrimonial status (single people 
distance themselves more from the family) (CEC 1993,  pp 77-83). 
The family continues to represent a strong value within the European Union, even 
though its definition may be increasingly uncertain and the expectations which 
individuals (looking for 'private happiness' and claiming their entitlements) and 
states (in pursuit of the general good) place in it are fundamentally contradictory. 
The lists of national provisions for 1994 to early 1995 do not seem to belie this 
consideration. 
The family as a social construct 
Acknowledging  the  type  of evidence  about  the  family  which  we  have  just 
stressed, at the level of perceptions and social control, certainly does not entitle us 
to come to conclusions about its naturalness.  Comparing family behaviour, social 
perceptions  of  the  family  (which  vary  from  country  to  country)  and  the 
institutional, legal and political arrangements which surround it, shows that the 
idea of the family is constructed in accordance with different combinations of 
factors  depending  on the  country concerned.  The  fact  that  observing  legal 
mechanisms in the various countries of the European Union reveals differences 
rather than a  type of general convergence (Rubellin-Devichi, 1995)  means that 
features specific to different nations remain. 
These derive in particular from the place given to the family in social perceptions. 
For instance, in the Netherlands, the expressions 'primary forms of living' and 
'households' have over the last three decades or so tended to replace 'family' or 
'nuclear family', bearing witness to a desire for neutrality with regard to all ways 
of organizing private life.  Such a situation may be explained with reference to 
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We are acquainted with the philosophical tradition of a liberal society like Britain 
which leads to state intervention being seen a priori as an intrusion into the private 
domain: the family and personal relationships.  This is why, for example, the UK 
is not opposed to the text of the European Directive on parental leave proposed as 
part of the programme on equal opportunity for men and women, except with a 
dispensation limiting the scope of parental leave to mothers. 
The  position  of Germany with  regard  to  the  family  is  itself  marked by the 
principle of dual subsidiarity deriving from the wide powers of the various local 
authorities  and  the  major  importance  given  to  non-governmental  bodies  as 
opposed to public institutions.  This is shown by the existence of facilities such as 
kindergartens or creches which are mainly in the private sector. 
In Ireland, the influence of the Catholic Church pushes to the fore religious and 
cultural values which make the family a private matter. It is therefore not a matter 
of 'replacing the family  and its duties', but of providing one-off responses to 
specific problems where necessary. 
These three countries merely serve here as examples to stress the importance of 
taking into account what we shall call macro-social variables when attempting a 
comparative reading of national data on family behaviour and instruments of 
family  policy.  These  macro-social variables also derive from  the interplay of 
families  (behaviour, attitudes to  the family,  aspirations and so on),  organized 
social movements likely to represent them (associations, militant, family, feminist, 
social  and  trade  union  movements  etc),  state  (particularly  social  services), 
voluntary or private institutions, the government political apparatus and political 
party formations. 
These macro-social variables make a contribution to the construction of national 
family  policy  models  which  will  be  explored  in  future  analyses.  Better 
understanding  of  these  national  models  might  make  it  possible  to  improve 
understanding and prediction of those changes, whether they be regressive or 
progressive, which affect family policies. 
Amongst the regressive  movements, we might take  the  example of shifts  in 
position regarding abortion, within the framework of extremely lively debates 
which have developed recently in several European Union countries (especially in 
Germany, Ireland and Italy, as well as in Spain)  (Dumon, 1994). The desire to 
come back to traditional values for the family,  reflected in English conservative 
opinion amongst others, is another example, especially when that desire means 
calling into question social benefits seen as encouraging family break-down, or 
making divorce more difficult or developing mediation services to try to reconcile 
spouses before divorce (Morgan, 1995). 
Amongst the progressive movements, we could quote the example of recognition 
of homosexual couples.  Even though the European Court did not accept the 
interpretation of the provisions laid down in the European Convention on Human 
Rights, according to which the right to homosexual marriage could be protected, 
countries  in  Northern  Europe  have  already  accepted  this  type  of  marriage 
between people of the same sex (in Denmark as per the law dated 7 June 1989, in 
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'partnership contract').  Such recognition is also foreseen in a bill submitted to the 
Dutch parliament, which suggests that 'when the law refers  to  marriage and 
spouses,  it  automatically  includes  homosexual  cohabitees'  (Rubellin-Devichi, 
1995).  It is thus quite different from provisions in other countries, such as France, 
which merely aim to ward off some of the consequences which might arise from 
living together. 
Any interpretation of such contrasts and differences between countries can only 
be conducted precisely with reference to the macro-social variables and national 
models which make the family and the social perceptions relating to it a social 
construct. 
The family as a political construct 
Can the  wide diversity  of  measures  taken by various  member states  of  the 
European Union over a given period be arranged along broad lines which would 
correspond to major principles of family policy? After attempting to approach the 
issue of the family within the European Union on the basis of what the family 
genuinely  represents  as  a  value,  and  having  highlighted  the  many  factors 
influencing the social make-up of the family,  would it be possible to focus  the 
analysis more precisely on what underpins government policy on the subject? 
We  shall choose to  give priority to  three broad lines,  each having two major 
polarities, so that government policy towards families in the European Union may 
be  positioned  in  accordance  with three  major  alternatives:  institution versus 
individual, prescriptive logic versus social logic, the family as a private matter 
versus the family as a matter for the state. 
Institution versus individual 
Changes in family behaviour over recent decades have been interpreted as part of 
a phenomenon of de-institutionalization of the family.  According to a holistic 
concept  which  predominated  in  traditional  societies,  the  relationship  of  the 
individual to the family was related to his/her status as a mere part of a group, 
subject above all to collective interests (man being one of the elements making up 
a whole which is assigned to a place in a closely integrated social sphere). Getting 
married is not just to sanction a relationship with a partner, but to accomplish a 
social  act in accordance with the demands of the communities to  which one 
belongs. 
'Privatization' of family behaviour, that is, the organization by individuals of their 
private domain in accordance with their own aspirations, marks the advent of an 
individualistic concept where the interests of the individual take precedence over 
those of the community.  This is  a  powerful trend  which is  appearing in all 
industrialized  societies,  including  the  European  Union.  However,  different 
traditions still lie behind this powerful trend.  Individualism has been present for 
a  long time,  for  instance in Northern European countries.  This  explains  the 
particular tone of family policies there, with greater stress being placed on the 
status of individuals within the family, especially the question of equality between 
men and women.  This basic conception does indeed fit in with the idea that 'the 
family does not exist as such, but only as one of the places in which individuals 
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It is in opposition to another concept, which is, for example, more widespread in 
Latin countries under the influence of the Catholic Church, according to which the 
family is first and foremost an institution.  According to this second concept, the 
family is initially perceived on the basis of the social functions it is expected to 
fulfil.  These  functions  of  biological  reproduction,  social  reproduction  and 
socialization are deemed vital for the future of the society and this justifies the 
public authorities' efforts to encourage and regulate them. 
To  use terminology borrowed from the legal world, the family is not here of a 
private nature, but  first of all of a public nature.  To give an example, France is a 
country which implemented an ambitious family policy after the Second World 
War.  This policy was based on that concept; it was in line with traditions where 
the family  could have a  presence:  either in a  relationship of fusion  with the 
political order (political society is built on the idea of the family and vice versa), 
or in a supervisory relationship (in view of the strategic importance of the family 
for society, the state may claim the right to monitor the functioning of the family 
closely and even, in some cases, decide itself to take on certain functions essential 
to the community). 
Beyond  what we  might  call  the  historical  inertia  which  lies  behind  specific 
national characteristics, this institution versus individual alternative is liable to 
influence family policies in all countries of the European Union.  Bearing in mind 
the stakes which the family and the individuals which make it up represent for 
any society, states may in fact, whatever the traditions from which their actions 
draw  inspiration,  'move  the  cursor'  from  the  'institution'  polarity  to  the 
'individual'  polarity,  depending  on  what  they  consider  is  required  by  the 
circumstances (arising from changes in individual behaviour towards the family, 
or from the aspirations of the citizens). 
The growth in numbers of couples living together outside marriage, which we 
have already mentioned, is thus a phenomenon to which states react differently. 
Even though, during the period 1994- beginning 1995, this form of relationship 
was not the subject of any genuine legal recognition but merely benefitted from 
additional measures taken in certain countries of the European Union, the fact 
remains  that  its  basic  status may vary considerably:  from  acceptance  of the 
principle of 'equality of conjugal modes' (Rubellin-Devichi, 1995), represented by 
a build-up of provisions, through to reticence justified by the threat this type of 
relationship could present to the institution of marriage (for instance in Germany 
where, by virtue of constitutional protection of marriage) there is a desire to limit 
the social benefits granted to cohabitees. 
Of course, different policies are matched by different perceptions on the part of 
national opinion. It  is probably significant to note here that the Danes are the most 
favourably disposed towards cohabitation (almost 80 per cent of them consider 
that 'it is  not for  others to judge' against an average of 63.3  per cent for  the 
European Union as a  whole) (CEC,  1993,  pp 86-89).  Yet  more than a  third of 
Greeks think that living together is a bad thing (13.8 per cent for the whole of the 
European Union) (ibid pp 86-89). 
These contrasts show up again in connection with the rights of homosexuals, if 
one looks at a first group made up of Denmark, the Netherlands and Spain where 
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married, to enjoy the same advantages as married couples to inherit each other's 
property' and, in a slightly smaller proportion, 'should be able to adopt children' 
(ibid pp 93).  On the other hand, in a  second group made up of Greece and 
Portugal, two-thirds of respondents think that homosexuals should not be able to 
enjoy any of these rights (ibid pp 94-95). 
The institution versus individual alternative is likely to come into play not only in 
relation to the ways  couples are made up, but also in accordance with the roles 
performed within and outside the family  (parental roles  and involvement in 
professional activity). 
As far as professional activity is concerned, the member states of the European 
Union are witnessing, to varying degrees, the phenomenon of the increasingly 
common professional involvement of women. The proportion of working women 
went from 40  to 44  per cent between 1986 and 1993  throughout the European 
Union (Begeot and Fernandez-Cardon, 1995; Hantrais, 1995).  It is interesting to 
note  here  that  in  Denmark,  as  in  other Nordic  countries,  women's level  of 
professional activity is almost equivalent to that of men. This position is in strong 
contrast to that occupied by a group of countries where this level is low: Spain (33 
per cent), Greece and Italy (34 per cent) (Hantrais, 1995). 
The overall increase in women's professional activity is due less to a  massive 
influx of women, of whatever age, into the job market, than to their continuing to 
work as they get older, i.e. following a behavioural pattern which has long existed 
in the Nordic countries and which, having spread into countries in the centre of 
the European Union, is now beginning to reach the countries of Southern Europe. 
We  may indeed  suspect  here,  beyond  the  determinations specific  to  the job 
market, the influence of cultural models in which women are coming to be seen 
no longer as merely part of an institution such as the family but as individuals. 
The self-realization of those individuals can occur through something other than 
exclusive investment in the family.  This appears to be confirmed by the opinions 
expressed by Europeans with regard to working mothers.  The Danes are less 
favourable  than  others  to  the  idea  of  'mothers  staying  at  home'  and  more 
favourable than others to the idea that 'mothers should continue to work outside 
the home', which contrasts, for instance, with the opinions of the Germans and 
Portuguese, who are still very attached to the idea of the mother staying at home 
to look after the children (CEC, 1993). 
Such  variations  have  repercussions  on  national  policies  regarding  the 
reconciliation of professional and family life.  By way of example, while Denmark 
is developing a policy which aims above all to ensure gender equality (Hantrais 
and Mangen, 1993)  and is  therefore concerned with the status of individuals 
making up the family rather than with the family institution as such, Germany 
seems more interested in 'reinforcing the traditional image of the caring role of the 
mother'.  The same goes for most countries of Southern Europe which continue, 
especially under economic pressure (with high rates of unemployment and social 
exclusion), to give great importance to the family and kinship network rather than 
developing an ambitious policy of reconciling work and family life  (Hantrais, 
1995). 
Existing provisions in respect of flexible  working conditions or child care,  as 
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background of these general concepts.  Promotion of part-time work and child 
care modalities in Denmark thus fits logically with the pursuit of an aim to involve 
both men and women in the problems of reconciling work and family life, by 
virtue of the principle of sexual equality. Measures in favour of part-time working 
in  the  United  Kingdom  or  even  in  France  certainly  do  not  have  the  same 
significance if  one considers that, in reality, they only concern women. 
We should say finally that the way the issue of reconciling work and family life is 
handled by European Union countries is defined in accordance with a concept of 
the respective status of men and women as individuals, to a greater or lesser extent 
vis-a-vis the family institution. 
The question of parental roles presents the same challenges since, as we have just 
seen,  it  is  part  of  the  same  issue.  We  might  perhaps  hypothesize  about  a 
weakening of the institutional concept of the family, with differentiated conjugal 
and parental roles, based on the more and more frequently expressed concerns 
about the role of the father in cases of divorce and separation.  Even though, in all 
European Union countries (with provision for divorce), custody of children after 
divorce or separation is in the vast majority of cases given to the mother, some 
countries are increasingly raising the issue of fathers' rights (e.g. the Netherlands, 
United Kingdom and France).  However, it is no doubt significant that this issue 
is not on the agenda in most Latin countries. 
Legal recognition of the idea of joint parental authority is yet another way of 
recognizing the roles of both father and mother.  Such legal recognition is found, 
according to different modalities, in most countries of the European Union even 
though, in practice, there is a great distance between Spain where 'the general rule 
is that the husband no longer enjoys supremacy, the two parents being equally 
entrusted with exercising parental authority' and Germany, where German judges 
make  very  little  use  of  the  option  of  joint  parental  authority  after  divorce 
(Rubellin-Devichi, 1995). 
In fact,  more generally, the idea that maternal and paternal roles can to some 
extent be bi-lateral is  still far from carrying all before it.  If one judges by the 
opinions expressed by Europeans on tasks to be performed on a child's behalf, 
only the Danes and the Dutch seem to have 'begun a process of "depolarizing" 
paternal and maternal roles', while the Germans (former West Germany) and the 
Greeks are among those with a larger proportion of respondents thinking that 
bringing up children is a matter for the mother alone (CEC, 1993). 
The way in which the problem of parental representation in certain institutions 
(such as schools or health boards) will be handled in coming years will probably 
be revealing with regard to these concepts of the status of individuals within the 
family.  During the period 1994-beginning 1995, this problem has apparently only 
been dealt with in three countries- Netherlands, United Kingdom and Denmark 
-as far as representation within educational establishments is concerned. 
The promotion of children's rights could also be one illustration of the increasing 
stress  placed  on  the  individual  rather  than  on  the  family  institution.  The 
ratification by European countries of the United Nations Convention on the rights 
of the child has encouraged a  trend towards giving autonomy to children in 
relation to their families.  This increasing autonomy is shown, for instance, by the 
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influence over decisions concerning them (Eekelaar, 1995.)  Denmark leads the 
field here again, since it is  the country which gives children the most rights to 
autonomy,  unlike  Greece  or  Italy  where  parental  authority  remains  almost 
absolute.  The most exemplary expression of this development can perhaps be 
seen in the recent British provisions which, under certain circumstances, allow 
children to  approach the courts, independently of their parents, about matters 
concerning their upbringing (ibid).  In several other countries, children have the 
right to be heard in connection with their parents' divorce proceedings (in France, 
children can even be represented separately from their parents). 
Prescriptive logic versus social logic 
We have already mentioned the prescriptive logic versus social logic alternative in 
relation to new forms  of relationship.  The general trend in European Union 
countries, as in all industrialized societies, would seem in fact to be less towards 
exerting  social  control  over  the  way individuals  organize  their  private  lives 
(reflected in increasing neutrality in respect of the formation and breaking up of 
couples), than towards dealing with the social consequences of these increasingly 
'privatized' practices. 
However,  we  may  ask  whether  what  we  have  just  considered,  within  the 
framework  of  the  institution/individual  alternative,  to  be  evidence  of  the 
increasing pre-eminence of the individual may lead to the implementation of a 
new prescriptive logic within the family sphere.  This would no longer aim to 
protect the family as an entity (for instance by prohibiting divorce or making it 
difficult), but to protect individuals within the family, possibly against the family. 
It is in this light that we see the increasing concern being shown in European 
Union countries about domestic violence  (violence between spouses, parental 
violence against children).  This concern is expressed either by the establishment 
of repressive legislation, as in Germany or in France, regarding marital rape, or by 
the establishment of,  or support for,  networks of agencies  (in most European 
Union  countries,  but in  varying  forms)  designed  to  assist  women  who  are 
subjected to violence by their partners. 
In the same way, child protection networks are being set up, breathing new life 
into that 'state guardianship' which is  one of the symbols of the welfare state 
(Eekelaar, 1995) and going so far, in certain cases, as to remove children from their 
parents'  care  (for  instance,  there  is  now  a  broader  range  of  circumstances 
authorizing such removal in the Netherlands). 
The family as a private matter versus the family as a matter for the state 
We  have already seen that the 'privatization' of family behaviour in no way 
implies a withdrawal of the state from family affairs, especially in view of the 
social consequences which are likely to arise.  As has already been shown, the 
paradox contained in developments in this regard is that a liberalization of the 
rules on family formation and functioning has encouraged an extension of state 
intervention  as  a  palliative  to  the  social  consequences  of  such  liberalization 
(Schultheis, n.d.). 
Of course, this  powerful trend is  still  subject to variations depending on the 
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regard to the place of the state in regulating private behaviour.  The fact remains 
that the private matter versus state matter alternative is likely to take on great 
importance in future, to judge by the issues which have been the subject of policy 
measures or debates during the period 1994- beginning 1995 (without here going 
into the debates about the 'perverse effects' produced by certain benefits - for 
instance for lone parent families; these perverse effects are said to encourage the 
withdrawal of the state and the restoration of individual responsibility).  This 
applies to the problem of protecting women in their reproductive functions and, 
perhaps more so, to the problem of intergenerational solidarity. 
In  the  first  case,  most European Union countries  have taken account  of  the 
Directive of 19th October 1992 concerning the protection of pregnant women in 
the work place, that is to say that they have, in general, strengthened already 
existing legislation.  In the second case, the scale of the problem is very likely to 
increase in view of the ageing of the population and the imbalances that this 
causes, especially in resource distribution between children and young people on 
the one hand and elderly people on the other (Sgritta, 1995), as well as the issues 
this raises with regard to the care of elderly people, by the family and by the 
community. 
Examination of national situations over the period 1994- beginning 1995 shows 
how acute the problem is and how the various European Union countries are 
seeking  to  strike  a  balance  between  family  mobilization  and  community 
assistance, whether the latter takes the form of public assistance, developing a 
private sector or voluntary assistance. 
In any event, community assistance has to be funded somehow.  This latter factor 
will certainly have a very heavy influence on the way European Union countries 
deal in future with the family matter versus state matter alternative, in a situation 
where public expenditure is to be restricted and, consequently, social protection is 
to be limited.  In such a context, fundamental issues about the role of the state are 
inseparable from  those relating to  the 'targets' of policy (families of whatever 
configuration, the unemployed, elderly people).  These should in future be at the 
heart of debate on family policies in the European Union, tempered by those 
specific national features on which we have laid so much stress in this chapter. CHAPTER THREE 
Demography and Changing Family Forms 
Introduction 
National family policies and indeed any policy affecting families have to operate 
in the context of the demographic characteristics of that country. Policy has to 
adapt and change as the size and structure of the population changes. However, 
policy is not just a handmaiden of demography: the relationship is not only one 
way- the demography of a country can also be influenced by policy. 
Policy can have some influence on whether and when people live with a partner 
and  marry,  when they have children and how many they have,  when their 
children finish education and training, when they leave the parental home and 
when they start work. Policy can also affect the age at which people retire and 
even when and where they die. Policy is more or less relevant to people's lives 
from  the cradle to  the grave. Though policy may not be the most important 
determinant  of  these  kinds  of  behaviour,  it  is  certainly  one  influence.  By 
influencing behaviour, policy affects the demography of a nation. 
Nevertheless, it is quite clear that policy itself has to adapt to the size and age 
structure of the population. At one end of the life-cycle, maternity and child health 
services,  pre-school  provision,  primary and  secondary school  class  sizes,  the 
demand for teachers and expenditure on family benefits are all heavily influenced 
by fluctuations in the birth rate. At the other end, earlier fluctuations in fertility, 
migration,  life-expectancy  and  mortality  determine  the  number  of  people 
receiving benefits in retirement, demands for health and personal social services 
and, in the end, even demand for burial or crematorium services. In between, 
demographic trends have a profound impact on demand for further education, 
labour supply, demand for housing of different sizes and types and the caring 
capacity of the community- to name but a few aspects. 
It is for these reasons that in order to understand national family policies and the 
way they change, we need also to have an understanding of the changing form of 
families  in different countries.  This  is  particularly important at the moment 
because although the size of the populations of the countries of the EU is fairly 
stable, the structure of those populations is in the process of very dramatic change. 
In particular,  there are three inter-related trends  of particular significance for 
family policy- the collapse in fertility in all EU countries, the rapid changes taking 
place  in  family  form  evident  in  most  EU  countries  and  the  ageing  of  EU 
populations. These three trends will be reviewed in this chapter (though focusing 
on these trends it is not denied that changing employment patterns, migration and 
other demographic trends are also very important to family policy). 
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Sources of comparative demographic statistics 
Until recently the student of comparative demography had to rely on a number of 
rather unsatisfactory sources.  There  were  the regular reports of international 
organisations  which  produced  more  or  less  useful  population  statistics  (for 
example UNICEF, 1989; United Nations, 1993).  The regular reports of the OECD 
contain useful comparisons of population structures and the OECD also produces 
ad  hoc  studies from time to time with useful comparative population data (for 
example OECD, 1990; OECD, 1993; OECD, 1994). The Council of Europe produces 
an annual review which is extremely useful (Council of Europe, 1994). Then there 
are ad  hoc  studies undertaken by national statistical bureaux - for example, the 
Office  of  Population Censuses and Surveys  (UK)  in its  quarterly publication 
Population  Trends  produces  articles  which  sometimes  draw  on  primary 
comparative studies  (for  example Begeot,  Smith and  Pearce  1993).  There are 
studies such as the Luxembourg Income Study which generate demographic data 
as a by-product of the analysis of their comparative data sets. Finally there are 
other ad hoc comparative studies on specific topics which collect material which 
contributes to a comparative data base (for example see Bradshaw et al1996). At 
the EU level, until recently, we have had to rely on data collected on an ad hoc basis 
either  through  National  Round  Tables  or  more  recently  through  national 
informants in the observatories and networks (Fernandez-Cardon, 1994). 
However, Eurostat now collects, analyses and presents comparative demographic 
data. This effort was sanctioned by the Treaty of Maastricht which required the 
Commission 'to draw up a report each year on progress in achieving the objective 
of Article 1, including the demographic situation in the Community'. As well as 
the annual Demographic  Statistics,  Eurostat provides the Commission with the 
material produced as The Demographic Situation in the European Union  (CEC, 1995) 
and also Major  Issues  in  European  Demography  (CEC,  1994).  There is  also  the 
Eurostat Conference report Human  Resources  in  Europe  at  the  dawn  of the  21st 
century  (Eurostat, 1992a).  In addition, Eurostat publishes a variety of papers 
containing data on different aspects of the European demographic scene. Together 
these are the main source for the material in this chapter.  A developing research 
programme on the subject of demography has been initiated and funded by the 
European Commission. 
Population size 
All the EU countries undertook censuses in 1990  or 1991.  Table 3.1  shows that 
estimates of population size in 1994 vary from 81.3 million in Germany  to only 
385,000 in Luxembourg. The table also shows that since 1950 all the EU countries 
have experienced growth in their populations ranging from an average of 0.27 per 
cent per annum in the UK to 0.90 per cent per annum in the Netherlands.  There 
was a slowing in the annual average rate of growth in all countries in the 1980s 
and in Denmark and Portugal there was hardly any growth at all. 
Population growth rates are a function of fertility, migration and mortality and the 
relative contribution of each of these factors has varied from country to country 
and  over  time.  Estimates  have  been  made  of  the  likely  future  size  of  the 
populations of EU  countries. The higher of these estimates envisages average 
growth of 0.57 per cent per year between 1993  and 2020.  The lower estimates 
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Table 3.1: Population size and population growth 
Country  Population  Annual o/o  Annual o/o 
(millions)  increase  increase 
1994  1950-1990  1980-1990 
Belgium  10.1  0.32  0.13 
Denmark  5.2  0.37  0.04 
Germany  81.3  0.29  0.17 
Greece  10.4  0.59  0.53 
Spain  39.1  0.66  0.29 
France  57.8  0.57  0.42 
Ireland  3.6  0.35  0.24 
Italy  56.9  0.39  0.14 
Luxembourg  0.4  0.56  0.54 
Netherlands  15.3  0.90  0.58 
Portugal  9.9  0.31  0.03 
United Kingdom  58.2  0.27  0.23 
Sources: Begeot, Smith and Pearce (1993) Table 1, Council of Europe (1994), Eurostat (1995) 
and reductions in the population in every country except France, Netherlands and 
Portugal during that period. 
The population of Europe is a declining proportion of the world population as 
well as  a  declining proportion of the  population of the industrialised world. 
Variations in the growth rates within the EU will (obviously) change the relative 
proportions of the overall EU  population contributed by the different member 
states. Between 1980 and 2020 the percentages of the population who are French, 
Dutch, Portuguese, Greek and Spanish is expected to grow while the proportion 
who are Italian, German and British is expected to decline. 
Given the relative stability of the EU population, age structure is more important 
than population size. The most important determinant of the age structure is past 
and present fertility rates. 
Fertility 
Fertility (or rather the Total Period Fertility Rate) is a measure of the number of 
children each woman will have during her child-bearing life.  In order for  the 
population to reproduce itself each woman needs to have 2.1  children. Table 3.2 
shows that every country in the EU had a fertility rate in 1993 below replacement 
level. Ireland's fertility rate had for some time been an outlier in this respect but 
as a result of an extraordinarily rapid decline in fertility,  Ireland reached sub-
replacement fertility  in  1993.  Although southern  EU  countries  fertility  levels 
began to fall in the late 1970s (about a decade after the northern countries), they 
have  rapidly  caught  up  and  indeed,  overtaken  the  northern  countries.  For 
example Spain and Italy now have the lowest fertility rates in Europe and indeed 28  A Synthesis of National Family Policies 1994 
the industrial world. This seeming uniformity in fertility rates masks considerable 
variations in how they are achieved - thus in Denmark, the UK and France there 
are high levels of births outside marriage. In Germany there are high proportions 
of childless women. In France there are fewer women without children but more 
one child families (Eurostat, 1992b). 
Despite a considerable literature on the subject, no entirely satisfactory (or rather 
simple) explanation has been produced for fluctuations in fertility. A two volume 
five country EC/Eurostat study concluded 'that there is no identifiable stable link 
between labour force  participation and fertility  outcomes. However there is  a 
process  of joint determination, affected  by macroeconomic situations and the 
cultural and social fabric' (Eurostat, 1991, volume 1, para 16). There is no doubt 
that birth control technology and abortion have enabled women to separate sexual 
activity from child rearing, to delay marriage and defer child bearing. This has 
been associated with an increased participation of women in paid employment. 
Participation in work can lead to further delay in child rearing because added to 
the  not  inconsiderable  direct  costs  of  having  a  child,  are  the  indirect  or 
opportunity costs of lost earnings, foregone promotion prospects, lost pension 
rights and so on.  Increased opportunities for  women in the expanding service 
sector,  rising real  earnings and rising earnings relative to men's in  most EU 
countries further increase these costs. Economic independence is associated with 
increased relationship breakdown, which not only interrupts child bearing but 
makes it even more risky and more important for a woman to remain in the labour 
market, given the high risks of poverty for lone parents. The economic recession 
of the early 1990s may have also made a contribution, as it undoubtedly did in the 
1930s. 
There are some demographers (for example Brass, 1989)  who believe that this 
decline in fertility is merely delay- a generation of women have chosen to have 
their babies in their thirties rather than their twenties. It  is argued that fertility will 
catch up as they have their babies later. It  is true that the decline in fertility in some 
northern EU countries ceased during the 1980s and there is some evidence of a 
recovery of fertility  in some (Scandinavian)  countries in recent years.  This  is 
because the age-specific fertility rates in those countries have been increasing for 
the over 30s. But there is no EU  country whose fertility rate has recovered to 
replacement level as yet and in the UK and the Nordic countries, where fertility 
began to recover earliest, it has stuck at sub-replacement level and indeed begun 
to fall  again.  Many of the countries that began the fertility  decline have now 
experienced nearly a child bearing generation at sub-replacement level: thus it is 
too late to catch up. Meanwhile the labour supply of married women continues to 
increase  as  does  marital  disruption.  Family  planning  technology  is  likely  to 
become more efficient with the male contraceptive pill and the abortion pill. There 
is little or no evidence that men are adapting their behaviour to make it easier for 
women to be mothers and workers. All this suggests that fertility is likely to 
remain at low levels or continue to decline. 
One  obvious  question  is  whether  it  matters  that  fertility  continues  at  sub-
replacement level? Given the lack of concern in most EU countries, the answer is 
clearly no. Indeed in the short term reductions in fertility, particularly if the rate 
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Table 3.2: Total period fertility rates 1970, 1980, 1990, 1993 
Country  1970  1980  1990  1993 
Belgium  2.25  1.69  1.61  1.59 
Denmark  1.95  1.55  1.67  1.75 
Germany  2.02  1.45  1.50  1.28 
Greece  2.34  2.23  1.43  1.34 
Spain  2.84  2.22  1.30  1.26 
France  2.48  1.95  1.80  1.65 
Ireland  3.87  3.23  2.17  1.93 
Italy  2.43  1.69  1.29  1.22 
Luxembourg  1.97  1.50  1.62  1.70 
Netherlands  2.57  1.60  1.62  1.57 
Portugal  2.76  2.19  1.48(89)  1.52 
United Kingdom  2.45  1.89  1.84  1.75 
Sources: Craig (1992), Council of Europe (1994), Eurostat (1995) 
consequences.  There  can  be  savings  in  public  expenditure  on  child-related 
services  and  benefits  or  indeed  improvements  in  them.  For  example  one 
consequence of the decline in births in Ireland has been the decision to make 
substantial  increases  in  child  benefits.  Also,  unemployment  can  be  solved 
demographically, pressure on housing reduced and so on. The anxieties arising 
from sub-replacement fertility are two-fold; first, what would be the consequences 
for the economy and social fabric of European countries if  labour supply does not 
keep pace with labour demand; second, what are the economic costs and social 
and economic consequences of an ageing population? While ageing is certainly on 
the agenda of EU countries, given the parlous state of labour demand and new 
threats  to  European  competitiveness  from  the  newly  industrialised  Asian 
economies, possible future labour shortages are not a concern. 
Even if they were, and countries decided that they wanted to have an impact on 
fertility, the historical evidence suggests that it is extremely difficult to engineer 
changes in fertility behaviour by social and fiscal policies. The attempts to employ 
incentives in many of the former Eastern block countries had little success. The 
attempt  to  coerce  mothers  in  Rumania  not  only  failed  but  had  disastrous 
consequences for  mothers and children. The evidence from  France which has 
pursued pro-natalist policies for over 80 years, is not encouraging. France has a 
slightly lower fertility rate than the UK, which has never espoused explicit pro-
natalist policies. All the evidence suggests pro-natalist policies may encourage 
mothers to have babies earlier and may increase fertility by 0.1  or 0.2 but beyond 
that they have had little impact. It is  conceivable that more concerted,  more 
generous pro-natalist policies may have more impact, but they would require 
considerable transfers of resources in favour of women and families  of child-
bearing age, at the expense of the childless and elderly and they would still have 
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Changing family form 
While there is evidence that in respect of fertility the EU countries have become 
more alike, when we turn to trends in the structure of families there appears still 
to  be  a  good  deal  more  variation.  Nevertheless,  family  form  is  changing 
throughout Europe and although the changes have been much greater in some 
countries than in others they appear to have a common trajectory throughout the 
EU. In general, the forms of families that have dominated European populations 
since about the first world war have become much more diverse, complex and 
volatile  and  these  changes  present  social  policy  with  new  challenges.  The 
variations within Europe can be depicted broadly as a north/  south divide - with 
northern countries starting out on the trends earlier than southern countries and 
southern countries beginning later but catching up rapidly, albeit from a lower 
base. Although there is some truth in this hypothesis, as we shall see there is still 
considerable variation for some indicators within the south and northern blocs (as 
well as confusion about how to classify countries such as Ireland). There is also 
considerable variation between regions within some countries. 
We have already seen in relation to fertility that women are having fewer babies 
and that this is  partly a function of delayed childbirth. Table 3.3 compares the 
mean age of mothers at the first birth. Since 1970 this has increased by about three 
years in most countries. The mean age of women at child bearing was very similar 
in the EU countries in 1993  varying from 30.3 years in Ireland to 27.7 years in 
Portugal. 
Table 3.3: Age of mothers at birth of first child 
Country  Mean age at first birth 1992  Mean a~  of women at 
child  earing 1993 
Belgium  26.3 (1989)  28.1 
Denmark  26.9  28.9 
Germany  27.3/25.4  28.1 
Greece  25.4  27.8 
Spain  26.1  (1991)  29.3 
France  27.2 (1991)  28.7 
Ireland  25.9  30.3 
Italy  27.1  (1991)  29.4 
Luxembourg  - 28.6 
Netherlands  28.0  29.8 
Portugal  25.0  27.7 
United Kingdom  26.0  27.9 
Sources: Craig (1992), Council of Europe (1994), Eurostat (1995) 
It is  especially noticeable  that the fertility  rate amongst teenage  women has 
declined in all European countries with the exception of the UK, where there has 
been a slight increase.  Although the rates remain relatively high in Ireland and the 
Mediterranean countries, the rate at which teenage pregnancies are declining is 
impressive. Conversely, in the UK 3 per cent of all  15  to 19  year olds give birth 
(Figure 3.1); this is three times as many as in the Netherlands, or France,  (FPSC, 
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Figure 3.1 
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Table 3.5 gives the crude marriage rate for EU countries in 1993. Since 1970 this 
has declined in every country in the EU. Marriage is occurring later- at least three 
years later since 1970 in most northern EU countries. The age at first marriage is 
also compared in Table 3.5 and varies from 28.2 years in Denmark to 24.4 years in 
Table 3.5: Marriage rate, age of first marriage and proportion of marriages which 
are first marriages 
Country  Crude marriages  Age at first  First marriage as % total 
rate 1993  marriage 1992  marriages females 1993 
Belgium  5.4  24.9  80.8 
Denmark  6.1  28.2  73.2 
Germany  5.5  26.5/25.1  77.1 
Greece  6.0  24.4  91.9 
Spain  5.0  25.6 (1991)  96.0 (1992) 
France  4.4  26.1  83.6 
Ireland  4.4  25.9 (1990)  99.4 (1991) 
Italy  5.1  25.8 (1991)  96.2 (1991) 
Luxembourg  6.0  25.9  80.6 
Netherlands  5.8  26.6  82.5 
Portugal  6.9  24.5  94.4 
United Kingdom  5.9  25.5 (1991)  73.1  (1992) 
Sources:  CounCil of Europe (1994), Eurostat (1995) 32  A Synthesis of National Family Policies 1994 
Greece. Re-marriages or marriages where one or other of the partners have been 
married already have been a growing proportion of all marriages but remarriage 
is  also in decline and cohabitation following  marriage breakdown and before 
marriage has become common. Re-marriages were more than a  quarter of all 
marriages in 1993 in Denmark and the UK (see Table 3.5). In most countries there 
is  evidence that marriage is  not just being delayed but that fewer people are 
marrying. 
The decline in marriage and the increased age at which marriage begins has been 
associated  with  an  increase  in  births  outside  marriage,  and  an  increasing 
proportion within cohabitation. Table  3.6  shows that the proportion of births 
outside marriage had reached over about a third in the UK and approaching a half 
in Denmark by 1993  and, although there is  still considerable variation in  the 
proportion  of births  outside marriage  in  the  EU  and  very  different  rates  of 
increase,  all  countries  had  experienced  at least  a  doubling  in  births  outside 
marriage since 1970. An increasing proportion of births outside marriage will be 
to couples who are cohabiting. 
The decline in marriage has also been associated with an increase in cohabitation 
- an increased proportion of men and women living together as man and wife, 
sometimes  as  a  prelude  to  marriage,  between  marriages  or  more  rarely 
permanently outside marriage.  Cohabitation is  extremely difficult  to  compare 
across  countries because of  the difficulty  of  establishing  the nature of living 
together relationships. There is also some evidence that 'living apart together' is 
on the increase. Cohabitation is already well established in Denmark and Sweden 
with pre-marital cohabitation almost universal and couples commonly having 
their first child while cohabiting. Cohabitation is emerging rapidly in Belgium, the 
UK,  France,  Luxembourg,  Netherlands  and  Germany.  In  these  countries  the 
proportion of women cohabiting before marriage is  increasing rapidly for each 
birth cohort, though there are differences in the proportion of women who have 
Table 3.6: Births outside marriage 
Country  % Live Births Outside Marriages 1993 
Belgium  12.6 (1991) 
Denmark  46.8 
Germany  14.8 
Greece  2.8 
Spain  10.5 (1992) 
France  33.2 (1992) 
Ireland  19.5 
Italy  7.3 
Luxembourg  12.9 
Netherlands  13.1 
Portugal  17.0 
United Kingdom  31.8 
Sources:  Eurostat (1995), EC (1995) Demography and Changing Family Forms  33 
Table 3.7: Divorce 
Country  Total divorce rate 1992  Crude divorce rate 1993 
Belgium  0.39  2.1 
Denmark  0.42  2.5 
Germany  0.30  1.9 
Greece  0.12  0.7 
Spain  - 0.7 
France  0.33 (1991)  1.9 
Ireland  - -
Italy  0.07  0.4 
Luxembourg  0.36  1.9 
Netherlands  0.29  2.0 
Portugal  - 1.2 
United Kingdom  0.44 (1991)  3.1 
Sources:  Council of Europe (1994), Eurostat (1995) 
children in cohabiting relationships. Ireland and the southern European countries 
still have negligible cohabitation (EC, 1995; Dormor, 1992; Kiernan and Estaugh, 
1993). 
Marriage (and possibly also cohabitation) has become more unstable than in the 
past. Divorce and relationship breakdown have become more common. Divorce is 
influenced by the difficulties of access and it can be seen in Table 3.7 that it varies 
considerably between countries, with the UK and Denmark having the highest 
rates and Ireland, Italy and Greece having the lowest.  In most countries it has 
more than doubled since 1970, although from rather different bases. From the mid 
1980s in some countries, the divorce rate has begun to level off.  It is not clear 
whether this is a real levelling off due perhaps to later and more stable marriages, 
or  merely  a  function  of  fewer  couples  getting  married  and  cohabitation 
breakdowns not being recorded in divorce statistics. 
There have been three important consequences of the delay and/  or decline in 
marriage,  the  increase  in  births  outside marriage,  in cohabitation and in the 
breakdown of marriages. These are discussed in turn. 
First, along with ageing and changing patterns of household formation a delay 
and/  or decline in marriage has contributed to the increase in singleness - single 
person  households  - and  probably  an  associated  increase  in  isolation  and 
loneliness (Kaufmann 1993).  By  1990/91, 26.7 per cent of EU households were 
single  person  households  and  the  proportion  ranged  from  34.4  per cent  in 
Denmark to 13.4 per cent in Spain (see Table 3.8). 
Secondly, changing family form has contributed to the increase, a rapid increase 
in some countries, in the proportion of families  headed by a  lone parent. The 
definition of what constitutes a lone parent family varies considerably between 
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Table 3.8: One person households 
Country  One person households as % of all households 1990/91 
Belgium  28.4 
Denmark  34.4 
Germany  33.6 
Greece  16.2 
Spain  13.4 
France  27.1 
Ireland  20.2 
Italy  20.6 
Luxembourg  25.5 
Netherlands  30.0 
Portugal  13.8 
United Kingdom  26.7 
Sources:  Eurostat (1995) 
because of the problems in some countries of identifying lone parents in multi-
unit households (Roll, 1992). The latest Eurostat estimates are given in Table 3.9 
and they show that the proportion of families with a child under 16 who were 
headed by a lone parent varied from 20.4 per cent in Denmark to 5.7 per cent in 
Greece. 
Bradshaw et al  (1996)  have produced independent and more recent estimates as 
part of a special study for the Observatory on the labour supply of lone parents. 
The vast majority of these families are headed by a woman - 83.3 per cent in the 
EU in 1990/91 (Eurostat, 1995) but there is considerable variation in the marital 
composition of the  lone  parent population  - Ireland  has a  particularly high 
proportion (61  per cent) who are widows/widowers and the UK has the highest 
proportion who are single never married (38 per cent) (Bradshaw et al, 1996). This 
increase in the proportion of lone parent families has been associated with concern 
about a  range of issues including the poverty of lone parent families and the 
impact on children of family breakdown. There are very considerable variations 
between the EU  countries in the proportion of lone parents who are working 
outside the home and the reasons for this are the subject of a special study being 
undertaken by the Observatory. 
Thirdly, family forms have become much more complex with an increase in the 
proportion of step and other relationships with consequences for relationships 
between brothers and sisters and half-brothers and  sisters,  parents and step-
parents and grandparents now, in the future and for generations to come. This 
increasing complexity in family form is also exacerbated by evidence that with 
longer periods of education and training and increased unemployment, young 
people are leaving the parental home at older ages than in the past. 
Many of these changes have been so rapid that we are only beginning to describe 
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Table 3.9: Lone parent families 
% Lone parent  % Lone parent  % Lone parent 
Country  families  families with  families with at 
1990/91  children under 6  least one child 
1990/91  under 16  1990/91 
Belgium  14.1  14.9  14.6 
Denmark  8.5  13.5  20.4 
Germany  11.5  14.3  15.4 
Greece  7.6  3.2  5.7 
Spain  10.0  - 6.0 
France  10.4  8.3  10.8 
Ireland  15.0  8.8  10.7 
Italy  11.8  - -
Luxembourg  12.7  10.5  12.3 
Netherlands  10.1  11.2  12.2 
Portugal  9.2  6.1  9.0 
United Kingdom  13.5  19.2  19.0 
Sources: Eurostat (1995), EC (1995) 
demographic statistics on births in and out of wedlock, marriage, re-marriage and 
divorce,  fail  to  describe  satisfactorily  what is  happening  to  and  in families. 
Although in some countries, at a national level, some good data have begun to 
emerge on changing family patterns including cohabitation, lone parent families 
and step-families, at a comparative level, the data are far from satisfactory, either 
because they do not exist or, because they are not comparable. Indeed, in part, 
because of its commonly processional nature and in part because it is not well 
accepted in some countries, it is likely that a good deal of cohabitation is either not 
counted  or  deliberately  concealed  in  multi-unit  households.  Similarly  the 
distinction between lone-parenthood and cohabiting is  not always consistently 
drawn and there are difficulties in the definition of lone parenthood particularly 
in relation to children's ages. 
There is also still, in respect of family form, considerable diversity within the EU. 
Thus for  example the prevalence of large households varies considerably with 
26.7 per cent of households in Ireland (in 1990/91) containing five or more persons 
compared with only 4.8 per cent in Denmark. The proportion of households made 
up of a couple with dependent children also varies from 49.9 per cent in Portugal 
in 1990/91 to only 26.3 per cent in Denmark. 
Ageing 
Like all industrialised countries, the countries of the EU are all ageing (OECD, 
1988;  ILO,  1995).  This is  partly a  function of increased life  expectancy, which 
continues to  rise  for  men and women. As  shown in Table  3.10,  in  1993  life 
expectancy at birth for men ranged from 70.6 years in Portugal to 75.0 in Greece. 
Life  expectancy  for  women  is  invariably  higher  than  for  men,  with  some 36  A Synthesis of National Family Policies 1994 
Table 3.10: Life expectancy at birth 
Country  Males  Females  Infant mortality 
1993  1993  rate 
1993 
Belgium  73.0  79.9  8.0 
Denmark  72.6  77.8  5.4 
Germany  72.7  79.2  5.8 
Greece  75.0  79.9  8.5 
Spain  73.7 (1992)  81.0 (1992)  6.9 
France  73.3  81.5  6.4 
Ireland  72.7  78.2  6.0 
Italy  73.4 (1992)  80.2 (1991)  7.3 
Luxembourg  72.2  79.4  6.0 
Netherlands  74.0  80.0  6.3 
Portugal  70.6  77.8  8.7 
United Kingdom  73.6 (1992)  79.0 (1992)  6.3 
Sources: Eurostat (1995) 
interesting differences in the gap between men and women - the smallest gap 
being in Denmark (5.2 years) and the largest in France (7.2 years). There are also 
quite large differences in the rate at which the expectation of life has increased 
between countries. Thus, for  example, in Denmark the expectation of life  for 
women has only increased by just over three years since  1961/62 whereas in 
Portugal it has increased by eleven years over the same period. 
It is  notable  that the  expectation of life  is  not closely  correlated  with living 
standards - or rather, it is not the case that the poorer countries in the EU are 
necessarily the ones with shorter life expectancies. 
Ageing is also a function of earlier waves in fertility and patterns of migration. 
The traditional way to represent ageing is in terms of dependency ratios, though 
there  are  a  number  of  variations  in  the  ways  these  are  represented  in  the 
comparative literature. In Table 3.11  the second column compares the number of 
people over 60 as a proportion of the number aged between 20 and 59. This is a 
version of the pensioners' dependency ratio. We see that the UK has the highest 
proportion of people over 60 (39 per cent) and the Netherlands the lowest (30 per 
cent). However apart from the criticism that not all of those over 60 are dependent 
and not all those aged 20-59 are independent, this pensioners' dependency ratio 
fails  to represent the dependency of children. The effect of adding children is 
shown in two ways in the final two columns of the table. Because of the very high 
proportion of children in its population Ireland has the highest dependency ratio 
for both measures. The relative position of the other countries varies with how the 
dependent and independent are counted. 
These are still rather crude comparisons of the real differences in dependency 
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Table 3.11: Dependency ratios 
Country  0-19  60+  0-19+60+  0-19+60+  0-14+65+ 
20-59  20-59  20-59  20-59  15-64 
1990/91  1990/91  1990/91  1993  1990/91 
Belgium  0.45  0.38  0.83  0.83  0.50 
Denmark  0.43  0.37  0.80  0.78  0.48 
Germany  0.37  0.35  0.73  0.72  0.45 
Greece  - - - 0.83  0.49 
Spain  0.53  0.36  0.90  0.85  0.49 
France  0.49  0.37  0.87  0.87  0.52 
Ireland  0.74  0.31  1.06  1.01  0.62 
Italy  - - - 0.78  0.45 
Luxembourg  0.40  0.33  0.72  0.74  0.45 
Netherlands  0.44  0.30  0.74  0.73  0.45 
Portugal  0.58  0.36  0.91  0.88  0.52 
United Kingdom  0.48  0.39  0.87  0.87  0.53 
Sources: Begeot, Smith and Pearce (1993), EC (1995) 
which education and training ceases, the unemployment rate, the labour force 
participation  rates  of men and  women of working  age,  how common  early 
retirement is and the age at which people commonly retire (see CEC, 1995). The 
burden of ageing would then need to take account of variations in the degree to 
which the elderly population consume resources, both cash benefits and services. 
As far as services are concerned, there is a good deal of evidence that while there 
are more people living to older ages, older people are becoming fitter and less 
dependent than previous generations.  As most health resources are used in the 
very final stages of life or in the process of dying, at least as far as health resources 
are concerned, ageing does not necessarily imply an increased burden. Against 
this argument there is the fact that in many countries the fastest growing group of 
the elderly are the very elderly,  who are certainly more likely to require personal 
caring services than the younger and fitter elderly. 
Another problem in comparing the ageing of countries is that it is occurring at 
very different speeds in different countries. Thus the UK may currently have one 
of the highest pensioner dependency ratios in the EU, but because it was one of 
the earliest countries to experience ageing, it has passed through a rapid period of 
ageing, reaching a plateau.  Other EU countries are still ageing rapidly and will 
catch up and overtake the UK in the next few years. 
In their 1994  report on the demographic situation the European Commission 
(1995)  identified four groups of member states in relation to ageing: Germany, 
Belgium and Italy are member states  where the older age-groups eclipse the new 
generations; Denmark, Luxembourg, the UK and Greece where this tendency is 
not so pronounced  but is becoming more so given their fertility trends; Spain, 
Portugal,  France  and  the  Netherlands  have  balanced  numbers  of the  oldest 
people; and finally Ireland where the population is still predominantly young. 38  A Synthesis of National Family Policies 1994 
There is a good deal of variation in the predictions about the expectation of life  in 
the future. Caselli and Egidi (1992) have compared national predictions and found 
that they are generally more pessimistic than international predictions as well as 
recent actual experience. They also point out that progress in the treatment of 
ischaemic heart disease and certain cancers could have a very dramatic impact on 
life expectancy. On the other hand if  AIDS or other epidemics became widespread 
or a Chernobyl type disaster occurred in Europe it might have an opposite impact 
on life expectancy. 
The crucial issue is whether the quality of life of those additional years will be 
improved. Much of the attention on this subject has focused on health and the 
consumption of health services and so  called  'disability free  life  expectation'. 
However health is  only one aspect of a quality of life. Also of importance and 
concern  is  whether  the  living  standards  of  the  elderly  will  enable  them  to 
participate in society and whether there is the capacity in (changing) families and 
other social relationships to sustain the quality of existing systems of obligation 
and exchange. 
Conclusion 
The discourse around demographic change in EU countries is often expressed in 
terms of a crisis, a form of demographic if  not moral panic.  In particular, changes 
in family form are commonly seen as entirely negative- frightening and bound to 
lead to financial insecurity if not social collapse.  The debate moves rapidly on 
from this diagnosis to prescriptions which usually seek to influence or constrain 
behaviour, to impose a moral norm, by promoting the traditional nuclear family. 
Thus  a  recent  article  in  The  Economist  (5  September  1995)  entitled  'The 
Disappearing Family' while arguing that 'without compelling evidence that the 
net harm (of divorce) is great, and perhaps not even then, governments have no 
business imposing their moral choices on citizens'  (p19)  then sets out a set of 
policy  prescriptions  to  change  behaviour  including  abandoning  statutory 
minimum wages, making benefits 'less friendly' to lone parents and reducing the 
autonomy of young mothers. 
To  construct demographic changes being experienced in Europe in terms of a 
crisis is imprudent.  First, EU countries are not generally facing such dramatic 
changes as some countries outside Europe - for example, family change is not as 
dramatic as in the United Sates and ageing is not as rapid as in Japan.  Secondly, 
there is still a good deal of variation within the EU in all these experiences - thus 
many countries still have comparatively low levels of marital breakdown and lone 
parenthood.  Thirdly, many of the changes that disturb people are not as bad as 
they might seem at face value.  Thus most children are still brought up by both 
their parents together, most marriages survive and they are lasting a great deal 
longer than they did in the last century:  many children born outside marriage 
actually  have  two parents who are  in stable  cohabiting  relationships.  Lone 
parenthood is commonly a temporary experience - most lone parents repartner. 
Fourthly, many individual, familial and social benefits are emerging from, or are 
associated with the changes that are being experienced - the ability of women to 
control  their  fertility  and  achieve  greater  economic  independence  from 
participation in the labour force,  the freedom  of women (and  men)  to  leave 
unfulfilling  and  possibly  violent  marriages,  the  benefits  of  sub-replacement 
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Nevertheless there are important implications of these changes - for the labour 
market, for family policy and for social protection and for these reasons they and 
their consequences are a vitally important concern for the national governments 
and the European Observatory on National Family Policies.  Good comparative 
research, not just on demographic patterns but also their consequences, could 
make a  major contribution to developing a coherent understanding of what is 
going on and help to inform sensible responses. CHAPTER FOUR 
Reconciling Work and Family Life 
Introduction 
Paid work remains the prime source of financial security for families, not least 
because in most countries social protection in retirement or during periods out of 
work  is  substantially  dependent  on  employment-based  contributions  and 
entitlements.  Employment  is  also  a  key  source  of  personal  satisfaction  for 
individuals, including, increasingly, women.  Throughout the countries of the 
European Union growing numbers of women are taking it for granted that they 
will spend many of their active years in paid work.  While female labour market 
participation varies between member countries, it has been growing even in those 
which  already  have  high  rates,  and  for  many  families  the  maintenance  of 
reasonable standards of living depends on having two wages or salaries coming 
into the household. Yet at the same time parents want and need to be able to fulfil 
their caring responsibilities towards children and, often, towards other relatives. 
The argument in favour of time for family responsibilities is not just a question of 
avoiding neglect or damage to children, or of keeping down the public costs of 
social care for the elderly, though these may be factors in policy debates.  It also 
represents a positive desire for fulfilling inter-personal relationships and for relief 
from the constant need to juggle priorities, which tends to fall more heavily on 
women.  Measures which help parents to  reconcile the demands of work and 
family  life  are  therefore  at  the  heart  of  social  policy  and  contribute  to  the 
enhancement of quality of life. 
However, the demands of economic competitiveness which are central to  the 
European project tend to have contradictory impacts on the family /work nexus. 
'Flexibility' in labour markets is increasingly seen as desirable in order to reduce 
costs to business and thereby cut unemployment (OECD, 1994a).  This flexibility 
can take the form of reduced working hours, job sharing or splitting, shiftwork, 
or other arrangements which may suit people, especially women, who need to fit 
work around child-care or other family responsibilities.  Often, however, flexible 
work is not of the kind that fosters satisfactory combinations of work and family 
life.  'Zero-hour contracts', for  example, temporary work, subcontracting and 
other forms  of 'non-standard' work can lead to  employment insecurity.  The 
development of better employment rights and benefits for non-standard workers 
are frequently viewed as a burden on employers which discourages the creation 
of new jobs.  Parental leave, career breaks and other 'family-friendly' initiatives 
are also sometimes seen as obstacles to competitiveness.  Yet job creation is not in 
itself a panacea: the experience of the USA in particular suggests that flexibility 
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and deregulation can lead to the creation of low-paid and often insecure jobs 
which require more intensive working hours to produce earnings sufficient to 
support a family (Freeman, 1994). 
In 1992 the Council of Ministers adopted a Recommendation on child care, which 
was proposed as part of the Community Charter on the Fundamental Rights of 
Workers and the Community's Third Action Programme on Equal Opportunities 
for Women and Men.  Its aim was to:  ' ... encourage initiatives to enable men and 
women to  reconcile their occupational, family and upbringing responsibilities 
arising from the care of children' (article 1).  This was linked to a more general 
goal to: 
' ...  promote and encourage,  with due respect for  freedom  of the 
individual,  increased  participation  by  men  (in  the  care  and 
upbringing of children), in order to achieve a more equal sharing of 
parental responsibilities between men and women' (article 6). 
The problem is that the employment insecurity which stems from labour market 
change can militate against greater participation by men (and women too)  in 
family  and  household  responsibilities  because  of  the  need  to  demonstrate 
indispensability to employers. 
It was in the context of these contradictory forces  at work in the  social and 
economic life of member states of the EU that the Commission launched a new 
Network on Families and Work  in 1994.  This  Network aims  to  disseminate 
information and stimulate good practice among private companies and other 
employers on how an improved balance between work and family life can be 
struck to mutual advantage (European Commission, 1994a). 
The idea of reconciling work with family life does not in itself imply a single or 
uni-directional set of policies.  Measures can range from generous schemes of 
maternity leave which permit traditional roles and divisions of labour in the 
household to be preserved, to policy arrangements which assume full-time work 
by both partners to be the norm from the earliest months after a child's birth. 
Also, while there is often a concentration on schemes of leave which are available 
when a child is born or during their early years, there is an increasing recognition 
of the need to take into account the continuing nature of family responsibilities, 
which do not end when a child starts school. 
This chapter outlines recent developments in national policies to reconcile work 
with family life.  It is organised within the broad framework of topics pursued in 
earlier  reports  from  the  Observatory  and  concentrates  on  four  main  issues: 
maternity  and  employment  rights  in  the  workplace;  flexible  work;  leave 
arrangements,  including  such  evidence  as  there  is  on changes  in  roles  and 
responsibilities in families; and child care.  These are the key policy themes which 
it is suggested form the agenda for the reconciliation of work and family life.  Tax 
and benefit systems are also important influences on whether and how much 
parents will work, but these are considered in the next chapter. The chapter starts 
by highlighting  some  significant  changes  in  patterns  of  employment among 
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Patterns of employment in the European Union 
In the 10  years up to 1992  (the latest for which detailed comparative data are 
available)  a  number  of  broad  trends  are  evident.  First,  the  labour  market 
participation of women, especially those in the prime working age group of 25-49 
years, has continued to rise across the whole of the EU, whereas that of men has 
tended to remain steady or to fall (OECD, 1993; European Commission, 1994b). 
This has been true both in countries with relatively low female participation rates, 
such as Ireland, Spain and Italy, and in those, like Denmark and to a lesser extent 
Portugal, with higher rates.  Labour force participation, however, does not always 
mean actual employment, and the recession which hit many member countries in 
the early 1990s  led not only to  substantially higher recorded unemployment 
among women, but also to a slight drop in labour market participation in 1992-
indicating that some women were withdrawing into 'inactivity'. 
The second, and linked, trend has been towards shorter average working time. 
The common perception has been that part-time work has been increasing, though 
this is an oversimplified view of what is a complex phenomenon.  The average 
drop  in  working  time  between  1983  and  1992  varied  substantially  between 
countries (from less than half an hour per week in Italy and the UK to over two 
hours in Belgium and 4.5  hours in the Netherlands)  (European Commission, 
1994b).  The combination of factors  leading to shorter working hours (which 
include changes in the balance of employment between industrial sectors and 
increased participation by women) vary between countries.  The proportion of 
women working in the main band of part-time hours (10-29  hours per week) 
actually  changed  very  little  in  most  countries,  though  several  countries 
experienced a  slight decrease in the hours of women who had been working 
around 40  hours per week.  Similarly,  there was a  tendency for men working 
around 40 hours to have reduced their hours, on average, but for both men and 
women there was a marginal increase in working time of those working over 48 
hours per week.  The overall changes in men and women's working time have 
tended to follow existing national patterns.  Thus, rather than any strong signs of 
convergence  we  can see  some differences  being  accentuated.  However,  the 
interaction between the family cycle and changing patterns of employment is 
difficult to study from cross-sectional data, and the limited comparable evidence 
available  from  event  history  data  suggests  cohort  effects,  including  higher 
educational attainments among younger women, which may tend increasingly to 
transform married women's part-time work into full-time employment (Blossfeld, 
1994).  If  this is the case some degree of convergence is more probable. 
The important question when looking at families is the employment pattern of 
mothers and fathers.  Recent comparable data are hard to come by, though some 
evidence will be emerging from  a  special study of the labour supply of lone 
parents, linked to the Observatory (Bradshaw et al., 1996 forthcoming).  One study 
for  the  European Network on Child  Care looked at changes in employment 
among parents of young children since the mid-1980s (European Commission, 
1993a).  Among mothers with children under ten the average employment rate in 
the EU countries (excluding Portugal and Spain) rose from 42 per cent in 1985 to 
over 50 per cent in 1991, with a similar trend taking place from 1988 in Portugal 
and Spain.  More than four-fifths of this increase came in part-time employment. 
The largest increases took place in the Netherlands (16.7 per cent), followed by the 
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lowest rate of employment for this group (30  per cent).  The smallest increases 
were in  France,  Italy  and Greece  (all  around four  per cent),  while  Denmark 
recorded  a  slight  drop but continued  to  show the  highest level  of  maternal 
employment (75 per cent).  By contrast the situation of fathers changed little over 
this period in any country. Whilst leave schemes, flexible work and the availability 
of child care represent one side of the equation, the other frequently neglected 
aspect  is  the  level  of  demand  for  female  labour  in  the  particular  national 
economies (Blossfeld, 1994). 
Economic activity rates tend to decrease with the number of children and where 
the youngest child is aged under three, though France is an exception to  this 
pattern.  The 'youngest child effect' is particularly marked in Germany and the 
UK, although in the UK the biggest increase in female employment over the 1980s 
took place among married or cohabiting women with pre-school age children 
(OPCS,  1994).  On average, in 1991,  mothers with children under ten mainly 
worked between 30 and 39 hours a week, with the longest hours worked in the 
southern European countries and the shortest in the Netherlands and the UK. 
Fathers' working hours averaged between 40 and 49 hours per week, with almost 
20 per cent working more than 50 hours, and the longest hours worked were in 
Ireland and the UK (European Commission, 1993a). 
The picture is  somewhat different for lone mothers. There are difficulties with 
making comparisons because of varying national definitions of lone parenthood, 
but it appears that in most EU countries except the UK,  the Netherlands and 
Germany lone mothers are considerably more likely to be in paid work than 
married or cohabiting mothers (Bradshaw et  al.,  1996).  They are also generally 
more likely to be in full-time work (defined as 30 hours per week or more).  This 
applies not just to those with young children. 
It may be misleading, however, to look at the working trajectories of mothers en 
masse.  Recent evidence from the UK, for example, suggests a growing cleavage in 
the quantity and quality of paid work by women with children according to 
occupational class, with those in more professional occupations being less likely 
to work anti-social hours but more likely to work longer hours even when 'part-
time'  (Glover  and  Arber,  1995).  This  is  connected  to  higher  educational 
achievements and has consequences both for  levels  of pay and for  access  to 
employment rights and social protection. 
An emerging pattern is that of women who report a continuous career, without 
breaks of more than a year.  It is  in countries where the labour force participation 
rates are relatively high, such as the UK, that women are least likely to report a 
continuous career.  Conversely, in countries such as Italy, Spain and Greece, where 
fewer women are economically active, continuous employment is proportionately 
more common (European Commission, 1994c).  However, the meaning of this 
phenomenon differs between countries.  Continuous employment can represent 
economic necessity and may often involve relatives such as grandparents playing 
an important role in child care (such as in Greece and Italy) or it can represent 
successful  management  of  child-rearing  and  employment  responsibilities. 
Similarly, interrupted work can indicate either a flexibility that permits time for 
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So how have recent legal and policy changes contributed to this picture?  The rest 
of this chapter summarises the key developments reported in 1994 and early 1995. 
Maternity and employment rights in the workplace 
In  the  course  of  1994,  implementation  of  the  EU  Directive  (92/85)  on  'the 
protection of pregnant women at work, and those who have recently given birth 
or who are breast feeding' was reported by a number of countries which had not 
previously  met  its  requirements  in  full.  The  Directive  covers  employment 
conditions  and  hours,  the right  to ante-natal  examinations in working  hours 
without  loss  of  pay,  protection  against  dismissal,  a  minimum  of  14  weeks 
maternity leave, and access to maternity benefits at least in line with sickness 
benefits, with qualifying periods of no more than one year.  The changes in 1994 
represented an improvement on the legal provisions and conditions existing in 
1993  principally in Ireland, the UK and Italy.  The Irish legislation introduced 
access  to ante-natal  examination in work time, increased the minimum rate of 
maternity benefit and specified that mothers entitled to a higher payment from 
disability benefit than from maternity benefit should receive the higher rate.  The 
changes to UK legislation established the minimum required length of maternity 
leave for all women and reduced the qualifying period for maternity pay to six 
months. In Italy there were some fears that the Directive would weaken women's 
rights, which were already superior to those required, and might reduce the scope 
for further improvements.  There have been no reductions in provision, however, 
and a new right of attendance at ante-natal clinics without loss of pay represents 
an  improvement.  These  changes  mean  that  the  Directive  has  now  been 
implemented in full in all the member countries except Greece, where the right to 
attend ante-natal  clinics in paid work time does not yet formally exist, and in 
Portugal, where maternity leave, at 90 days, is still slightly less than the specified 
14 week minimum.  Legislation introducing 14 weeks maternity  /paternity leave 
was,  however, approved  by the  Portuguese parliament in April  1995  and is 
awaiting ratification.  The Act will also introduce new provision for either parent 
to take leave to care for a sick child without loss of earnings.  Also, although the 
right to attend ante-natal clinics during work-time is not yet formally inscribed in 
law in Greece, it is thought to be widely available in practice. 
A  number of other developments  should be mentioned.  In  Denmark,  new 
legislation was implemented requiring women to take two weeks paid leave after 
a child's birth (in addition to existing leave facilities which are beyond the EU 
minimum), while in Ireland the period of pregnancy after which a woman whose 
child is stillborn can receive maternity benefit was reduced from 28 to 24 weeks. 
In a series of important European Court cases against the UK government, the 
Court of Justice  ruled  that  the  termination  of  a  contract  on the grounds of 
pregnancy constituted direct sex discrimination and that a Ministry of Defence 
regulation  on  dismissal  of  pregnant  workers  was  in  breach  of  European 
legislation.  In Italy debate has centred on extension of rights to maternity benefits 
to women outside the labour market and on raising payment levels. 
Flexible work 
Recent developments in the area of flexible  working give an indication of the 
differing ways in which this concept is viewed.  Denmark, Germany and Italy and 
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designed to give employees greater choice about whether to work part- or full-
time.  Some of these changes were explicitly framed within broader policy aims of 
establishing family-friendly employment and included other measures to protect 
or extend the employment and social security rights of part-time workers, to help 
parents fit  in caring for sick children or to protect the promotion prospects of 
women.  In Italy, however, employers are reluctant to agree to part-time work 
because of economic disincentives resulting from the structure of social security. 
France introduced legislation in its Family Law to develop part-time work at the 
request of either employer or employee and made the parental child-rearing 
allowance (Allocation  Parentale d'Education)  payable on a part-time basis, though 
this should perhaps be seen in the context of France's traditional pro-natalist 
policies as much as in terms of labour market flexibility. 
In Belgium, the 1993 I 4 Global Plan included incentives for employers to negotiate 
with  trades  unions  for  more  flexible  work arrangements  in  order to  reduce 
unemployment,  but only  a  very  small  number  of  firms  have  reached  such 
agreements to date.  A new national agreement signed in January 1995 provides a 
further  opportunity  for  negotiations  at  regional  and  company  level.  The 
negotiations also included a new agreement on night work: in principle this is not 
allowed, but from now on exceptions will apply equally to women as to men, thus 
opening  up  the  possibility  of  an  increase  in  night  work  for  women.  In 
Luxembourg the thrust of new legislation in 1994  was towards regulation of 
temporary work, which will now only be permissible within set limits and will 
bring improved rights. 
Although debate  continued  in other countries,  particularly  in  Ireland  where 
several Commissions have recommended a  range of policies for more family-
friendly  work, there were few significant changes in legislation.  In the UK, 
however, the House of Lords ruled that British legislation on the rights of part-
time workers was in breach of European law - a ruling the Government accepted 
in spite of having opted out of the Directive on part-time workers.  The qualifying 
period for rights against dismissal and redundancy has now been lowered from 
five to two years. 
Many families develop what might be called forms of 'privatised flexibility', by 
making use of shift work and other patterns of working which enable parents to 
care for children without using outside services.  This is  particularly the case 
where child care services are poorly developed or expensive.  Changing work 
patterns, such as extended shopping hours, may provide opportunities for such 
arrangements, as in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK.  They do so, however, 
at  the  potential  cost  of  reducing  time  for  the  family  to  be  together.  The 
implications  for  parents,  in  terms  of personal  stress  and  overwork,  may  be 
considerable, and require  further  research.  Trades  unionists  in  a  number of 
countries (including Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands) have opposed these 
types of flexibility, arguing that they result in poorly paid and insecure jobs in 
which workers are exploited.  In Germany there was a hard-fought campaign to 
prevent shops opening on Sundays.  This was seen as preserving an important 
right of the family to private time.  There was a similar debate in the Netherlands, 
where the local authorities have the power to allow or refuse Sunday opening, 
and in the UK, where the laws on Sunday shopping have long been contradictory 
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One  of  the  other  forms  of  flexible  work  which  is  acquiring  an  increasing 
importance  is  that  of  'flexiplace'  or  home-working.  The  majority  of  those 
involved in home-based work, whether in traditional industries or in newer forms 
of 'teleworking', are women, though in certain countries, such as the UK and the 
Netherlands, men are over-represented in highly skilled forms of teleworking.  In 
the Mediterranean countries  there is evidence that such home-based work forms 
an important part of household strategies for managing time and income, as in 
Portugal,  where  textile-based  outwork has been carried  out for  many years. 
Whilst teleworking and other forms  of home-based work can offer flexibility, 
much depends on the level of control exercised by participants over their work. 
Even  in  professional  teleworking  there  are  dangers  of  isolation  and  poorer 
working  conditions,  and  there  is  little  evidence  available  as  yet  on  the 
consequences  for  family  and  parental  relationships  of  the  blurring  of  the 
boundaries between home and work (Kaufmann, 1995).  A Bill passed in January 
1995 in Belgium created a legal framework for home-working, introducing hours 
limits,  written contracts  and  specified  terms  and  conditions  of  employment. 
Although companies are increasingly developing 'flexiplace' and distance work 
policies,  there  were  no  other  significant  national  legislative  or  policy 
developments reported. 
In general, while there has been some movement towards more flexible  work 
arrangements, the main engine behind recent changes often appears to be the 
continuation of  high unemployment and the need  to  generate  employment 
opportunities.  Change is also uneven, with countries with more traditional work 
patterns being slow to introduce new forms of work.  Where changes are taking 
place the context is important and they cannot always be seen as unambiguously 
positive for families. 
Leave schemes 
The general rationale for schemes of leave for parents is that they promote the 
health and well-being of children, pregnant women, mothers and fathers; improve 
economic performance by retaining trained workers; and reduce unemployment. 
The  European  Commission  (1983)  has  also  explicitly  argued  that  leave 
arrangements should foster the sharing of family  responsibilities and promote 
equality of opportunities of men and women in the labour market, though this is 
by no means an inevitable outcome (European Network on Childcare, 1994a). 
Leave may be categorised into four main types: 
maternity leave,  which is  primarily a  health measure and usually only 
available to fathers in cases of maternal death or severe illness 
paternity leave, which is solely for fathers, usually for a short period of time 
around the birth of a child 
parental  leave,  which may be  taken by either partner,  generally  while 
children are of pre-school age 
leave for family reasons - usually to care for children or other relatives who 
are ill, or for other domestic situations. 
In some countries  'rest breaks'  are also  available  to  working mothers,  again 
primarily as a health measure. 
In addition to leave schemes specifically for parents, a number of countries have 
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often used for family reasons.  There is a clear gender division in the use of such 
schemes, with the majority of women using them for family reasons, while men 
are more likely to use them for travel or pre-retirement activity. 
Leave can be available either as a statutory entitlement or through collective or 
contractual agreements with employers.  The latter frequently enhance statutory 
minimum entitlements, though there is no comprehensive source of information 
on  collective  agreements  for  all  the  member  countries.  Another  important 
distinction is that leave may be paid or unpaid. 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 summarise leave provisions in the EU member countries at the 
end of 1993 and shows the changes introduced during 1994 and early 1995.  For 
more details of provision, including qualifying conditions for parental leave and 
levels of earnings-related payment for maternity leave, see the sources cited. Table 4.1: Leave provisions in the EU countries at 31/12/93 
COUNTRY  MATERNITY  PATERNITY  PARENTAL 
BELGIUM  General right for all  3 days at 100% of  Public sector workers can take 
female employees. 15  earnings.  a maximum of 3 months 
weeks. Paid: earnings- unpaid leave, to be taken 
related.  immediately after maternity 
Self-employed women  leave. 
entitled to 3 weeks  Private sector employees 
post-natal leave, with a  (either parent) can receive a 
lump-sum maternity  favourable level of 
grant.  unemployment benefit if  they 
stop work or go part-time to 
care for a child. This counts as 
full-time work for social 
security if taken within 6 
months to 3 years after the 
child's birth. 
(See also Career Breaks.) 
DENMARK  General right for all  10 days, paid as for  10 weeks per family paid as 
employed and self- maternity leave.  for maternity leave. 
employed women. 
18 weeks. Paid: 
earnings-related. 
GERMANY  General right for all  None.  Up to first 3 years of child's 
female employees.  life. Paid at flat-rate for 6 
14 weeks (more for  months then through income-
multiple/premature  related benefit for 18 months. 
births). Paid: earnings- Available to either parent and 
related.  can be split between them or 
for alternating periods. 
Parent on leave can work 
for an employer for up to 
19 hours per week. 
LEAVE FOR FAMILY 
REASONS 
10 days per year, unpaid, for 
private sector workers. 
Public sector workers (by 
negotiation with departments) 
can get: 
•  leave for urgent family 
reasons (up to 2 months unpaid) 
•  reduced hours for social and 
family reasons (half-time 
working for 3-24 months, 
unpaid, with maximum of 5 
years in working life) 
•  long-term leave for family 
reasons (up to 4 years while 
child is under 5, or 6 years if 
child is disabled. Unpaid) 
These leaves do not count as 
periods of work for social 
security purposes. 
None (but see parental leave). 
10-25 days per parent 
depending on number of 
children, at full pay, up to 
child's 12th birthday. 
Double amount for lone 
parents. 
CAREER BREAKS 
Workers can take 
(non-statutory) 
career breaks of 6-12 
months or, where a 
child is born, 12 
weeks after 
maternity leave, by 
agreement with the 
employer. 
Alternatively those 
employed at least 
3/4 time can go half-
time for between 6 
months and 5 years. 
Rat-rate payments 
depending on 
circumstances. 
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COUNTRY  MATERNITY  PATERNITY  PARENTAL 
GREECE  For all insured women.  None.  Up to 3 months unpaid for 
14 weeks. Paid:  each parent 6 months for lone 
earnings-related.  parents. Cannot be transferred 
between parents. Employer 
can refuse if more than 8% of 
workforce on leave. 
SPAIN  For women with 6  2 days at 100% of  12 months unpaid per family. 
months contributions  earnings. Mother can  Further 2 years available, but 
in previous year. 16  choose to transfer up to  employee loses right to 
(+ 2 for multiple births).  4 weeks maternity  automatic reinstatement. 
Paid: earnings-related  leave to father.  Parents with child under 6 or 
(up to a ceiling).  disabled can also reduce their 
working hours by 'h-' h but 
with no compensation for lost 
pay. 
FRANCE  Women insured for at  3 days, to be taken  For first 3 years of child's life. 
least 10 months with  during 15 days before  Can be taken by either parent, 
contributions for 1200  or after birth.  shared or alternated. Parent 
hours in previous year.  taking leave can work hart-
16 weeks (26 for 3rd  time. Unpaid, but fort  e 
and subsequent child +  second and subsequent child a 
extra for multiple  ~ali~ing  parent can receive 
t  e A location Parentale 
births).  d'Education (APE). 
Paid: earnings-related.  Employer with fewer than 100 
workers can refuse if they 
consider leave would prejudice 
production. 
IRELAND  39 weeks of insured  None.  None. 
employment in previous 
year or tax year. 14 
weeks + optional 13 
unpaid weeks. Paid: 
earnings-related (with 
minimum and 
maximum). 
--- -- - - - - - -
LEAVE FOR FAMILY 
REASONS 
6-10 days per year depending 
on number of children, unpaid. 
For children up to 16 or older if 
disabled. 
First 2 days of a child's 
serious illness for each parent, 
at full pay (  4 days if  parent 
has to travel). 
None. 
None. 
-- --
CAREER BREAKS 
Unpaid career 
breaks available. 
Unpaid career 
breaks available. 
Unpaid career 
breaks available. 
-
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~ Table 4.1: Leave provisions in the EU countries at 31/12/93  continued 
COUNTRY  MATERNITY  PATERNITY  PARENTAL 
ITALY  General right for all  None.  6 months after maternity 
employed and self- leave. Must be taken before 
employed women.  child's 1st birthday. Main! y for 
22 weeks. Paid:  mothers but can be partly or 
earnings-related.  wholly transferred to father. 
During first year after  Paid at 30% of earnings. 
birth mothers in f/  t  Where a child is seriously 
work can take two 1  disabled, leave can be 
hour rest periods per  extended to first 3 years of life, 
day (or shorten day).  paid at 30% of earnings, or can 
PIt workers can take  be taken as 2 hours per day 
1 hour.  paid leave. 
Both leave and rest 
breaks available to 
fathers in cases of 
maternal death or 
severe disability. 
LUXEMBOURG  6 months contributions.  None.  None. 
16 weeks(+ extra for 
multiple births). Paid: 
earnings-related. 
NETHERLANDS  General right for all  None.  6 month period for each 
employed women.  parent when they can work 
16 weeks. Paid:  reduced hours (to a minimum 
earnings-related (with  of 20 hours per week). Can be 
maximum).  taken at any time until a child 
is four years old. Entitlement 
is not transferable between 
parents and there is no 
compensation for lost 
earnings except for lone 
parents whose pay falls below 
social assistance level. 
-
- -- -- -
LEAVE FOR FAMILY 
REASONS 
Either parent may take unpaid 
leave until child reaches 3 years. 
None. 
None. 
- -
CAREER BREAKS 
Public sector 
workers are entitled 
to 1 year's unpaid 
leave, either full-
time or part-time. 
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c.n  ..... Table 4.1: Leave provisions in the EU countries at 31/12/93  continued 
COUNTRY  MATERNITY  PATERNITY  PARENTAL 
PORTUGAL  Insured women.  None.  6-24 months per family, to be 
90 days. Paid:  taken after maternity leave. 
earnings-related.  Unpaid. 
Available to fathers in  Where a child is under 12 or 
cases of maternal death  disabled a (non-managerial) 
or serious illness.  parent can work half their 
During first year after  normal hours, but without 
birth, breast-feeding  compensation for lost pay. 
women can take two 1 
hour breaks per day. 
UNITED  2 years fIt or 5 years  None.  None. 
KINGDOM  p/t insured 
employment with same 
employer. 40 weeks: 
6 weeks paid earnings-
related, 12 weeks flat-
rate and remainder 
unpaid. Does not carry 
continuous pension 
entitlement. 
LEAVE FOR FAMILY  CAREER BREAKS 
REASONS 
None. 
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~ Table 4.2: Leave provisions in the EU countries: Changes up to 4/95 
COUNTRY  MATERNITY  PATERNITY  PARENTAL 
BELGIUM  From October 1994, 
maternity leave can be 
transferred to the 
father if the mother is 
hospitalised or dies. 
DENMARK  In January 1995 full pay for 
parental leave introduced in 
most of the private sector. 
Additional6 months of leave 
introduced for either parent, to 
care for children, for training 
or for a 'sabbatical' break, plus 
a further six months by 
agreement with employers. 
Rates of pabment during child 
care and sa  baticalleave 
reduced from 80 per cent of 
unemployment benefit to 70 
K;'r cent in 1995, and will be 
rther reduced to 60 per cent 
from 1997. 
SPAIN  From March 1995 the 
guarantee of being able 
to return to the same 
job after rna  terni  ty 
leave is extended from 
1 to 3 years and 
employers' social 
security contributions 
for replacement 
workers have been 
reduced. 
LEAVE FOR FAMILY  CAREER BREAKS 
REASONS 
~ 
~ 
C) 
;:: 
:1 
~· 
~ 
*  ;;:, 
;:: 
:::>... 
~ 
~ 
~ 
t-< 
--::;.; 
'"" 
~ Table 4.2: Leave provisions in the EU countries: Changes up to 4/95  continued 
COUNTRY  MATERNITY  PATERNITY  PARENTAL  LEAVE FOR FAMILY 
REASONS 
FRANCE  Economic exemption for 
employers with less than 100 
staff removed. 
Under 1994 Family Law 
(effective from 1/95), 
•  all employees with one 
year's seniority have right to 
take parental leave 
•  return to the same or 
similar job guaranteed and 
training can be undertaken 
during leave 
•  people who have taken 
career breaks of at least five 
years to care for at least two 
children eligible for 
professional re-training. 
LUXEMBOURG 
PORTUGAL  Law introducing 14  New law will also introduce 
weeks maternity leave  paid leave for either parent to 
approved by  care for a sick child. 
Parliament in April 
1995. Awaiting 
implementation. 
CAREER BREAKS 
Right to unpaid 
leave for public 
sector workers 
extended to 2 years, 
plus career break 
facilities co-
ordinated with those 
of maternity leave. 
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>4 Table 4.2: Leave provisions in the EU countries: Changes up to 4/95  continued 
COUNTRY  MATERNITY  PATERNITY  PARENTAL  LEAVE FOR FAMILY 
REASONS 
UNITED  From October 1994, all 
KINGDOM  pregnant women are 
entitled to 14 weeks 
maternity leave and 
will be deemed 
unfairly dismissed if 
they lose their jobs 
because of pregnancy. 
Women with 6 months 
service (and with 
earnings above the 
National Insurance 
Contribution lower 
earnings limit) will 
receive flat-rate 
Statutory Maternity 
Pay. The extended 
period of leave and 
earnings-related pay 
period continues to 
apply as before to 
those with longer 
service. 
Sources: Observatory questionnaire, Bradshaw et al. 1995 forthcoming, European Network on Childcare, 1994a 
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Changes in leave provisions during 1994 
During  1994  or from  the  beginning of  1995,  improvements  or extensions  in 
statutory or collective leave arrangements were announced in several countries. 
In Belgium, from October 1994, maternity leave can be transferred to the father if 
the  mother is  hospitalized  or dies.  In Denmark,  in  January  1995,  collective 
bargaining agreements included the introduction of full pay for parental leave in 
most  of  the  private  sector  of  employment  and  greater  flexibility  in  leave 
arrangements.  An additional six  months of leave  was introduced for  either 
parent, useable to care for children, for training or for a 'sabbatical' break, plus a 
further six months by agreement with employers.  The rates of payment during 
child  care  and  sabbatical  leave  were,  however,  reduced from  80  per cent of 
unemployment benefit  to 70  per cent in 1995, and will be further reduced to 60 
per  cent  from  1997.  In  Denmark,  in  January  1995,  collective  bargaining 
agreements included the introduction of full pay for parental leave in most of the 
private sector of employment and greater flexibility in leave arrangements.  An 
additional six months of leave was introduced for either parent, useable to care for 
children, for  training or for  a  'sabbatical' break, plus a  further six  months by 
agreement with employers. The rates of payment during child care and sabbatical 
leave were, however, reduced from 80 per cent of unemployment benefit to 70 per 
cent in 1995, and will be further reduced to 60 per cent from 1997.  This is because 
the impact on public expenditure is seen as too great. 
In Spain, a recent law (March 1995) has also introduced several improvements: the 
guarantee of being able to return to the same job after maternity leave is extended 
from one to the full three years and employers' social security contributions for 
replacement workers have been reduced. 
During the last year,  France has also  removed the exemption which allowed 
employers with less than 100 staff to refuse parental leave on economic grounds. 
The 1994 Family Law also introduced several significant improvements which 
came into force from January 1995: 
all employees with one year's seniority by the date of the child's birth now 
have a right to take parental leave 
return  to  the  same  or  similar  job  is  guaranteed  and  training  can  be 
undertaken during leave 
people who have taken career breaks of at least five years to care for at least 
two children are now eligible for professional re-training. 
In Luxembourg, a law of June 1994 introduced a second year of unpaid leave and 
a co-ordinated structure of partial career suspension for public sector employees. 
The  introduction  of  parental  leave  is  still  being  debated.  In  Portugal,  as 
mentioned earlier, a Bill to bring maternity leave in line with the EU Directive 
92/85 has been approved and is awaiting implementation.  Finally,  legislation 
taking effect from October 1994 in the UK created a two-tier system of maternity 
leave in the UK, with all pregnant women becoming entitlement to the minimum 
14 weeks leave and protection against dismissal on grounds of pregnancy.  Those 
with six months service get the flat-rate statutory maternity pay for 18  weeks, 
while those with longer service continue to receive earnings-related pay for the 
first six weeks. Reconciling Work and Family Life  57 
The tables show that a statutory minimum of 14 weeks paid maternity leave now 
exists or will shortly exist in all12 EU countries.  Several countries have more than 
this, with the maximum of 22 weeks in Italy.  This basic leave is remunerated in 
all countries on an earnings-related basis of generally between 70 and 100 per cent 
of previous pay, sometimes up to an earnings ceiling. In the UK, however, a two-
tier system now operates, with a short period of earnings-related payment only 
for those with longer service.  Additional periods of leave are available in the case 
of multiple births in Germany, Spain, France and Luxembourg, while Ireland and 
the UK have extended periods either unpaid or paid at a  flat-rate.  Italy and 
Portugal also allow women with very young children to take rest breaks during 
work time or to reduce their daily working hours.  They are also the only two 
countries which specifically allow maternity leave to be transferred to men in the 
case of maternal illness or death, though in Spain a mother can transfer up to four 
weeks of her leave to the father. 
Paid paternity leave as such, however, is still uncommon, existing on a statutory 
level only in Belgium, Denmark, Spain and France, and ranging from two to ten 
days. 
Parental leave is the area where countries show the most variation.  The only 
countries without any statutory provision are Ireland, Luxembourg and the UK-
Britain being one of the countries most opposed to the introduction of the EU 
Directive on this issue.  In those countries which do have some provision there is 
variation along three main dimensions: first whether provisions are available to 
both private and public sector workers; secondly whether it is paid or unpaid and 
whether this is on an earnings-related basis or through a flat-rate social security 
benefit; and thirdly how long it is  available for.  There are further differences 
concerning the retention of statutory rights to reinstatement in the same job and 
in protection of pension rights.  These variations, and others related to adjustment 
of working hours and special provision for disabled children, make it difficult to 
compare straightforwardly the overall length of leave available to  parents in 
different countries, taking in maternity leave as well, but it is clear that in terms of 
continuous paid leave  the most extensive provision is  available in  Denmark, 
Germany and Italy. 
The availability of leave  for  family  reasons adds a  further dimension to  this 
question.  Clearly statutory provision is only one aspect, but it is noticeable that a 
number of countries have legislated to make such provision a right.  Mostly this 
is  unpaid, or paid on a  flat-rate  basis,  as  in  the  extensive  range of schemes 
available  in  Belgium which extend  beyond  just  those for  parents.  Portugal, 
however, allows public sector workers and low-income lone parents up to 30 days 
paid leave per year.  Germany has perhaps the widest recognition of family 
responsibilities, as leave is granted to arrange a child's wedding, and to care for 
sick or elderly dependants, as well as the more common provisions in respect of 
young children who are ill.  Such provisions acknowledge that family duties are 
not confined to a few years, but extend throughout life.  There is increasing debate 
about the need for measures which would increase flexibility over the working 
lifetime, although there have been few substantive moves in this direction to date. 
Germany is currently debating the possibility of measures enabling individuals to 
save a proportion of annual leave  to use for extended breaks. 58  A Synthesis of National Family Policies 1994 
Changing roles and responsibilities within families 
There  has  been  some  encouragement  or  recognition  in  recent  years  of  the 
increased involvement of fathers, at least around the time a child is born; this is 
associated with the introduction of paternity leave in several member states.  The 
amount of leave  is  small and usually unpaid.  Denmark has both the most 
longstanding and the most generous provision in this area, with 10  days paid 
leave introduced in 1984.  Companies and public sector organisations frequently 
make improved provision for their employees. 
Although parental leave is generally available to both parents, it continues to be 
overwhelmingly  used  by  mothers.  Only  one  per  cent  of  parental  leave  in 
Germany is taken by men, and only three per cent of men take leave in Denmark 
(European Network on Childcare, 1994a).  A number of factors may influence this 
decision.  Where the father earns more, it is  economically rational for him to 
remain in work.  This is particularly the case where leave is unpaid or paid at low 
replacement rates.  There is evidence that women with lower qualifications and 
low-paid jobs prefer to take leave, both because of their lack of earning power and 
because of dissatisfaction with their work situation.  Workplace acceptance of the 
legitimacy of leave may also be important: men in Denmark and the Netherlands 
reported that although there was a favourable attitude towards taking paternity 
leave,  this did not extend to taking lengthier periods of parental leave.  Practical 
issues, such as breast feeding, may also be important, especially where the period 
of leave is short.  Mothers also appear to have 'first refusal' in terms of parental 
leave: where they express a  preference for taking the whole period, this is not 
usually challenged by the partner.  Danish research suggests that men most likely 
to take leave are highly educated and work in the public sector, with partners who 
are  also  highly  educated  and  high  earners.  In  the  Scandinavian  countries 
particular efforts are being made to encourage men to take parental leave, by, for 
example, allocating them a  specific proportion of parental leave which would 
otherwise be lost. 
The implications of men's low take-up of parental leave have been highlighted in 
one Swedish research study, which found that unless men spent at least three 
months at home with the child they did not evolve their own strategies for child 
care and household tasks and the traditional gender division of responsibility 
remained unchanged (Sundberg, 1993).  This issue remains of crucial importance 
for  the reconciliation  of work and family  life.  Across all  member states  the 
evidence is that women continue to carry out the vast majority of household and 
child care tasks.  The role of fathers in modern society has recently been the object 
of intense debate in Denmark, and in Ireland there is an increasing recognition of 
the  need  for  a  change  in  role,  which  is  linked  to  very  high  rates  of  male 
unemployment.  Advertising campaigns on the involvement of fathers in family 
life have been mounted in Spain during 1994. 
In  East  Germany,  days  which  had  previously  been  available  to  women  for 
domestic chores were abolished on the grounds that this was incompatible with 
sex equality. Some commentators argue that extended parental leave can reinforce 
gender stereotyping and restricts women's career development.  This has been an 
issue in the Scandinavian countries, particularly Sweden, for  some time.  The 
same point has been made with respect to Germany.  The extension of parental 
leave provisions in the southern European countries, on the other hand, appears Reconciling Work and Family Life  59 
designed more to accommodate traditional child rearing and household practices 
than to create gender equality in employment. 
Leave arrangements in the private sector 
In most of the member states, more generous leave arrangements have been found 
in the public sector (as in Italy, Denmark and Germany).  There is evidence of a 
trend for these rights to be extended to the private sector, either as part of national 
collective bargaining (as  in Denmark) or as benefits available to  employees of 
specific companies (such as BMW in Germany).  There has been no systematic 
data collection on these schemes, which makes it difficult to assess their extent 
and  significance  but  this  is  likely  to  improve  with the  establishment  of  the 
Network on Families and Work.  The size of the employing organisation may be 
an important factor.  Leave entitlements are frequently not available to  those 
employed in small enterprises, either because they are specifically exempted, or 
because of the difficulties in policing employers' practices. 
The role of employers is clearly highly significant.  Many employers across the EU 
have schemes of leave which are superior to those offered by statute.  There are, 
however, certain drawbacks to schemes which are employer-based.  Because they 
are a legal entitlement of the employee, they are not transferable to the other 
parent and this may limit the scope for flexibility in deciding how to organise 
family responsibilities.  The provision of favourable conditions for some workers 
may also exacerbate the 'dualisation' of welfare state provision, where an elite of 
workers enjoy advantages not available to the majority.  Nursery and day care 
provisions by employers are, however, highly valued and may have an effect on 
decisions about whether to have children (European Commission, 1994b). 
Concerns  are  frequently  expressed  about the potentially  damaging  economic 
effects of employers having to accommodate parents' leave requirements.  Even 
where the costs  of leave are met by public funding,  there are other costs to 
employers, chiefly that of replacing the employee who is  on leave.  In reality, 
companies do not appear to  experience significant problems, as  the numbers 
taking leave at any one time are typically very low (less than two per cent of the 
workforce).  In Germany, over 90 per cent of companies said that there had been 
no major problems.  By contrast 75 per cent anticipated problems if the period of 
leave were extended to three years, although it is not clear whether these would 
materialise in practice.  Employers in general are more favourably disposed to 
parental leave, because it is predictable and can be planned in advance, whereas 
shorter periods of leave, such as those designed for the care of children when they 
are ill, are seen as disruptive and causing loss of productivity.  An emphasis by 
employers on the potentially negative effects of leave tends to obscure the benefits 
which result, such as the increased productivity of parents who are able to deal 
appropriately with domestic situations rather than working under stress.  The 
problems faced by small employers are perhaps more difficult to resolve, and may 
require special forms of support. 
In order for possibilities of reconciling work and family life to be extended to all 
workers in member states a considerably extended framework of paid statutory 
rights would be required.  The European Network on Child Care (1994a)  has 
suggested  a  minimum  of  16  weeks  post-natal  maternity  leave,  two  weeks 
paternity leave  and  12  months  parental leave,  to  be met from  public funds, 60  A Synthesis of National Family Policies 1994 
together  with  10  days  leave  for  family  reasons  per  year,  to  be  funded  by 
employers.  There has been, to date, considerable opposition to the extension of 
parental rights by some member states, and the Draft Directive on parental leave 
has remained blocked for over a decade.  In such a context, it may be unrealistic 
to anticipate major developments during the coming year, although as the Table 
4.2 above indicates, individual countries are continuing to make positive, if fairly 
small, improvements in provision. 
Child care 
The third main pre-condition for the reconciliation of work and family life is the 
availability of good quality and affordable child care.  There is a huge variety of 
child  care  provision  across  member  states,  with  a  distinctive  emphasis  on 
particular combinations involving the family, statutory and voluntary agencies in 
the private sector in each country.  Child care is the specific brief of the European 
Network on Childcare and their publications discuss the range of provision in 
more detail than can be dealt with in this document (see, for example, European 
Network on Childcare, 1994b, 1994c).  The impact of child care costs on family 
incomes and the importance of different benefit and subsidy arrangements are 
highlighted in the next chapter, and in the special Observatory study on the 
working patterns of lone  parents  (Bradshaw et  al.  1996).  Child  care  is  also 
discussed in  the broader context of support for  the  provision of  care  within 
families in Chapter Five.  Here we briefly outline changes reported in the last 15 
months. 
Several countries reported developments in national policy on child care during 
1994.  In Denmark, pressure on child care places led to the announcement of a 
'Child Care Guarantee' for all children aged between one and five years by 1996. 
In  Germany,  one  problem  with  child  care  provision  has  been  the  irregular 
teaching hours in primary schools.  Some schools have been introducing 'core-
time care' to help working mothers and since the start of the 1994/5 teaching year 
core-time has been made compulsory in the state of Baden-Wiirttemburg.  The key 
national debate has been around the implementation of the  guarantee (legislated 
for in 1992)  of a nursery school place for all children aged over three years  by 
1996.  Local authorities have opposed this measure on costs grounds and have 
tried, unsuccessfully, to have it postponed or phased in more slowly. 
In Greece the European Commission is supporting a pilot programme of full-day 
care for children in kindergartens and schools, to be implemented from the 1994/5 
school year and developing over a period of four years.  Care and activities will 
begin after the end of the normal school day and thus designed to help with the 
problems faced by working parents (particularly working mothers). 
In France the number of child care places is continuing to expand, with budgetary 
provision allocated for 100,000 extra places in creches and day nurseries over five 
years.  From January 1995 the supplementary assistance paid to families for the 
employment of a registered child minder has been increased, bringing the total of 
cash assistance and tax reliefs for this purpose to around 70 per cent of gross costs. 
At the same time, the allowance for care of young children at home (AGED) has 
been increased by over 50  per cent.  It will also now be paid at  half rate for 
children aged between three and six years. 
Provision has also been rising in Luxembourg.  Here the main, but inconclusive, 
debate has been about the merits of company creches.  In March 1994, the Minister Reconciling Work and Family Life  61 
for the Family indicated that vcompanies would be eligible to apply for subsidies 
from the budget allocated for the development of day care centres. 
A  pledge was given by the UK Prime Minister to create, over time, places in 
nursery schools or other provision for  all four year olds whose parents want 
places  for  them.  A  task force  was set up by the Minister for  Education  to 
implement  the  pledge.  The  result,  however,  announced  in  July  1995,  was  a 
proposed voucher scheme offering all parents a flat-rate sum to spend as they 
chose on approved forms of care.  The details of this scheme are not yet clear, but 
it has met with some criticism on the grounds that it appears to offer little extra 
money for child care provision (since local authority providers would have grants 
reduced) and would mainly benefit higher income families already paying for 
care. 
There were no other significant national policy developments, although in Italy 
the most recent regional law on family support (in Liguria) included provision for 
meeting the cost of day care up to a specified limit per child.  In Ireland a national 
Working Group on Child Care Facilities for Working Parents criticised the absence 
of a national policy strategy in this area. CHAPTER FIVE 
Family Incomes and Tax-Benefit Policies 
Introduction 
One of the key ways in which national policies impact on families is through the 
combination of fiscal and transfer arrangements which affect disposable incomes 
and thus contribute to living standards.  This chapter begins with a summary of 
national  experts'  assessments  of the  effect  of  current tax/benefit  regimes  on 
welfare outcomes for families in their respective countries, looking at levels of 
poverty and their concentration within particular family groups. This is followed 
by a comparative analysis of the structural impact of tax and benefit policies in 
1994 using the 'model family' method developed in previous comparative studies 
by the Social Policy Research Unit.  This is a new departure for the Observatory, 
and the rationale and methodology are described in some detail below.  The final 
section of the chapter summarises changes in the fiscal and social security systems 
announced in 1994 and early 1995, and considers their likely impact on family 
incomes. 
Poverty and family living standards 
Any  discussion  of  poverty  and  income  distribution  in  the  EU  countries 
immediately comes up against a number of problems, both methodological and 
political.  Definitions of poverty can be highly controversial within individual 
countries,  and  the  multi-faceted  nature  of  the  problem  makes  international 
comparisons difficult.  The European Commission, through Eurostat, has set in 
motion an increasing harmonization of social statistics which has allowed the 
setting of standards or benchmarks against which national policies can be judged 
(Room,  1995).  Yet  in  using  percentages  of  the  national  mean  income  or 
expenditure, these standards primarily measure inequality and are frequently 
rejected as indicators of poverty per  se.  There is  also the question of whether 
poverty should be measured on a national or Community-wide basis.  The data 
allow for the calculation of poverty lines for the Union as a whole, which tend, not 
surprisingly, to show a concentration of poverty in the poorer countries, but it is 
an open question as to whether the policy implications of such an approach are 
likely to be addressed by the EU. 
Aside from technical debates concerning measurement levels, the use of income 
or  expenditure  and  equivalence  scales,  there  is  a  wider  question,  reflecting 
different  ideological traditions, of whether distributional  issues are the key or 
whether the relational questions which underpin the concept of 'social exclusion' 
are more relevant (Room, 1995).  Data on relative income and expenditure may 
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therefore be seen as only one part of a wider picture, but they are nevertheless 
interesting in the context of family policy, in so far as they indicate how different 
kinds of families with children fare in the distribution of national incomes. 
Table 5.1  shows estimates of poverty produced for Eurostat, based on 40 and 50 
per cent of national average household expenditure at the end of the 1980s (the 
latest period for  which these comparable data are available).  The equivalence 
used is the modified OECD scale.
1  This represents a compromise between the 
main OECD scale, which tends to record  larger families  as poorer, and other 
'subjective' scales which have the opposite effect.  The results are sensitive to the 
different equivalence scales in terms of the numbers below particular thresholds, 
but the overall country rankings do not change significantly.  The family budget 
datasets on which these estimates are based are not always fully comparable, and 
some of the national samples are very small.  More comparable data have been 
assembled as part of the Luxembourg Income Study (see, for example, O'Higgins 
and Jenkins, 1989; Smeeding et al., 1992), but as yet there is information for only a 
small number of EU countries beyond the mid-1980s. 
The table shows that the reduction in poverty rates caused by moving from the 50 
per cent  to  the 40  per cent line  is  proportionately greater in countries with 
relatively low levels of poverty, with the exception of the UK.  This would suggest 
that in these countries the  'poverty gap' (that is  the extent  to which people's 
expenditure is  below the specified threshold) is  relatively small (Bardone and 
Degryse, 1994). 
Table 5.1: Eurostat estimated poverty rates by country, end of 1980s (modified 
OECD equivalence scale) 
In  terms of:  40%  threshold  50%  threshold  In  terms of:  40%  threshold  50%  threshold 
Household  Person 
Belgium  1.7  6.6  Belgium  2.2  7.4 
Denmark  1.4  4.2  Denmark  1.1  3.9 
Germany  5.3  12.0  Germany  4.5  10.9 
Greece  13.0  20.8  Greece  11.4  18.7 
Spain  9.3  17.5  Spain  8.7  16.9 
France  7.5  14.9  France  6.9  14.7 
Ireland  7.9  16.4  Ireland  7.5  15.7 
Italy  12.5  22.0  Italy  11.6  21.1 
Luxembourg  3.7  9.2  Luxembourg  4.8  11.1 
Netherlands  1.9  6.2  Netherlands  1.5  4.8 
Portugal  17.3  26.5  Portugal  15.5  24.5 
UK  7.4  17.0  UK  6.4  14.8 
Source: Extracted from Table 2 in Bardone and Degryse, 1994, based on national family budget surveys. 
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On a household basis, Portugal, Italy and Greece stand out as having the largest 
concentrations of relatively low incomes, with Ireland and France also relatively 
high at the 50 per cent threshold.  Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands exhibit 
the least relative poverty. 
Aggregate data do not, of course, tell us how far different forms of families with 
children are vulnerable to poverty.  In fact, while there is a consistent pattern of 
certain household types falling into low income or expenditure groups across 
most or all of the EU countries, there is much more variation in the extent to which 
families with children are among the lowest income groups.  Again, there is a 
problem with comparable data, not least because of different ways of defining 
household types.  Table 5.2 gives further Eurostat estimates of poverty rates by 
selected risk groups in eight EU countries around the end of the 1980s, using the 
50 per cent threshold. 
In all countries, households headed by an unemployed or 'unoccupied' person 
were particularly vulnerable, as were couples with four or more children and lone 
parents.  Single and married people over 65  were also especially likely to  be 
relatively poor in most countries, as were households headed by women, but the 
exceptions here were Belgium and Luxembourg.  However, by only looking at the 
household status of adults, we miss seeing the full picture as it affects children. 
The table suggests that nearly a fifth of all children aged 16 and under were in 
households in relative poverty in most of the eight countries, with rather fewer in 
Belgium and somewhat more in Portugal. 
The differences in relative poverty between countries reflect a variety of factors, 
including disparities  in market earnings,  the extent to  which unemployment 
affects  different  household  types,  social  and  demographic  changes  such  as 
increases in lone parenthood, and the role of fiscal and social security policies in 
concentrating  preventive  help  on  particular  groups.  Looking  at  individual 
countries we can begin to see how these factors impact on families. 
In Belgium, for example, research by the Centre for Social Policy indicated an 
overall relative improvement in the living standards of families  with children, 
including lone parents, between 1985  and 1992,  both as measured by the EU 
norms and by the CSP's 'subjective standard' (CSP,  1992).  Although there have 
been increases  in the number of families  receiving  social  security payments, 
recipients mainly have other sources of income and there is  no evidence of a 
serious dualisation between those with social security incomes and those without. 
There is  a  substantially increased risk of being in poverty, according to  either 
standard, where the family has only one earner or is headed by a lone parent, and 
on the basis of the EU norm nearly 15 per cent of children in families with three 
or more children live in material insecurity.  Nevertheless, families with children 
are on average better represented  in higher income groups  than households 
without children. 
There is a widespread view in Denmark that the EU thresholds represent only 
measures of inequality (which is lower in Denmark than in most countries) and 
that other means of enquiry are necessary in order to locate 'true' poverty.  One 
recent study by Hansen (1990) found that disposable income for all family types 
was higher than that of single people, but that equivalised per person income in 
families was generally lower.  Lone parents in particular were around five times Table  5.2:  Estimated  poverty  rates  in  eight  countries  by selected  risk  groups  (50  per  cent  of average  equivalent 
expenditures using modified OECD scale), end of 1980s* 
France  Spain  Portugal  Italy  Greece  Ireland  Belgium  Luxembourg 
Total population (households  14.9  17.5  26.5  22.0  20.8  16.4  7.5  9.2 
Socio-economic catergory head 
Farmer  I agricultural worker  25.0  27.4  39.8  31.2  28.8  9.8  25.7  24.4 
Unemployed  34.8  29.3  47.5  35.7  24.5  43.6  28.3  44.1 
Retired  21.9  27.3  48.5  35.7  33.4  19.2  7.2  11.3 
Homemaker  /unoccupied  31.0  23.8  34.5  36.6  30.5  30.9  (23.6)  14.0 
Household type 
One person, 65 and older  33.8  37.9  59.9  40.3  44.5  35.7  7.4  11.2 
Couple with 4 or more children  36.9  22.7  37.6  42.9  27.6  22.3  18.8  25.0 
Lone parent household  18.3  22.8  27.8  22.9  17.5  23.8  14.4  17.5 
Economic situation 
Nobody working  26.0  32.0  47.5  35.0  35.1  37.1  7.7  10.6 
Age of head 
Below25  11.3  19.9  33.8  19.8  7.8  17.3  14.4  10.6 
65 and older  26.1  29.1  49.5  37.1  38.9  23.3  8.3  10.5 
Sex of head 
Female  22.6  25.2  33.9  28.8  29.3  24.2  7.7  9.9 
Persons below 14 years  16.0  16.8  22.3  19.5  15.0  21.0  6.7  11.4 
Persons between 14 and 16  19.4  21.1  25.0  22.7  19.8  n/a  11.0  18.0 
Source: Table 2 in Ramprakash, 1994.  *Years of surveys range between 1987 and 1990 
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as  likely  as  couples  with  children  to  experience  their financial  situations  as 
difficult. 
Germany  has  experienced  a  marked  increase  in  long-term  receipt  of  social 
assistance  (regarded  in  the  Fifth  Family  Report  as  an  indicator  of  poverty) 
between 1980 and 1992, particularly among families with children.  The number 
of married couples in receipt of assistance quadrupled over this period, although 
the increase for lone parents was slightly below the average.  The latest (1993) 
wave of data from the Socio-Economic Panel showed a doubling (from 10 to 20 
per cent) of the proportion of German nationals with incomes below 50 per cent 
of the national mean between 1984 and 1993.  For non-nationals the figure was 
nearer 25 per cent.  Households most likely to experience poverty by this measure 
are lone parents (33 per cent), households with five or more persons (23 per cent) 
and households with older children (19  per cent)  (Federal Office  of Statistics, 
1994).  However, most households tend to remain below the poverty threshold for 
less than a year. 
There is little information on family poverty and living standards in Greece, but 
the Eurostat data suggests that in spite of a relatively high level of overall poverty 
this is concentrated less among larger families than in other equivalent countries 
and more among the elderly.  This may be a result of the special benefits for larger 
families  which  are  a  feature  of  the  social  protection  system.  However,  the 
existence of a large informal economy in Greece makes these data less than fully 
reliable.  There are also considerable variations by region (Bourdalos, 1994). 
Spanish household expenditure data suggest that the percentage of households 
with expenditure below 50 per cent of the national average has changed little 
between  1974  and  1991  (INE,  1993).  The  average,  however,  masks  wide 
differences  between household  types,  social  groups  and  regions.  The  most 
vulnerable groups are older persons living alone (46 per cent), followed by lone 
parents (39 per cent) and then single people under 65.  Poverty is least common 
among couples without children (12 per cent) and then those with children (14 per 
cent).  Women  are  particularly  vulnerable  overall,  with  25  per  cent  of  all 
households below the threshold being headed by a women. Older women are the 
most likely of all groups to be in poverty, mainly because their lack of a paid 
working career has left them with only minimal pensions. 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 above show that at the end of the 1980s in France around 15 per 
cent of households had expenditure below the 50  per cent threshold, and that 
compared with other similar countries one of the groups most likely to be below 
this level was couples with four or more children.  Between then and 1994 the 
number of people receiving the Revenu Minimum d'Insertion (RMI) (around 40 per 
cent of whom are lone parents or couples with children) has more than doubled. 
According  to  CNAF  (1994),  around  seven  million  people are  thought  to  be 
'socially vulnerable' and around 10 million are dependent on basic social security 
benefits. 
Ireland had one of the highest levels of relative poverty in Europe at the end of the 
1980s.  A study by the Economic and Social Research Institute estimated that 26 
per cent of all children lived in households with disposable income below 50 per 
cent of the national average (Nolan and Farrell, 1990).  A recent study by the 
Combat Poverty Agency, using a budget standards approach, suggested that only 68  A Synthesis of National Family Policies 1994 
for the youngest children did the child support package (the combination of child 
benefit and child tax allowances) come close to the actual cost of raising a child 
(Carney et al., 1994). 
The  latest  data  for  Italy  were  collected  for  1993  by an  official  Commission 
(Commissione  d'indagine sulla  povertii e sull'emarginazione, 1994).  These show that 
using an  'International  Poverty  Line'  based  on equivalised  expenditure it  is 
families with three or more children who are disproportionately poor.  Poverty is 
also sharply differentiated by region, with families in the South twice as likely to 
be poor as those in the North. The differing regional characteristics of households 
and families also leads to variation in the factors associated with poverty.  Thus in 
the South, the greatest risk of being in poverty is associated with being in a large 
family and dependent on the income of one person, while in the North family 
bonds are more fragile and one of the main risks is being an older person living 
alone (Sgritta, 1993).  Where poverty is most acute it is thus closely correlated with 
the family, both positively and negatively.  The Commission estimated that more 
than one million children - around one in seven - were in poverty in 1993. 
By  EU  standards Luxembourg has a  relatively low level  of poverty,  and  the 
introduction  of the  Revenu  Minimum  Garanti  (RMG)  helped  to  improve  the 
financial situation of households as a whole between 1985 and 1992.  On the basis 
of the RMG threshold, the percentage of households in poverty fell from 6.3 per 
cent in 1985 to only 1.2 per cent in 1992 (Hausman, 1993), and among couples with 
children the poverty rates are even lower.  The one group who are particularly 
vulnerable to poverty are lone parents, especially where they have more than one 
child (10.3  per cent using RMG threshold).  The EU threshold of 50 per cent of 
equivalised expenditure is  considerable higher than that of the RMG and thus 
took in 7.6 per cent of households in 1991  (Hausman, 1993).  Again lone parents 
were the most vulnerable group (26-33 per cent), followed by couples with three 
or more children. 
After Denmark, the Netherlands has the lowest level of poverty according to the 
EU norm-a situation which is supported by an extensive system of social security 
protection.  However, around one household in 12 lives on the level of the social 
minimum, which research has suggested may be broadly adequate in the short 
term, but during longer periods of claiming can lead  to  recipients  incurring 
serious debt (Woldringh et nl., 1987).  By 1994, around 63,000 one parent families 
and 52,000 couples with children had been living on this minimum for more than 
eight years. 
Portugal, by contrast, is the country with the highest estimated poverty rates, and 
research suggests that there has been little change in the last decade, except to a 
small extent in rural areas (Ferreira, 1993; Rodrigues, 1993; Bruto da Costa, 1994). 
Contrary to the pattern in a number of countries, families with children are rather 
less likely to be poor than other households, especially single people and couples 
aged over 65  and younger single people.  Even lone parents, with a  1989/90 
poverty rate of nearly 18 per cent were only slightly more vulnerable than single 
men under 65 (Ferreira, 1993). 
In July 1994,  the UK government published its official statistics on Households 
Below Average Income (DSS, 1994).  This showed that although living standards had 
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half average income had increased.  Between 1979 and 1991/2 the proportion of 
lone parents in this position increased from 19 to 59 per cent, while the figure for 
two parent families with children tripled from eight to 24 per cent.  Another study 
(Goodman and Webb, 1994) used the same data but looked back over the last 30 
years.  This showed that up to the mid-1970s inequality was decreasing, but that 
since then it has grown sharply, with a  shift in the composition of the poorer 
groups away from older people and more towards families  with children.  A 
number of other studies were also published in 1994, highlighting the impact of 
growing inequality on health and on the difficulties experienced by low-income 
families with children in making ends meet. 
The  extent  to  which  families  experience  poverty  or  inequality  in  different 
countries is mediated by fiscal and social security policies.  One way of exploring 
the impact of these policy structures is  by comparing the situations of 'model 
families'. 
The model families comparison 
Rationale and methods 
The purpose of the model family technique is to allow comparison to be made of 
the value and structure of 'income packages' which accrue to particular types of 
family or household as a  result of the distribution of market earnings and the 
fiscal and social security arrangements in existence at a given time in each country. 
For the purposes of this report, the national experts in the Observatory completed 
an 'income matrix', based on the package of benefits and charges likely to apply 
to  a  set  of  model families  in specified,  near-identical  circumstances  in  each 
country in May 1994.  These data enable comparison of the disposable income 
accruing  to  the model families,  and thus of  the marginal gains or losses  for 
different types and size of family which are implicit in policy structures. They also 
allow analysis of ways in which income packages are constructed and the relative 
importance of different elements of the tax/benefit systems. 
The approach builds on similar methods developed for an earlier study of child 
support packages also carried out at York (Bradshaw et al.,  1993).  In that study 
data were collected on the impact of the tax/benefit systems on model families in 
15 countries in May 1992.  Information on three other countries was subsequently 
added, and  the level  of social  assistance  in 18  countries has been compared 
(Bradshaw,  1995).  These  data  were  also  used  to  compare  the  benefits  and 
incentive structures for  lone parents (Whiteford and Bradshaw, 1994)  and the 
treatment of married women engaged in housework and home care (Shaver and 
Bradshaw, 1995).  As part of a recently completed study for the UK Department of 
Social Security and the OECD, (Eardley et al., 1996 forthcoming), the model family 
technique  was  used  to  compare  the  level  and  structure  of  minimum 
income/social assistance benefits in the OECD countries in 1992. 
The  method  depends on being  able  to  compare  like  with like  - a  perennial 
difficulty in cross-national research.  Simulating the impact of national polices on 
the model families requires a series of detailed specifications and assumptions 
which are not always entirely satisfactory.  The following sections outline the 
choices made for  this exercise, starting with the specification of model family 
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Family types 
The following nine family types were chosen for comparison: 
1.  A single person aged 35 
2.  A couple both aged 35 (all couples are assumed to be married) 
3.  A couple aged 35 with one child under three (two years and eleven months, 
i.e. pre-school in all countries) 
4.  A couple aged 35 with one school-age child (seven years) 
5.  A couple with two children aged seven and eight years 
6.  A couple with three children aged seven, eight and 14 
7.  A lone parent (female, separated or divorced not widowed) with one pre-
school child 
8.  A lone parent with one school-age child (aged seven) 
9.  A lone parent with two school-age children (aged seven and eight). 
This selection of family types is inevitably somewhat arbitrary.  They were chosen 
to illustrate and compare the impact of tax benefits on a range of types of families, 
but it has to be recognised that some of these family types, particularly the lone 
parents, are more or less common in different countries. They are also all 'nuclear' 
families. The complexity of attempting to model the policy framework for  the 
presence of other adults in the household or for other wider family and household 
obligations  arguably  outweighs  the  possible  advantages,  though  this  is  a 
limitation in the context of the Observatory's brief.  Specifying that all couples are 
married also means that differences in the treatment of cohabiting couples cannot 
be analysed.  Finally, the assumption has to be that resources are shared within 
families in a similar way across the countries compared.  There are sufficient data 
on inequalities in within-household resource distribution in certain countries to 
make this assumption highly questionable, but since the purpose of the analysis 
is to examine the notional structural effect of tax/benefit policies on families it can 
be argued that the distribution of resource consumption within families,  is  a 
separate issue.  It should be noted,  however,  that different  countries'  policy 
approaches to this question are reflected in areas such as individual taxation, 
individualisation or splitting of benefits and choices about to whom benefits for 
children are paid.  Any recent changes in these arrangements are noted in the 
companion volume, Chapter 2 and summarised later in this chapter. 
Income 
Most  of  the  family  types  were  allocated  hypothetical  income  from  market 
earnings at several levels.  In addition, some were assumed to have no earnings or 
social insurance income, and to be receiving payments under minimum income 
guarantees or social assistance arrangements, where these exist. 
The following five earnings cases were compared: 
1.  Couples and lone parents with one earner receiving half national average 
male earnings 
2.  Couples and lone parents with one earner receiving national average male 
earnings 
3.  Couples and lone parents with one earner receiving one and a half national 
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4.  Couples with one earner receiving national average male earnings and the 
other receiving 0.66 average female earnings 
5.  Couples with one earner receiving one and a  half national average male 
earnings and the other receiving one and a  half national average female 
earnings. 
In order to be able to calculate the value of special support going to lone parents 
compared to couples with children or single people without children, the lone 
parents (while assumed to be mothers) were assumed to be receiving the relevant 
ratios of average male earnings.  Clearly this would often be unrealistic, but it is 
necessary in order to avoid confusing the structural effects of tax/benefit policies 
with wage differentials by sex. 
There are no completely satisfactory and up-to-date data on earnings for all the 
countries in the study and it was necessary to use a standardised methodology to 
produce  estimates.  For  comparability  this  replicated  the  methods  used  in 
Bradshaw eta/. (1993).  OECD estimates for 1992 in The Tax-Benefit Position of 
Production Workers (OECD, 1994b) were used as the base. These give the average 
gross earnings of all full-time production workers in the manufacturing sector in 
each country.  They were updated to May 1994  by using the index of hourly 
earnings of production workers in the manufacturing sector given in the OECD 
publication Main Economic Indicators.  National informants were asked to check 
these figures against national sources and in a few cases adjustments were made 
to the OECD figures. 
The  earnings  levels  derived  using  this  method  are  summarised  in  national 
currencies and in purchasing power parity terms
2 in Table 5.3.  It should be noted 
that in considering the net disposable incomes of families we are not starting from 
a  level playing field  because average gross earnings differ between countries. 
Average male earnings in Greece and Portugal, for example, are only about half 
those in the Luxembourg and the Netherlands- after taking account of differences 
in purchasing power.  Earnings in Spain are also lower than elsewhere.  Among 
the remaining northern European countries, earnings are remarkably similar, with 
the exception of France, which has average male earnings not much greater than 
Spain in purchasing power terms.  Finland and Sweden, among the new members 
of the  EU,  also  have  relatively  low average  wages,  although  they  were  not 
involved in this study. 
That France and these other two countries have earnings apparently so much 
lower than the other northern European countries calls for some explanation. It is 
no doubt partly a function of purchasing power parities, but we believe that it is 
mainly related to the level of the  'social wage' in those countries.  In France, 
employers' social security contributions represent 55 per cent of average earnings. 
Similarly in Sweden they represent 35  per cent of average earnings, while in 
Finland  the  combination  of  employers'  social  security  and  superannuation 
contributions brings the total to 29 per cent of average earnings.  It is likely that 
' Purchasing Power Partities  (PPPs)  arc  a  method of comparing the  actual  value of a  currency  in  terms of its 
purchasing power against a standardised basket of goods and services. They have their limitations (see Eardley eta/., 
1996 forthcoming), not least that they are primarily designed for use in comparisons of aggregate national income 
and expenditure rather than at a micro level, but it can be argued that they are the best available way of comparing 
the value of benefit across countries. Table 5.3 gives the PPP equivalent to£ sterling used in this analysis. 72  A Synthesis of National Family Policies 1994 
what is happening in these countries is  that workers are effectively foregoing 
higher current earnings for the benefits (often in the future) of a generous social 
wage.  These high social security contributions can thus be seen as a form of 
deferred wage.  By contrast, earnings are higher in the UK, for example, partly 
because employers are not required to contribute so much to the social wage.  If 
this is the explanation for these differences, then, as Whiteford (1995) has argued, 
when comparing the earnings levels of workers between countries it might be 
more appropriate to include employers' social security contributions, which has 
not been done in this analysis. 
There are also differences between countries in the relationship between male and 
female  earnings:  average  female  earnings  as  a  proportion  of  average  male 
earnings, vary in the 12 EU countries from 85 per cent in Denmark to 56 per cent 
in Luxembourg. 
The final case used was of families receiving social assistance.  In each country the 
adults were assumed to have been unemployed for  too long to be entitled to 
contributory  unemployment  benefit,  or  to  have  failed  to  achieve  sufficient 
contributions.  It was assumed that none of the social assistance families had any 
income from earnings - they were receiving the full assistance paid to the long-
term unemployed or to lone parents.  It was thus designed to be the 'worst case 
scenario' in each country.  Again it must be recognised that this is an unusual 
situation in some countries.  Social assistance in some countries is also organised 
on a local basis, without fixed national rates.  The model families were assumed 
to be living in a specified area (see below).  Where payments are discretionary, the 
national informants estimated the amounts likely to be awarded to the families in 
the circumstances specified.  It should be recognised, however, that these figures 
are inevitably less reliable than those for other benefits with fixed rates, and that 
in countries with substantial local variation and discretion the situation applying 
in one area may not be representative of the country as a whole. 
The calculation of cash benefits received and tax and social security contributions 
payable was fairly straightforward for most countries, given the families' income 
and family circumstances. However, calculation of other elements of the package 
called for the establishment of a common context and framework for the analysis. 
A particular difficulty arises in the comparison of housing costs. 
Housing costs 
Housing costs are especially difficult to take into account in comparative research. 
Costs vary within and between countries according to tenure and the size, age and 
location of dwellings.  In some countries rents may be controlled for those persons 
occupying dwellings before a certain date.  For owner occupiers, loan structures 
and interest rates vary between countries, often according to the stage in the 
economic cycle, while the level of mortgage interest is also affected by the stage of 
a purchaser's life cycle.  There are also significant differences between countries in 
tenure distribution at different income levels.  Nevertheless, housing costs cannot 
be ignored. In many countries help with housing costs is a critical element in the 
benefit package and even where such support does not exist, variations in housing 
costs mean that real income levels differ substantially before and after taking 
account of housing.  For this exercise, the families were assumed to be living in 
rented  dwellings  - rented  from  a  public  authority,  housing  co-operative  or Table 5.3:  Average gross male and female earnings in local currencies and purchasing power parities, £ sterling per 
month, 1994 
Male  Female 
-, 
Local currency  ppp = £1  Value in ppps £  Local currency  Value in ppps £  Female earnings 
sterling  sterling  as o/o  of male 
earnings 
Belgium  BFR  69,788  62.77  1,112  52,341  834  75 
Denmark  DKR  18,753  15.35  1,222  15,903  1,036  85 
Germany  DM  4,523  3.37  1,342  3,346  993  73 
Greece  DR  240,161  344.13  698  181,019  526  75 
Spain  PTA  177,631  196.22  905  119,013  607  67 
France  FF  9,740  10.42  935  7,693  738  79 
Ireland  £IRL  1,161  1.06  1,095  824  777  71 
Italy  LIT  2,499,000  2425.00  1,010  1,934,848  798  79 
Luxembourg  LFR  82,199  58.17  1,413  46,092  792  56 
Netherlands  HFL  4,639  3.42  1,358  3,479  1,018  75 
Portugal  ESC  107,735  211.97  508  74,336  351  69 
UK  £  1,241  1.00  1,241  844  844  68 
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housing association if they were common forms of tenure in the country, or from 
a private landlord if that was the most common tenure pattern. In those countries 
with high levels of owner occupation this assumption is less representative. 
National informants were asked to fix typical or representative rent levels for such 
dwellings in a  given town in their country.  There is an argument for  using 
national average rents rather than local estimates, but previous experience has 
suggested that up-to-date information on average rents is  often not available. 
Locating the families in a given commune, town or city,  helps to  structure the 
comparisons where benefits vary locally, but it can be difficult in some countries 
to  nominate  a  typical  or  'average'  location.  The  size  of the  dwellings  was 
specified, and varied with the model families, so that single people were assumed 
to be living in one-bedroom dwellings, couples without children, lone parents 
with one child and couples with one child lived in two-bedroom dwellings, and 
lone parents or couples with two or three children in three-bedroom dwellings. 
Again, this is an artificial assumption, as families on constrained incomes will in 
practice make different choices in response to local housing markets. The national 
informants  were  left  to  determine  whether  the  dwelling  was  a  house  or  a 
flat/  apartment, on the basis of what was the most likely accommodation type in 
their country. 
Informants were also asked to provide the gross rent.  One defect of this method 
is that it does not take account of the value of any bricks-and-mortar subsidy on 
the dwelling- the difference between the market rent and the gross rent. If  certain 
families are benefiting more than other households from living in houses with 
bricks-and-mortar subsidy and therefore have lower rents for the same dwelling, 
the  support  package  for  such  families  will  be  underestimated.  It is  also 
Table 5.4: Gross rents nominated by the national informants, in £sterling PPPs, 
per month, 1994 
One bedroom  Two bedrooms  Three bedrooms 
PPPs £ sterling  PPPs £ sterling  PPPs £ sterling 
Belgium (Antwerp)  159  190  214 
Denmark (Copenhagen)  119  165  230 
Germany (Mannheim)  139  179  201 
Greece (Peristeri, Athens)  102  131  160 
Spain (Madrid)  209  245  280 
France (Fontanay aux Roses)  240  307  345 
Ireland (Dublin)  330  425  472 
Italy (Turin)  53  106  159 
Luxembourg (Lux. City)  287  341  394 
Netherlands (Njimegen)  115  131  164 
Portugal (Lisbon)  58  58  58 
UK (York)  117  131  163 Family Incomes and Tax-Benefit Policies  75 
anomalous that the rents assumed in some countries are those subject to rent 
control.  In these cases the rent is being subsidised by the landlord. 
Table  5.4  shows  that  the  designated  rents  varied  substantially  between  the 
nominated  locations,  even  for  the  same  size  dwelling:  for  a  two-bedroom 
dwelling they ranged from a  controlled rent of £58  per month (in  purchasing 
power parities) in Lisbon to more than £340 per month in Luxembourg.  The rents 
in Dublin, though apparently even higher, are the product of a differential rent 
scheme in public sector housing which varies rents with the income and family 
circumstances of the occupants.  The rents given in the table are for the richest 
working family in the study. The ratio of rents for dwellings of different sizes also 
varied between countries.  Thus in Turin, for example, the estimated rent for a 
three-bedroom dwelling is about three times the rent for a one-bedroom dwelling, 
but in Antwerp a three-bedroom dwelling only costs a quarter more than a one-
bedroom dwelling.  In Portugal there is no difference in the rents of different sized 
dwellings  because  they  are  controlled.  These  variations  illustrate  the  very 
considerable problems involved in taking account of housing costs in this kind of 
analysis.  National informants were then asked to give the net rent - that is, the 
rent actually payable by a family of the specified type and earnings level.  The 
difference between the gross rent and the net rent was then treated as part of the 
package of support. There is no denying that these assumptions are both arbitrary 
and unsatisfactory in many respects.  However, to  have ignored altogether the 
impact of housing costs and housing subsidies would have been more misleading. 
Housing costs are not only a problem at the design stage of comparative projects, 
they are also difficult to handle at the analysis stage, particularly in relation to the 
social  assistance case.  The problem arises because in some countries housing 
costs, or a proportion of them, are paid together with social assistance. Thus the 
basic benefit takes account of some or all  housing costs.  In other countries, 
housing costs are subsidised either by a reduction in rent payable or by a housing 
benefit  or  allowance  scheme  which  is  administered  separately  from  social 
assistance.  If comparisons are  made of  the  level  of social  assistance  before 
housing costs then the first group of countries- those that pay the housing subsidy 
in with social assistance - will appear to have higher levels than the others.  One 
option is to avoid making comparisons of social assistance before housing costs 
and to  concentrate  on comparisons after housing costs,  when income  net of 
housing represents the income people have left to spend on items other than 
housing. 
However there are three objections to this approach: 
Housing is a consumer good and consumers are more or less free to make 
choices about the quality and quantity they consume.  It is not in the same 
category as income tax or social security deductions.  The families in some 
of those countries who receive their housing allowance in with their social 
assistance could choose to consume less  housing and use the element of 
their benefit provided for  housing for  general consumption.  A possible 
solution would be to identify the element in social assistance that represents 
housing costs and deduct it from benefits.  But to do that would be to 
misrepresent the actual resources that the family has command over, and 
for  some  countries  it  is  not  possible  to  identify  the  housing  element 
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Similarly, families in those countries with housing benefit schemes could 
theoretically move to more expensive housing and pay higher rents without 
it affecting their net disposable resources (unless the rent is  considered 
unreasonable in the housing benefit scheme). 
As  we  have  seen,  the  rents  of  the  dwellings  in  each  country  vary 
considerably.  The  quality  of  the  housing  will  also  vary,  though  not 
necessarily  according  to  the  level  of  the  rent.  Therefore,  if the  social 
assistance comparison is made only after housing costs families may not be 
starting from the same standard of living. 
There  is  no simple solution  to  these  problems.  It  would be wrong  to  make 
comparisons only before housing.  Yet  it would also be misleading in certain 
circumstances to compare incomes only after housing.  The answer we believe is 
to present the results in most circumstances both before and after housing costs, 
but also to bear in mind that results after housing costs are strongly affected by the 
assumptions made and the local circumstances. 
Local taxes 
National informants were also asked to take account of any local taxes payable in 
the nominated location and to calculate the impact of any subsidies.  If the local 
charge was a form of local income tax, contributing to national revenues, it was 
included with income tax. 
Health costs 
In order to take account of the value of health care in each of the countries, a 
standard  package  again  had  to  be  established.  The  base  line  assumptions 
employed were that health care at the point of demand was free and available to 
all regardless of means and that it was of similar quality in every country. Account 
was then taken of any variations from  this assumption by costing a  standard 
package of health care in each country.  This included any charges for  three 
prescriptions per person per year for a standard antibiotic, three visits to a general 
practitioner per person per year and one visit to a dentist for a check-up and filling 
per person per year.  The costs were estimated for  both adults and children, 
annualised and turned into a  monthly charge.  Where such payments would 
normally be met through an insurance premium, the monthly premium was 
entered  in  the  matrix  as  the  health  charge.  The  major  problem with  these 
assumptions is that in those countries - including Greece, Portugal, Spain and to 
some extent Italy - where in theory there is access to public health services but in 
practice the quality may be poor or the waiting list long, families often tend to use 
private treatment. 
Education/child-care costs 
In order to take account of the costs or value of free  or subsidised pre-school 
provision, a standard package was again established for each country.  National 
informants were asked to follow the most prevalent pattern of formal full-time, 
pre-school provision in their country and to  take account of the costs of this 
provision. This resulted in different types of care being costed in each country, and 
no account could be taken of any variations in the quality of that care.  Child-care 
costs for  the child under three were counted where the lone parents or both 
parents in a couple were at work. Again there are problems with the assumptions, 
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including only a child aged just under three, the comparison fails to illustrate the 
substantial differences in services or costs which can apply in some countries to a 
child aged just over three. 
It was assumed as a base-line that school education of an equivalent standard, 
including basic books, was available free  to all children of school age.  It was 
assumed that parents would have to pay for a midday meal and that children 
lived near enough their school not to require school transport. Account was then 
taken of any charges that parents were expected to pay for the education and any 
benefits (including the value of free or subsidised school meals) that they might 
receive. 
The limitations of the model family approach 
The assumptions that have been described  above are essential to  the task  of 
simulating policy by obtaining comparable information on an up-to-date basis. 
However, there are several disadvantages, in addition to the problems discussed 
earlier.  First, this method inevitably produces a description of the way the system 
should work rather than how it necessarily does.  For example, the study implicitly 
assumes that all those eligible for means-tested benefits are claiming them, despite 
the fact that take-up of these benefits is known to be far from complete in some 
countries. It  is possible to address this difficulty at the analysis stage by excluding 
such benefits or even by building in some assumptions on take-up.  However, 
because of the complexity of the interactions within the different systems this is 
not always  a  safe  or easy solution  and  the  data  on which  to  ground  these 
assumptions are often  missing.  Other behavioural effects  of policy  are also 
inevitably missing from the analysis.  For example, the high cost of formal child 
care in some countries means that many working parents, especially lone parents, 
in practice find other informal solutions.
3  In modelling their net incomes it may, 
therefore,  be unrealistic  to  take  the  child-care  costs  into account.  These  are 
limitations which make it necessary always to emphasise that it is the structural 
features of tax/benefit systems which are being compared, not the outcomes for 
actual families.  Concentrating on the formal arrangements and the intended 
impact of the policies one is  seeking to evaluate can, however, be as valid as 
looking at the actual impact. 
Secondly, looking at families at one point in time obscures the more complex life-
cycle effects of tax/benefit systems. In particular, while employees' social security 
contributions are taken into account as reducing disposable income, there is no 
way of modelling the future benefits which accrue from them.  In so far as higher 
contributions may bring better benefits (which is not always the case), this may 
distort the picture for some countries from a longer-term perspective, especially in 
relation to retirement pensions.  However, by counting benefits received at the 
time, some account is taken of the distributive effect of contributions previously 
paid by the family in question and by other contributors. 
Thirdly, concentration on cash income and charges tends to understate differences 
between countries in the level of service provision.  This applies particularly to a 
country like  Denmark, where family  support is  based  strongly on extensive 
' Costs, of course, are not the only motivation for working women choosing to place their children with relatives or 
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service provision.  The income matrix reflects differences in some elements of 
support for families, including health and education costs, but it cannot in itself 
represent the full range of possible provision. 
Fourthly, the more assumptions that are made about the circumstances of the 
model families, the less representative those families are of actual populations. 
This  problem is  the  inevitable cost  of achieving  comparability.  It has to  be 
accepted that the model families in the study are most unlikely to exist in all their 
characteristics in any country.  They are not representative but illustrative. They 
illustrate  a  range  of  experience,  and  being  comparable  they  enable  us  to 
demonstrate and compare the tax/benefit 'environment' implicitly created for 
families in a  variety of circumstances in a  number of countries.  Ideally other 
families  and other aspects  of the benefit systems would have been included. 
However, with nine family  types, six earnings levels and a variety of different 
benefit systems in each country, the matrix was already large and complex. 
This is the first time an attempt has been made within the Observatory project to 
simulate financial policies towards families using this technique.  Revisions and 
corrections have to be made on a continuous basis, and the data presented below 
should not be taken as a full or totally accurate picture of the impact of family 
policies  in  the  European  Union.  The  analysis  does,  however,  provide  an 
important set of initial comparative indicators which will be subject to elaboration 
and refinement in future years. 
Results of the model family analysis 
The first set of charts (Figures 5.1a - 5.1d) shows how the tax/benefit systems 
operate in principle to alter the distribution of market incomes for four model 
families: 
(a)  a couple with three school-age children, with one earner on half average 
earnings (or the minimum wage if it is higher) 
(b)  a lone parent with one pre-school age child, working for average earnings 
(c)  a  couple with two school-age children, with both parents working, each 
receiving one and a half times the average earnings for their sex 
(d)  a couple with one pre-school age child, both parents working, the man for 
average  male  earnings  and  the  woman  for  two-thirds  average  female 
earnings. 
The first column for each country provides the gross earnings, the second column 
gives the income after direct taxes and social security contributions have been 
paid, and the third column after any benefits have been received,  net of any 
charges for health, education or, if appropriate, for child care.  The final column 
gives the net disposable incomes after the deduction of net housing costs (the 
problematic assumptions on which have to be borne in mind). 
It can be seen that there is a good deal of variation between countries at different 
stages of the redistributive process.  In the case of the low-earning, larger family 
(Figure 5.1a) earnings in France are relatively low, close to those in Ireland and 
well below other EU countries with similar GOP per capita. The reasons for this 
have been discussed above.  They are further reduced by the impact of direct 
taxation  and  social  security  contributions.  However,  the  benefit  package  is 
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this family ends up overtaking the same family in Denmark,  Netherlands and the
UK. The Irish family has relatively low net housing costs at this earnings  level
and thus ends up with the highest disposable  income. Before housing costs, the
impact of benefits is substantial  in the UK. It is interesting to note that in Portugal
and Spain, where extra assistance for larger families has traditionally been a
feature of family and child allowance packages, the benefit system appears  to
have only a marginal effect for this family in raising post-tax income. In Greece,
on the other hand, the impact of benefits is substantial,  but is severely reduced by
net housing costs.
Similar re-rankings  can be observed in Figure 5.1b, where the assumption  that the
lone parent has to find child care in order to work makes  a big impact on the value
of the benefit package. Ireland and the UK show notably lower net disposable
incomes as a result of this, although  as was noted earlier the reality is often that
these potential costs are avoided in favour of informal child care.
For the family in Figure 5.1c - the best-off family in the study - the impact of
benefits is less pronounced. However  there is still some re-ordering of countries,
mainly as a result of differences in tax and social secdrity. Thus the UK, for
example, takes considerably  less from this family than the Netherlands, Denmark,
Germany and Belgium.
Figure 5.1d shows that only in France and Belgium  does a dual-earner couple
requiring  care for a child aged just under three receive any significant net benefit
from the redistributive  process.
Figure 5.La The tax/benefit redistributive  process for a low-income  larger family
Couple with 3 children  (7,8,14 years old), half average earnings,  May 1994
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Frgure 5.1b: The tax/benefit  redistributive Process for a lone parent with one
pre-school child
Figure 5.Lc The tax/benefit redistributive process for a higher income couple
with two children
Lone parent with 1 child (2 years eleven months), average  earnings,  May 1994
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Figure 5.1d: The tax/benefit redistributive  process for a dual-earner couple with
one pre-school child
Support  for families with children
An important element in countries'  tax,/benefit  packages  is the combination  of
benefits, tax allowances or credits, and remission of charges, in respect of
dependent  children. The value of this child-related package is represented in the
foilowing tables by showing the difference  between  the net disposable  resources
of a childless  couple and a family with children at the same earnings level.
Figure 5.2a takes one family type - a couple with two school-age children - and
shows how the value of the child-related package before housing  costs varies with
earnings. For the low-income, one-earner family the child benefit package  is most
generous in Ireland, followed by the UK. These countries  are targeting their
support particularly towards families with low incomes and the package  does not
vaiy significantly  for families above with earnings  above this level. By contrast,
Luxembourg, esi:ecially, and France and Germany to a smaller extent, have more
generous plckages for families with higher earnings. This is the result of
providing muchbf the package through tax allowances which offer most help to
better-off families, or in the case of Luxembourg  a very generous level on non
income-tested  child benefit. Belgium and Denmark do not vary their packages
significantly  by earnings (though it should be noted that such one-earner couples
are unusuai iri Denmaik). The figures for Italy at the higher earnings level are
negative because any child-related allowances  or benefits accruing to these
families do not compensate for the educational expenses parents are expected to
pay for their children. It should be noted here that, as stated earlier, chqggs or
beirefits for after-school care for children of school age are not included. Such
provision is available on an income-related  basis in a number of countries,
including,  particularly,  Denmark.82 A Synthesis of l,{ational Family Policies 1994
Figure 5.2b takes one earner on average  earnings and shows how the child-related
package - again before housing costs - varies with the number of children. In
Belgium, France and Luxembourg,  the package  is proportionately much more
generous for a three-child family than a two-child family, whereas in most other
countries families receive about the same amount or less for the third child. In
Spain, the child-related package is insignificant  for all three families at this level
of earnings.
Figure 5.2a: The child benefit package for a couple with two childrery by
earnings
This analysis shows that the value of the child-related package varies both
between  and within countries according to a number of factors.  These include
earnings,  and the number and ages of the children in the household.  There is
further variation according to whether the comparison is made before or after
housing  costs (and, as we shall see, child-care  costs).
A first attempt to summarise the overall comparative value of the child-related
package paid to two parent families with some market earnings is presented  in
Tables 5.5a to 5.5d. These use the average  value in PPPs of the ihild-related
package accruing to the four couple families at five earnings levels. It is thus
based on the average of 20 family types and earnings levels, excluding lone
parents and families on social assistance. The child-related  package,  as in the
earlier figures, is estimated  as the difference in disposable  income, after tax and
social security contributions,  local taxes, net charges for the standardised health
package, and education and child-care costs, between  couples with and without
children.
Couples  with 2 children aged 7 and I years, before housing, May 1994
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Figure 5.2b: The child benefit package for a couple with one earner, by number
of children
Clearly an average for family types takes no account of the prevalence of different
types of family at the various income levels in different  countries - a prevalence
which may in some cases be influenced by behavioural  responses to the policy
structures under examination. Nor can it represent  the variation for different
family types. Nevertheless, this composite  figure does provide  a useful indicator
of the overall effect of policy. The average for each country is presented  as a
percentage  distance from the mean for all the family types before and after
housing costs. Those with negative  figures are thus below the mean on average.
It can be seen that Luxembourg  is the most generous  country in payments to
couples with children - not surprisingly perhaps given the relative wealth of this
small country. Luxembourg also has a high population of migrant  workers who
do not necessarily benefit from its generous social security system. The order of
countries after Luxembourg  depends somewhat on whether housing  costs are
taken into account or not, but in both cases Portugal, Greece, Spain and Italy have
the least generous child benefit packages.
Couples with one eamer,on  average eamings  before housing, May 1994
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Table S.Sa: Child benefit package: couples with children, before housing 
% difference from  mean  Rankings 
Belgium  111  Luxembourg  257 
Denmark  -26  Belgium  111 
Germany  28  France  106 
Greece  -57  Germany  28 
Spain  -108  UK  -24 
France  106  Denmark  -26 
Ireland  -29  Ireland  -29 
Italy  -131  Netherlands  -45 
Luxembourg  257  Greece  -57 
Netherlands  -45  Portugal  -91 
Portugal  -91  Spain  -108 
UK  -14  Italy  -131 
Table S.Sb::Child benefit package: couples with children, after housing 
% difference from  mean  Rankings 
Belgium  142  Luxembourg  310 
Denmark  -6  France  161 
Germany  90  Belgium  142 
Greece  -132  Germany  90 
Spain  -139  Denmark  -6 
France  161  UK  -33 
Ireland  -56  Ireland  -56 
Italy  -186  Netherlands  -61 
Luxembourg  310  Portugal  -89 
Netherlands  -61  Greece  -132 
Portugal  -89  Spain  -139 
UK  -33  Italy  -186 Family Incomes and Tax-Benefit Policies  85 
Table S.Sc: Child benefit package excluding Luxembourg: couples with 
children, before housing 
% difference from  mean  Rankings 
Belgium  175  Belgium 
Denmark  --4  France 
Germany  67  Germany 
Greece  --44  UK 
Spain  -111  Denmark 
France  169  Ireland 
Ireland  -7  Netherlands 
Italy  -140  Greece 
Netherlands  -28  Portugal 
Portugal  -88  Spain 
UK  12  Italy 
Table S.Sd: Child benefit package excluding Luxembourg: couples with 
children, after housing 
% difference from  mean  Rankings 
Belgium  237  France 
Denmark  32  Belgium 
Germany  165  Germany 
Greece  -145  Denmark 
Spain  -154  UK 
France  263  Ireland 
Ireland  -39  Netherlands 
Italy  -220  Portugal 
Netherlands  --45  Greece 
Portugal  -85  Spain 
UK  -7  Italy 
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It is  perhaps surprising to  find  Denmark in a  relatively low position by this 
composite measure.  This highlights some of the difficulties with the model which 
were discussed earlier.  The composite measure includes one-earner couples, who 
are unusual in Denmark though more common elsewhere, as well as male/female 
earnings ratios which are not typical of Denmark.  Also, service-based family 
support, including the after-school care which makes dual earnings more feasible, 
are not fully captured in the income matrix. 
Because Luxembourg's high payments may distort the mean for the remaining 
countries, Tables 5.5c and 5.5d present the same analysis excluding the Duchy. 
The rankings are,  of course, unaltered, but the dispersal around the mean is 
somewhat different. 
Lone parents 
So far the analysis has concentrated on two parent families.  The situation of lone 
parent families is considered in greater detail in a separate study linked to the 
Observatory  (Bradshaw et  al.,  1996).  Here we examine two aspects  of their 
treatment  in  tax/benefit  systems.  First  their  net  disposable  resources  are 
compared with those of a single person without children but with the same gross 
earnings (both based on male earnings). The disposable income figure is again 
calculated net of the standard deductions and charges referred to earlier.  The 
comparison is presented in Tables 5.6a and b. They show that the treatment of lone 
parents varies with earnings and family size, but at half average earnings a lone 
parent with one child is most generously treated in Ireland and Germany, and 
Table 5.6a: Lone parent support: difference between net disposable income of a 
single person and a lone parent, before housing, £ sterling PPPs per month 
Half average earnings  Average earnings  One and a half average 
earnings 
1 ch(7)  2 ch (7, 8)  1 ch(7)  2 ch (7, 8)  1 ch(7)  2 ch (7, 8) 
Belgium  59  161  59  160  60  161 
Denmark  123  227  122  226  122  226 
Germany  195  328  193  347  214  379 
Greece  30  39  33  47  31  45 
Spain  12  25  492  53  58  62 
France  69  201  124  254  131  282 
Ireland  209  271  99  109  -88  112 
Italy  45  63  15  28  -22  -31 
Luxembourg  135  250  226  363  192  395 
Netherlands  98  150  131  184  138  175 
Portugal  4  8  9  24  11  22 
UK  185  269  99  135  99  135 Family Incomes and Tax-Benefit Policies  87 
Table 5.6b: Lone parent support: difference between net disposable income of a 
single person and a lone parent, after housing, £ sterling PPPs per month 
Half average earnings  Average earnings  One and a half average 
earnings 
1 ch(7)  2 ch (7, 8)  1 ch(7)  2 ch (7, 8)  1 ch(7)  2 ch (7, 8) 
Belgium  30  109  30  109  30  110 
Denmark  127  230  76  167  76  115 
Germany  178  332  153  285  174  317 
Greece  2  10  5  18  2  16 
Spain  -25  -49  12  -21  20  -12 
France  90  227  163  296  55  176 
Ireland  207  269  100  109  88  65 
Italy  -10  -45  -39  -80  -77  -139 
Luxembourg  82  142  173  255  139  287 
Netherlands  115  161  111  130  118  121 
Portugal  5  9  10  24  11  23 
UK  167  221  82  79  82  so 
least generously treated in Portugal and Spain.  At higher earnings levels, France 
is also relatively generous, as are Germany and Luxembourg, whereas the UK 
concentrates more of its  help on lower earners.  After  housing costs  (on  the 
assumption that they would tend to have to occupy larger accommodation), lone 
parents in Spain and Italy are notionally worse off than single people and little 
better off in Greece and Portugal. This illustrates the problem described earlier of 
taking account of housing costs.  Precisely because little financial help is available 
to lone parents in these countries, women on their own with children would have 
difficulty meeting the rent for  the standard size and type of accommodation 
hypothetically  allocated  to  them.  They  would, in practice,  be more likely  to 
occupy other forms of less expensive housing. 
Only part of the extra income accruing to lone parents is directly child related, so 
the second way of comparing the treatment of lone parents is  to look at the 
difference in net disposable resources of a lone parent and a couple with the same 
number of children and the same earnings (Tables 5.7a and 5.7b).  This shows that 
the  tax/benefit  systems  in  most  countries  treat  lone  parents  slightly  more 
generously  than  couples  with  the  same  earnings.  The  main  exceptions  are 
Belgium and Italy, while it is also not true for some families in Ireland, Denmark, 
Luxembourg and Portugal.  Before housing costs are taken into account, France is 
the most generous overall to lone parents relative to couples, while after housing 
costs, France, the Netherlands, Germany and Spain are all relatively generous, 
depending on the earnings level, and the UK, through its income-related benefits, 
offers extra support to lone parents at the lower earnings level. 88  A Synthesis of National Family Policies 1994 
Table 5.7a: Net disposable income of lone parents as a percentage of the net disposable 
income of one earner couples at three earnings levels, before housing costs 
Half average earnings  Average earnings  One and a half average 
earnings 
1 ch(7)  2 ch (7, 8)  1 ch(7)  2 ch (7, 8)  1 ch(7)  2 ch (7, 8) 
%  %  %  %  %  % 
Belgium  93  94  90  91  92  93 
Denmark  103  115  98  107  95  101 
Germany  106  117  104  113  99  108 
Greece  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Spain  102  102  101  101  100  100 
France  108  114  105  109  102  107 
Ireland  96  95  102  102  100  101 
Italy  94  94  99  98  100  99 
Luxembourg  100  100  99  100  90  91 
Netherlands  102  102  104  104  107  107 
Portugal  102  100  100  101  96  96 
UK  104  104  103  103  102  102 
Table  5.7b:  Net  disposable  income  of lone  parents  as  a  percentage  of the  net 
disposable income of one earner couples at three earnings levels, after housing costs 
Half average earnings  Average earnings  One and a half average 
earnings 
1 ch(7)  2 ch (7, 8)  1 ch(7)  2 ch (7, 8)  1 ch(7)  2 ch (7, 8) 
%  %  %  %  %  % 
Belgium  89  91  86  88  89  91 
Denmark  104  118  97  108  94  102 
Germany  105  114  105  116  99  109 
Greece  101  119  100  107  100  104 
Spain  105  107  101  101  101  101 
France  128  119  116  112  104  110 
Ireland  96  95  103  110  99  101 
Italy  92  92  99  98  100  98 
Luxembourg  100  100  99  100  88  89 
Netherlands  103  103  104  104  108  108 
Portugal  104  101  100  101  96  96 
UK  107  109  105  105  103  103 
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So far, the value of the child-related income package for different families has been 
presented  without  any  analysis  of  the  effect  of  different  components  of  the 
tax/benefit system.  Tables 5.8a- 5.8c present the components of the system for the 
three family  types.  The figure  in each column represents  the difference  (either 
positive or negative) that the presence of children makes to the family compared 
with the situation of a one-earner couple or single person with no children. Thus, in 
Table 5.8a, a couple in Belgium with one earner at half average male wages and with 
three children would pay £36 per month less taxes than the same couple without 
children, would receive £278 per month in non means-tested child benefit, would 
pay £7 more in health charges and £18 in school costs, and overall would be £289 per 
month better  off  than  the  equivalent  childless  couple.  This  analysis  excludes 
. housing costs and social security contributions (which do not vary in any country 
according to the presence of children), but includes all the other elements included 
in the model families income package. 
Table 5.8a  shows that for  this larger,  low-wage family,  extra tax  allowances are 
significant only in Belgium and Ireland.  For most countries except Ireland and those 
of the South of Europe, a key component of the package is non income-tested child 
benefit.  Universal child benefit is important in the UK, but for this lower-earning 
family help through family credit (classed here as an income-tested child benefit) is 
more significant.  Income-tested child payments are the key element in Ireland too, 
while they play a smaller role in France, Germany, Spain and Portugal. Variations in 
health charges are generally not large, though Ireland stands out in making an extra 
health-related payment for this family type.  In addition, France and Ireland give 
free school meals; in Germany a small social assistance top-up is available to a family 
Table 5.8a: Structure of the child benefit package for a couple with three children (7, 
8, 14) on half average earnings, represented as the difference between their income 
and that of a childless couple at same earnings level, in£ sterling PPPs 
Tax  Non  income- Income- Health  School  Other  Total 
tested child  tested child  charges  costs 
benefit  benefit 
Belgium  36  278  - -7  -18  - 289 
Denmark  - 104  - -1  - - 103 
Germany  - 125  55  - - 24  204 
Greece  - 23  - -1  - - 22 
Spain  - - 46  -15  - - 31 
France  - 162  92  -10  99  - 343 
Ireland  19  57  223  37  9  - 345 
Italy  9  - - -10  -43  87  43 
Luxembourg  - 386  - -4  -22  - 360 
Netherlands  - 165  - -8  -34  74  197 
Portugal  - 22  17  -15  -7  - 17 
UK  - 116  212  - - - 328 90  A Synthesis of National Family Policies 1994 
at this earnings level; the Netherlands pay a benefit introduced to compensate for 
changes in the tax and social insurance structure (OT); and in Italy a dependant's 
allowance is payable. 
Table  5.8b  gives  the  same breakdown for  the lone parent on average  earnings, 
compared  to  a  single  person without children.  In  most  countries,  particularly 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Ireland and Germany, the lone parent would pay less 
tax than a single person. Only Denmark makes no distinction in tax liability between 
these two individuals, while in Greece and Portugal the extra allowance is marginal. 
The Netherlands, Denmark and the UK stand out in providing a significant level of 
non income-related child benefit.  France's policies of extending income-related child 
benefits further up the income scale than most other countries is also demonstrated 
in this table.  The substantial variation in net disposable income for this lone parent, 
compared to a single person, is crucially affected by the costs of child care.  In most 
countries, a lone parent on average earnings would have to meet the full costs - or 
find cheaper alternatives.  On this basis, the lone parent in the UK would be worse 
off (before housing costs), compared to a single childless person, than in any of the 
other countries. 
Table 5.8b: Structure of the child benefit package for a lone parent with one child 
aged 2 years 11 months, on average earnings, represented as the difference between 
her income and that of a childless single person, in £ sterling PPPs 
Tax  Non  income- Income- Health  School  Other  Total 
tested child  tested child  charges  costs 
benefit  benefit 
Belgium  14  41  - -2  - - 53 
Denmark  - 87  - - -97  46  -36 
Germany  76  21  - - -42  76  131 
Greece  4  4  - - - - 8 
Spain  54  - - -5  -153  - -104 
France  67  - 91  -4  12  44  210 
Ireland  89  19  - -9  -184  - -85 
Italy  27  - - -3  -73  29  -20 
Luxembourg  158  55  - -1  -102  - 110 
Netherlands  93  82  - 4  -164  - -7 
Portugal  5  11  - -5  -65  - -54 
UK  29  71  - - -347  - -247 
Table 5.8c looks at the dual-earner family on higher wages, with two school-aged 
children.  In all countries except Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK, this couple 
benefits from  child tax  allowances - especially in  Luxembourg.  Universal child 
benefit again plays an important role,  particularly in Luxembourg, Belgium and the 
Netherlands.  Overall, the UK and Ireland stand out in one respect: the differences 
in  disposable  income  for  this  couple,  compared  to  a  childless  couple,  are Family Incomes and Tax-Benefit Policies  91 
Table 5.8c: Structure of the child benefit package for a couple with two children (7, 
8), two earners at 1.5 average male and 1.5 average female earnings, represented as 
the difference between their joint income and that of a childless couple with two 
earners at the same earnings level, in£ sterling purchasing power parities 
Tax  Non  income- Income- Health  School  Other  Total 
tested child  tested child  charges  costs 
benefit  benefit 
Belgium  36  144  - -5  -15  - 160 
Denmark  - 70  - -1  - - 69 
Germany  78  42  - - - - 120 
Greece  10  13  - -1  - - 22 
Spain  19  - - -10  -8  - 9 
France  84  63  - -7  - - 140 
Ireland  6  38  - -18  - - 26 
Italy  13  - - -7  -66  - --{;0 
Luxembourg  415  184  - -2  - - 597 
Netherlands  - 96  - -40  - - 56 
Portugal  13  22  - -10  -5  - 20 
UK  - 80  - - - - 80 
considerably smaller than those for the three-child family in Table 5.8a.  This reflects 
the emphasis in these countries on targeting resources towards those with lower 
incomes. 
Child care 
Table 5.8b highlights the issue of the costs of pre-school child care.  Clearly if a 
lone parent, or both parents in a  couple, want to  work outside the home, the 
question of how to provide child care is crucial, especially for a child of pre-school 
age.  The institutional arrangements for services for children vary considerably 
between countries, but it is possible to make an estimate of the likely costs facing 
parents in the specified circumstances.  Table 5.9 shows the monthly costs of the 
nominated form of pre-school care for lone parents with one child at two earnings 
levels in £sterling PPPs and as a percentage of average earnings.  In Belgium, 
France and Greece, a couple or lone parent with a pre-school child do not pay for 
child care.  Charges vary with earnings in most of the other countries but they are 
standard and higher than other countries in Ireland, Spain and the UK.  Overall 
they are highest in the UK and Ireland. 92  A Synthesis of National Family Policies 1994 
Table 5.9: The net costs to parents of pre-school day care: lone parents with one child 
aged 2 years 11 months 
£PPPs per month  Percentage of earnings 
Half average  Average  %gross half  % gross average 
earnings  earnings  average earnings  earnings 
Belgium  - - - -
Denmark  52  97  7  8 
Germany  17  42  3  3 
Greece  - - - -
Spain  153  153  34  17 
France  - - - -
Ireland  184  184  34  17 
Italy  32  73  6  7 
Luxembourg  59  102  7  7 
Netherlands  59  164  9  12 
Portugal  20  65  8  13 
UK  347  347  56  28 
Table 5.10 shows the impact of child-care costs if parents choose to place their 
children in the main type of formal day care available in their respective countries. 
The table compares the difference in the child-related package identified in earlier 
tables, depending on whether the child is aged under three years or aged seven. 
This is  shown for lone parents at three earnings levels and for couples at two 
earnings levels. 
At half average earnings in Portugal, Spain and the UK the costs of child care 
more than wipe out the value of the child-related package for the lone parent.  At 
average earnings it is wiped out in Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and 
the UK.  As has been emphasised earlier, the high cost of formal child care in 
countries like Ireland and the UK may be one factor in lone parents' decisions 
to  use other more informal arrangements.  It  may also affect  their ability or 
inclination to seek paid work-a question which is addressed in the separate study 
of lone parents' working patterns (Bradshaw et  al.,  1996).  As was also stated 
earlier, no account is taken here of costs of after-school care for children of school 
age. 
For couples, it is only in Belgium, France and Germany that the costs of formal 
child care do not fully consume the extra payments and allowances available 
through the tax/benefit system. 
Tables S.lla and S.llb provide a summary of the value of means-tested social 
assistance or minimum income support, in purchasing power parities, before and 
after housing costs, for all the model families.  It is assumed that the assistance 
recipients have no other earnings- not perhaps a very representative assumption Table 5.10:  The impact of pre-school child care costs on the child-related income package for lone parents and couples at 
different earnings levels: difference in net disposable income depending on age of child, before housing, £ sterling PPPs 
per month 
Child Benefit Package 
I 
Lone parent over a single person before housing  2 earner couples over a childless couple 
Earning levels: 
0.5 ave  average  1.5 ave  ave male+ 0.66 ave female  1.5 ave male+ 1.5 ave female  I 
1 child  1 child aged  1 child  1 child aged  1 child  1 child aged  1 child  1 child aged  1 child  1 child aged , 
age 7  under3  age7  under 3  age 7  under 3  age 7  under 3  age 7  under 3 
Belgium  59  53  59  52  60  53  59  53  59  59 
Denmark  123  81  122  35  34  -53  34  -53  123  123 
I 
Germany  195  160  193  133  50  1  60  11  195  195 
Greece  30  30  33  33  9  9  8  8  30  30 
I 
Spain  12  -143  49  -104  4  -149  4  -149  12  12 
I 
France  69  156  124  211  22  114  46  46  69  69 
Ireland  209  26  99  -85  13  -177  14  -176  209  209 
I 
Italy  45  29  15  -20  -35  -137  -43  -137  45  45 
Luxembourg  135  62  225  110  132  -59  200  -118  135  135 
Netherlands  98  so  131  8  37  -198  80  -239  98  98 
Portugal  4  -15  9  -54  9  -53  10  -97  4  4 
UK  185  -162  99  -247  44  -302  35  -303  185  185 
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w Table S.lla:  Net disposable income for all family types on social assistance before housing 
Single  Couple  LP+l  LP+l  LP+2  Couple+]  Couple+] 
(2 years  (7)  (7, 8)  (2 years  (7) 
11  months)  11  months) 
Belgium  312  414  486  493  587  473  480 
Denmark  317  566  516  506  610  812  801 
Germany  323  486  509  509  632  585  585 
Greece  0  0  17  17  35  17  17 
Spain  184  209  224  227  265  245  247 
France  191  271  420  307  393  354  357 
Ireland  242  387  355  355  437  492  492 
Italy  120  239  239  233  330  341  335 
Luxembourg  515  782  641  678  887  909  946 
Netherlands  372  531  563  522  574  610  568 
Portugal  158  199  210  209  213  205  204 
UK  198  311  332  348  432  422  438 
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>4 Table S.llb:  Net disposable income for all family types on social assistance after housing 
Single  Couple  LP+l  LP+l  LP+2  Couple+l  Couple+l 
(2 years  (7)  (7, 8)  (2 years  (7) 
11  months)  11  months) 
Belgium  152  224  296  303  374  283  290 
Denmark  216  426  421  411  515  647  636 
Germany  184  307  331  331  431  407  407 
Greece  -102  -102  -113  -113  -125  -113  -113 
Spain  -34  --45  -30  -27  -26  -11  -8 
France  99  141  321  208  288  217  220 
Ireland  226  362  336  336  415  464  464 
Italy  67  133  133  127  171  235  229 
Luxembourg  313  528  387  423  578  654  691 
Netherlands  281  438  469  428  476  516  475 
Portugal  100  142  153  151  155  148  146 
UK  198  311  332  348  432  422  438 
Couple+2 
(7, 8) 
359 
658 
489 
-125 
-6 
350 
535 
282 
848 
521 
174 
522 
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in countries where assistance commonly acts as a  top-up to low or part-time 
earnings,  some of which may be disregarded  in the means  test.  Any non-
contributory child benefits payable in addition to social assistance are included in 
the overall sum.  As was  stated earlier,  social  assistance  rates  are  not fixed 
nationally in all  countries and the figures  given in  these tables  are based on 
estimates of the amounts likely to accrue to the families in the given locations. The 
countries where location and officer discretion are most likely to make a difference 
are Italy  and Spain.  Greece  and Portugal have no general  social  assistance 
schemes.  The figures given here for Portugal are for unemployment assistance, 
which assumes a previous contributory record which has now been exhausted. 
For Greece,  since most childless people below retirement age would have no 
access to social assistance once entitlement to unemployment insurance has been 
exhausted, the figures for these family types are zero, whereas lone parents and 
couples with children would receive some income-tested child benefit. 
For a  couple with two children,  payments vary from  £35  per month before 
housing costs, and a notional minus £125 per month after housing costs, in Greece 
to £1,156 before and £848 after housing costs in Luxembourg. The negative figures 
for Greece and Spain again illustrate the problem of housing costs.  It is unlikely 
that families on social assistance, or without any formal state support, would be 
able to meet the standard rents nominated and so would in practice have to find 
other, cheaper forms of accommodation.  The structural deficit in such families' 
incomes also illustrates the importance both of support from families and the 
likelihood of earnings in the informal economies of these countries. 
Tables 5.12a and 5.12b provide a picture of the implied equivalence scale in social 
assistance, representing the net disposable income of the different family types as 
a percentage of that of a couple without children.  Pre-school child-care costs are 
not included, but all the other elements of the income package are counted.  Only 
Denmark, Ireland and Luxembourg appear to pay less to lone parents with one 
child  than  to  childless  couples  at  the  assistance  level,  while  France  gives 
substantially more - particularly to lone parents with a child under three.  After 
housing costs,  France also stands out as being the most generous country to 
couples with two children or more children. 
Replacement rates 
The analysis so far has compared the level of families' incomes and how they are 
affected by the level of earnings, taxes, benefits and charges.  However, in the 
context of high unemployment in many countries of the European Union, it is 
difficult to look at benefit levels in isolation, without considering the incentive 
structures implicit within them for families where the adults are unemployed.  In 
assessing the incentive structures facing families, it is necessary to compare their 
incomes when earning with what they would receive if they had no income from 
earnings and were dependent on social assistance or the equivalent benefit paid 
to families outside the labour market. 
Economic  theory  distinguishes  between two  factors  that  may be relevant  to 
individual decisions to participate in the labour market-the income effect and the 
substitution effect.  The provision of social assistance means that a given level of 
income can be maintained without participation in the labour market (the income 
effect), while the withdrawal of benefits operates as a tax on earnings and reduces Table 5.12a:  Implied equivalence scale of social assistance, net disposable income as  percentage of that of a childless 
couple, before housing costs 
Single  Couple  LP+l  LP+l  LP+2  Couple+l  Couple+l  Couple+2  Couple+3 
(2 years  (7)  (7, 8)  (2  years  (7)  (7, 8)  (7, 8, 14) 
11  months)  11 months) 
Belgium  75  100  117  119  142  114  116  138  170 
Denmark  56  100  91  89  108  143  142  148  157 
Germany  66  100  105  105  130  120  120  142  163 
Greece •  - - 117  117  135  117  117  135  153 
Spain  88  100  107  109  127  117  118  137  153 
France  70  100  155  113  145  131  132  168  205 
Ireland  63  100  92  92  113  127  127  146  166 
Italy  50  100  100  97  138  143  140  184  228 
Luxembourg  66  100  82  87  113  116  121  148  183 
Netherlands  70  100  106  98  108  115  107  117  123 
Portugal  79  100  106  105  107  103  103  116  120 
UK  64  100  107  112  139  136  141  168  206 
-
*People without children receive no social assistance, but zero payment for couple is treated as index of 100 for comparison with other family types 
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'J Table 5.12b:  Implied equivalence scale of social assistance, net disposable income as  percentage of that of a childless 
couple, after housing costs 
Single  Couple  LP+l  LP+l  LP+2  Couple+l  Couple+l  Couple+2  Couple+3 
(2 years  (7)  (7, 8)  (2  years  (7)  (7, 8)  (7, 8, 14) 
11 months)  11  months) 
Belgium  68  100  132  135  167  126  129  160  218 
Denmark  51  100  99  96  121  152  149  154  173 
Germany  60  100  108  108  140  133  133  159  192 
Greece*  - - - - - - - - -
Spain  -76  100  -67  ---{;0  -58  -24  -18  -13  60 
France  70  100  228  148  204  154  156  248  340 
Ireland  62  100  93  93  115  128  127  146  164 
Italy  50  100  100  95  129  177  172  212  291 
Luxembourg  59  100  73  80  109  124  131  161  212 
Netherlands  64  100  107  98  109  118  108  119  127 
Portugal  70  100  108  106  109  104  103  123  127 
UK  64  100  107  112  139  136  141  168  206 
* People without children receive no social assistance, so for after housing cost comparison the notional negative figure for a couple is treated as the index 
figure (1 00) 
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the cost of not earning (the substitution effect).  However, if the level of social 
assistance is below the target level of income for an individual, the withdrawal 
rate may actually encourage further labour market effort, since the individual will 
have to work more hours to reach their income target (the income effect of the 
withdrawal rate). 
Benefit  replacement  rates  are  usually  calculated  by  comparing  the  levels  of 
statutory  entitlements  to  some  measure  of  income  in  work  (Bolderson  and 
Mabbett,  1991;  Palme,  1990;  Esping-Andersen,  1990),  thus  showing  what 
percentage of earnings is 'replaced' by benefits.  That is: 
Replacement rate  Income when receiving benefits  x 100 
Income when employed 
Replacement rates can be altered either by changes in the level of benefits or in the 
level of disposable income in work.  In several countries in the EU there are 
important schemes to provide in-work benefits, including Family Credit in the 
United  Kingdom  and  Family  Income  Supplement  in  Ireland.  Some  other 
countries tend to provide extensive systems of income-related housing assistance 
and more substantial assistance with child-care costs, the effects of which may be 
broadly similar, while others disregard part of earned income in the means test 
calculation, sometimes withdrawing benefit at less than a  100  per cent rate as 
income rises.  Such in-work benefits are an important component in policies to 
encourage workforce participation. 
It is also important to note that there are some difficulties involved in comparing 
benefit replacement rates across countries, related to whether it is appropriate to 
use gross or disposable income. 
Tables 5.13a and 5.13b compare the level of social assistance paid as a proportion 
of  the  net  disposable  resources  of the  same  families  receiving  half average 
earnings.  This  is  an indicator  of  the  replacement  rate  for  social  assistance, 
assuming that unemployed people receiving means-tested assistance are likely to 
be in the market mainly for lower-paid employment.  Clearly the extent to which 
this  represents  a  common  experience  will  depend  on  how  important  social 
assistance is as a benefit for families with unemployed adults.  We  know from 
other work (Eardley et al., 1996 forthcoming) that social insurance benefits paid at 
higher levels than assistance are still the main component of coverage for  the 
unemployed in a  number of countries. At this level of earnings some of the 
income-related in-work benefits are still operating.  Replacement rates vary by 
family  type,  but  for  couples  with  children  before  housing  costs  they  are 
particularly  high  in  Denmark,  Luxembourg,  Germany,  Portugal  for  larger 
families,  and  the  Netherlands.  Indeed  for  all  those  countries  except  the 
Netherlands some families  receiving social assistance would be better off than 
they would have been if they had been receiving half average earnings.  It is 
arguable, however, that for countries like Denmark where dual earner couples are 
the norm, a more realistic replacement rate would be based on earnings by both 
partners. Table 5.13a:  Replacement rates: net disposable income on social assistance as a percentage of net disposable income on 
half average earnings, before housing 
Single  Couple  LP+l  LP+l  LP+2  Couple+l  Couple+l  Couple+2  Couple+3 
(2 years  (7)  (7, 8)  (2  years  (7)  (7, 8)  (7,8, 14) 
11  months)  11  months) 
Belgium  65  36  92  92  91  83  83  84  87 
Denmark  74  52  101  92  93  149  149  147  146 
Germany  70  39  82  78  80  95  95  103  104 
Greece •  - - 6  6  11  6  6  11  9 
Spain  44  19  81  53  60  58  58  66  72 
France  41  25  68  58  59  63  73  78  69 
Ireland  57  36  78  56  63  74  74  77  79 
Italy  29  21  54  51  69  67  68  87  105 
Luxembourg  74  43  84  81  93  111  113  122  127 
Netherlands  75  40  98  88  89  99  98  99  98 
Portugal  71  32  102  93  93  93  93  101  103 
UK  39  22  97  50  56  64  66  70  74 
• No social assistance for people under retirement age without children 
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~ Table 5.13b:  Replacement rates: net disposable income on social assistance as a percentage of net disposable income on 
half average earnings, after housing 
Single  Couple  LP+l  LP+l  LP+2  Couple+l  Couple+l  Couple+2  Couple+3 
(2  years  (7)  (7, 8)  (2 years  (7)  (7, 8)  (7, 8, 14) 
11 months)  11 months) 
Belgium  49  47  88  89  89  75  75  77  82 
Denmark  68  60  104  92  94  147  148  142  143 
Germany  57  46  71  66  66  86  86  85  87 
Greece*  - - -64  -64  -68  -65  -65  -81  -65 
Spain  -17  -21  -143  -15  -17  -7  -75  -4  18 
France  36  41  71  57  58  60  78  83  70 
Ireland  57  52  80  55  62  73  73  76  78 
Italy  19  18  40  36  55  59  60  83  110 
Luxembourg  76  74  92  85  104  136  140  153  153 
Netherlands  75  64  100  88  89  100  100  100  100 
Portugal  61  63  103  90  90  90  90  102  104 
UK  54  54  178  65  74  85  88  96  98 
*No social assistance for people under retirement age without children 
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Overall liaing standards  of 'aaerage'  families
So far we have been considering elements of the tax/benefit  package and how
they affect net disposable resources.  In the final set of charts (Figures 5.3a-d), we
compare the net disposable income of two family types at different earnings
levels. It is possible from this to make a broad comparison of the structural  effect
of policy on the living standards  of these families in the EU (in so far as income
can be equated  with living standards). This analysis can obviously be repeated for
other family Wpes.
First we take a couple with two school-aged children. Eurostat estimates indicate
that in 1990/91, couples with children made up an average of around 38 per cent
of private households in the European Union, and that about 41 per cent of these
had two children (Eurostat, 1995). Before housing costs (and excluding families in
Luxembourg  who are consistently  the best offl, at half average  earnings it is in the
UK and Ireland that this couple has the highest level of disposable income,
followed  closely by Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. At average earnings
the Dutch family does better, followed by those in Germany and the UK. In the
highest earnings bracket, the family in the UK and the Netherlands share joint top
place (after Luxembourg), with Germany and France following,  but it has also
improved  its position in Italy, Spain and Ireland. The position does not change
dramatically after housing costs.
Figure 5.3a: Net disposable income for couples with two school-age children,
before housing, at five earnings levels, € sterling PPPs
Couples  with 2 children aged 7 and 8 years, before housing, May 1994
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Figure 5.3b: Net disposable  income for couples wlth
af[er housin B, at five earnings levels, € sterling PPPs
two school-age  childr€n,
Figure 5.3c: Net
before housing,
disposable income for lone parents with one school -age child,
at three earnings levels, E steding PPPs
Couples  with 2 children  aged 7 and 8 years, after housing, May 1994
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Lone parent with one child aged 7 years, before housing, May 1994
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Figure 5.3d: Net disposable income for lone parents with one school-age  child,
after housing at three earnings levels, € sterling PPPs
{igy." _5.3b also demonstrates one dimension of the notional inequality gap
derived from the different taxlbenefit structures. It can be observed that beforb
housing  costs the narrowest  gap between the disposable income of families at the
lolvest_ and highest earnings levels is in Portugal, followed by Belgium and
IryF"a. The largest gap is in Luxembourg, followed by the Netherlands and the
uK. After housing  costs, Ireland has the smallest income gap, with Spain showing
proportionately one of the largest. otherwise the picture does not change
substantially.
Figu-reg 5.3c and 5.3d give the same information  for a lone parent with one school-
aged child at three ealningg levels. Here it is noticeable that before housing costs
the lower earner is relatively  worse off, compared  to the highest earner, in3pain,
Luxembourg  and the Netherlands,  and relatively better off in Ireland. As with the
couple, after housing costs the gap closes even more in Ireland and widens in
Spain.
The figures in the annex to this chapter provide similar data for the other families
in the study.
The extra income ffict of second earners
The final analysis looks at the net effect for couples, after taxes and benefits,  of
having  a second earner. This is an important  issue given the Europe-wide increase
in women's labour market participation and it gives an indicltion of the net
employment incentive  effect for partners of the main earner. Table 5.14 shows theFamily Incomes and Tax-Benefit Policies  105 
Table  5.14:  Net  disposable  income  of  lone  parents  as  a  percentage  of  the  net 
disposable income of one earner couples at two earnings levels, before housing costs 
Average male + 0.66 average female  1.5 average male + 1.5 average female 
earnings  earnings 
Couple no  Couple 1 child  Couple 1  Couple no  Couple 1 child  Couple 1 
child  (under 3)  child (7)  child  (under 3)  child (7) 
Belgium  46  43  43  35  33  33 
Denmark  45  30  43  63  51  61 
Germany  39  32  37  55  50  54 
Greece  45  44  44  60  59  59 
Spain  38  18  38  52  38  52 
France  43  39  43  67  68  68 
Ireland  35  11  35  54  35  53 
Italy  51  28  48  78  65  81 
Luxembourg  56  39  52  52  33  50 
Netherlands  46  15  44  72  45  70 
Portugal  48  32  47  69  50  67 
UK  50  12  47  69  42  66 
proportionate increase in net disposable income resulting from second earnings 
for three family types at two earnings levels, before housing costs.  Thus, the first 
part of the table shows that in Luxembourg extra earnings by a female partner 
receiving two-thirds average female earnings increases net family income by 56 
per cent, compared with only 35 per cent in Ireland.  For most countries except 
Belgium, France and Greece this ratio drops substantially where there is a pre-
school age child.  It is particularly interesting to observe the effect of marginal 
taxation at the higher earnings level in the second part of the table.  Here the net 
benefit of second earners is greatest in Italy and the Netherlands - a surprising 
effect given that these two countries have amongst the lowest levels of married 
women's  labour  market  participation  in  the  industrial  world,  but  one  that 
supports a similar analysis for 1992 by Shaver and Bradshaw (1995).  Belgium also 
stands out in apparently having a rather low incentive for extra earnings at this 
level, whether families have children or not.  The figures given are, of course, 
dependent on the assumptions spelled out earlier in the chapter, especially those 
concerning child-care and educational costs. 
This  concludes  the  analysis  of  the  comparative  income  matrix  data.  As 
emphasised earlier, there are limitations to this technique and it describes implicit 
policy  structures  rather  than  actual  outcomes  for  families.  Nevertheless,  it 
proyides the basis for understanding comparatively the complex interactions of 
policies affecting families in the different countries - a basis which can be built on 
and improved in future years. 106  A Synthesis of National Family Policies 1994 
The final  section of the chapter now looks at key changes in fiscal  and social 
security systems which have taken place or been announced since the matrix data 
were collected. 
Changes in tax/benefit structures in 1994/5 
Changes have taken place in most countries, though not all of these are likely to 
have a major impact on family living standards.  Country by country summaries 
of key developments are included in Chapter Two of of the companion volume to 
this report.  It is not clear that any single direction or trajectory can be detected in 
these changes.  While many of the debates are common to the member countries, 
some have expanded or improved provisions affecting families, while others have 
cut back or continued to hold back on developments which have been promised. 
Domestic financial  considerations appear to  have been the main influence on 
government actions. 
Certainly the thrust of fiscal policy in most countries has been primarily towards 
containment of public expenditure and increasing affordability of social insurance 
schemes, or towards general restructuring of tax arrangements.  Thus Belgium, 
Denmark and Germany have all introduced new earmarked contribution schemes 
or surcharges, while Denmark and Luxembourg respectively have introduced 
environmental  taxes  and  increased  excise  duties - both of which  have been 
criticised as having a regressive impact on families.  Indexing of tax scales was 
also suspended in Belgium and, in 1994, in Spain, while the UK has continued its 
whittling away at the Married Couples and Additional Personal Allowances by 
capping the levels and restricting tax relief to the basic rate for all taxpayers. 
In  the  other  direction,  Germany  is  set  to  make  permanent  its  temporary 
arrangements  to  raise  tax-free  income  levels  in  line  with  the  subsistence 
minimum,  which  should  have  a  significant  effect  on  low-income  working 
families.  France has also introduced a series of changes aimed at stimulating 
employment, especially in domestic and 'close-to-home' services, though these 
have been criticised as mainly benefiting better-off families.  In Ireland there is a 
continuing debate about integration of taxes and benefits and the possibility of 
replacing child tax allowances with an expanded child benefit.  In the meantime 
personal allowances have been increased in real terms, including child additions, 
balanced by reductions in mortgage and health relief affecting mainly higher rate 
tax payers.  Italy has allocated extra funds for increased tax allowances for larger 
families and disabled people in 1995, though in view of the present low level of 
allowances this may not have a major impact. 
Some significant changes to child benefits were announced or implemented in 
several countries, while debates continued in others.  In Denmark, the amount for 
a child under two in the general scheme was increased to compensate for higher 
child care charges, while in Germany benefit rates for higher income families were 
reduced.  From 1996 a  new, more generous benefit/allowance scheme is to be 
introduced, but restrictions have been placed on access to benefits by non-German 
citizens.  In Spain, the income threshold for the means-tested child benefit was 
raised for  the first  time since  1991, but only the allowance for  disabled adult 
dependants was uprated.  In Italy too, failure to uprate child benefit has led to an 
estimated drop of 40  per cent in its real value since 1988.  In France the child-
rearing allowance (APE) was extended to the second child and the intention was 
announced to  extend child benefit and other allowances on an income-related Family Incomes and Tax-Beneftt Policies 107
basis to students and trainees aged 20-22. Ireland increased the higher rate of
child benefit and extended it to the third and subsequent child, while the
Netherlands,  on the other hand, announced that from 1996 the proportionate
increase in benefit for larger families will be abolished.
Changes in maternity allowances also took place in five countries. In Germany an
income test was introduced  for benefit in the first six months after the birth of a
child, while in France the rates of benefit were increased in cases of multiple
births. Ireland came into line with EC Directive 92/95 by making maternity
benefits equal to disability payments and introducing a new Health and Safety
Benefit foi pregnant women who cannot continue at work. The UK also
implemented the Directive in 1994. Luxembourg implemented ils 1992legis_lation
on maternity  allowances and childbirth medical services and tabled a Bill to
remove residence conditions, in line with a 1993 European Court judgement.
There were a number of other substantial changes introduced or announced in
other parts of the social security  systems,  focused in several countries particularly
on reducing payments of or entitlement to unemployment  insurance and
assistance, wnite changes in pension schemes in France, Ireland and Portugal
were of importance especially to older women. These changes,_and  others
affecting  social assistanc-e schemes, which were not especially directed  at families,
are summarised in the companion volume.
ANNEX; NET DISPOSABLE INCOMES OF OTHER FAMILIES AT VARIOUS
EARNINGS LEVELS, MAY 1994
Figure 5.3q Net disposable income of a couple with one pre-school child
before housing
Couples with one child aged 2 years eleven months, before housing,  May 1994
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Figure 5.3f: Net disposable income of a couple with one pre-school chil4 after
housing
Figure 5.3g: Net disposable income of a couple with one school-age child,
before housing
Couples with one child aged two years eleven months, after housing, May 1994
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Couples with one child aged 7 years, before housing,  May 1994
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Figure 5.3h: Net disposable income of a couple with one school-age child, after
housing
Figure 5.3i: Net disposable income of a couple with three school-age  childretU
before housing
Couples with one child aged 7 years, after housing, May 1994
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Couples with three children  agdd 7,8 and 14 years, before housing,  May 1994
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Figure 5.3j: Net disposable income of a couple with three school-age  childreru
after housing
Figure 5.3k Net disposable income of a lone parent with one pre-school child,
before housing
Couples with three children aged 7,8 and 14 years, after housing, May 1994
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Lone parent with one child aged 2 years eleven months, before housing, May 1994
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Figure 5.3t Net disposable income of a lone parent with one pre-school child,
after housing
Figure 5.3m: Net disposable income of a lone parent with two school-age
children, before housing
Lone parent with one child aged 2 years eleven months, atter housing, May 1994
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Lone parent with two children aged 7 and 8 years, before housing, May 1994
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Figure 5.3n: Net disposable income of a lone parent with two school-aged
childreru after housing
ppps € stertring per month
Lone parent with two children aged 7 and 8 years, after housing, May 1994
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lreCHAPTER SIX 
Care and Families: 
Obligations, Children and Older People 
This chapter seeks to explore the concepts and policy implications of caring and 
family obligation in the member states of the Union.  These are concepts which 
underpin the provision of services for disabled and elderly people as well as the 
development of measures aimed at the education and care of young children.  A 
consideration of family obligations is  important for at least two reasons when 
comparing family  policies.  On  the  one hand  family  obligations  have deep 
historical and cultural roots which are vital to an understanding of the types of 
policy solution adopted in a particular country.  On the other, the practicalities of 
providing care for young children or for older or disabled relatives have a marked 
effect on labour supply and on the economic circumstances of individual families. 
Attitudes to caring and family obligation 
Despite some evidence that support for  traditional gender roles is  weakening, 
they nevertheless appear to predominate in practice where caring for children is 
concerned.  Attitudes  favouring  a  'symmetrical'  family  are  more  prevalent 
amongst women, and amongst younger couples, especially where both are in 
employment.  All the countries reported the continuing primacy of the mother in 
both child care and domestic tasks, and this is borne out by surveys and time-
budget studies in a  number of countries, such as Italy, Germany, the UK  and 
Portugal.  Whilst domestic tasks are more equally shared in households where 
both partners work, the share of household work done by women continues to be 
much larger than that of men.  Women also continue to be the major providers of 
care for elderly and disabled people. 
A survey in the UK which examined attitudes to family obligations (Finch and 
Mason, 1993) found that although families continue to give and receive assistance, 
there is no clear consensus about when help should be given.  It was also found 
that obligations are 'negotiated' not only within the family but over time, in the 
context of changing normative assumptions.  By contrast, traditional expectations 
appear to remain very strong in the southern European countries such as Greece, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain, where there appears to be little negotiation, and caring 
responsibilities tend to be regarded as an inevitable part of family relationships, 
rooted in the private sphere and independent of state purview.  The ownership of 
land or other capital can be an important determinant of obligation and care. 
There is some evidence that older people use the prospect of inheritance as a lever 
to secure care from a relative.  There is evidence, however, that carers in many 
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countries are experiencing considerable strain.  In Greece, for example, hospitals 
are over-used as a result of the dearth of residential and domiciliary care facilities 
available.  Cases have also been reported of elderly people being abandoned at 
hospitals (Twigg et  al,  1993).  The lack of choice involved in the assumption of 
caring  duties,  and the  lack  of support available  to  carers  may cause  family 
relationships  to  become  strained  to  breaking  point  in  some  instances.  The 
development of domiciliary services to support elderly people and their carers is 
seen as a current priority in Greece. 
Caring for children 
Despite a growing recognition of the need for affordable and high quality child 
care services, the nuclear or extended family continues to be the major provider of 
such services in most countries.  Many parents have no outside help and rely on 
planning their hours and periods of leave to cover child care needs.  In the UK, for 
instance, most parents share child care, or receive assistance from relatives, and 
only a  minority (twenty three per cent) pay for child care,  although for  those 
families  with child care costs,  these are on average a  quarter of the woman's 
earnings (Marsh and McKay, 1993).  Reliance on grandparents and other relatives 
is also  common, for instance in France, Greece, Italy and Spain.  In Portugal half 
of all care for three to six-year-olds is of this type, with the proportion rising to 85 
per cent for the under threes. 
Day care centres in the private sector play an important role in Portugal, Spain, 
Greece and the UK.  In Spain, more than half of all working mothers use this type 
of provision.  In Germany and the Netherlands, 'independent' or voluntary sector 
provision  has  traditionally  been  important,  and  the  private  sector  has  a 
correspondingly  smaller  role.  Public  sector  day  care  centres,  whilst  under-
developed in comparison to other forms of provision, expanded by over 100 per 
cent between 1989 and 1992 in the Netherlands.  Historically, publicly-provided 
services for pre-school children have tended to fall into two distinct categories: 
those meeting the demands of parents who needed to work, which were typically 
targeted at low-income families  and fulfilled  a  largely 'holding' function, and 
those which were geared to the developmental and educational requirements of 
the child, which typically have limited hours and are incompatible with parental 
employment. Examples of both types of provision may still be found.  Indeed, the 
differing traditions may be evident in the allocation of ministerial responsibilities: 
in Portugal child care is  the responsibility of the Education and Employment 
Ministries;  in Spain it is the Department of Social Security, whereas in Italy and 
the UK it is the Department of Health.  Where the emphasis is on women's labour 
supply, as in Spain, there may have been less concern with the quality of care, 
whereas in other countries such as the Netherlands, a well-developed range of 
provision for children's needs leave many women unable to work.  Increasingly, 
however, the growing participation of mothers in the labour market has led to a 
realisation of the need for integration between different types of provision, and an 
emerging concern with the quality of care available. 
Workplace child care does not appear to be a major form of provision in any of the 
countries, although it is an important one for  workers in certain employment 
sectors,  typically  public  sector and service  sector  employees, as  in Germany, 
Ireland and Denmark. In the former GDR, workplace nurseries in state industries 
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use: 91  per cent of children attended some form of child care.  Although many of 
these nurseries have since been closed because of the economic situation, the level 
of provision remains considerably higher than in former West Germany.  Several 
countries, such as the Netherlands and Ireland, reported that workplace provision 
was stagnant or declining during the period under observation.  Places available 
in occupational nurseries have declined by over 200 per cent in Portugal between 
1989 and 1992.  At their best, child care schemes provided by employers can be 
particularly helpful in accommodating employment, because of their sensitivity to 
the requirements of the job.  An example is a pioneering nursery in Luxembourg 
which provides 24-hour care for  the children of hospital employees and also 
allows up to 2 'days off' for the parents by allowing the child to attend outside 
working  hours.(European  Network  on  Childcare,  1994a).  Some  company 
nurseries in Denmark also offer 'round-the-clock' care. 
Some potential obstacles to the development and use of workplace child care from 
the standpoint of the employer are  the  need for  capital  investment and  the 
problems of planning for workforce requirements.  From the point of view of 
parents and children, lack of occupational mobility, the need to take children to 
the place of work, and the lack of opportunity to build relationships with other 
parents and children in the area of residence may make workplace provision 
unappealing.  In Germany, there have been a number of innovative responses to 
these problems.  In Frankfurt and Munich, employers are able to subscribe to an 
agency, 'Kinderburo', which is able to broker a wide range of long-term and short-
term childcare services for its  employees.  This avoids many of the perceived 
disadvantages of employer-based child care by enabling arrangements to be made 
in the family's local area and without costly investment by the employer.  In 
Stuttgart  and  Frankfurt  companies  have  formed  consortia  to  jointly  fund 
nurseries.  Typically the companies will provide buildings and funding, but the 
nurseries are run by private organisations.  These measures take place against the 
background of a legislative commitment to child care places for all five-years old 
by 1996,  and have been particularly welcomed in a  climate of reduced public 
spending. 
The costs of child care 
It is difficult to make valid comparisons of the costs of childcare across countries, 
particularly as many parents rely on a combination of different services in order 
to meet their requirements.  Bradshaw et al  (1993),  in a  study looking at the 
package of child support measures available in fifteen countries, have compared 
the costs to parents of using the most prevalent form of care for one pre-school 
child (aged 2 years, 11  months).  The method relies on a number of assumptions, 
including full-time use of child care and full take-up of any available benefits or 
rebates.  Informal care has been disregarded, as has the quality of care available. 
The  results  are  therefore  illustrative  of  the  intentions  of  policy  rather  than 
representative of the situation of any identifiable family.  Nonetheless they have 
the advantage of facilitating cross-national comparison. The results are presented 
in the Table 6.1 below.  The same method has been used by Bradshaw et al (1995) 
to calculate costs of childcare for lone parents. 
Tax deductions towards the costs of child care are available in France, Germany 
(lone parent only),  Belgium, and Spain.  Typically  help is  limited  to care for 
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Table 6.1:  Monthly cost  (purchasing power parity £  sterling) of using most 
prevalent form of formal full-time care for one pre-school child, 1992 
Coountry  Case 1  Case 2  Case3  Case4  CaseS 
Belgium  0  0 
Denmark  73  73 
Germany  31  107 
Greece  0  29 
Spain  142  142 
France  49  50 
Ireland  155  155 
Italy  0  44 
Luxembourg  0  0 
Netherlands  49  141 
Portugal  1  10 
UK  156  156 
Notes: 
Case 1 - lone parent, 0.5 average (male) earnings 
Case 2 - lone parent, average (male) earnings 
Case 3 - lone parent, 1.5 average (male earnings) 
0  0 
73  73 
107  107 
29  29 
142  142 
51  52 
155  155 
88  44 
0  0 
210  172 
63  10 
156  156 
Case 4- couple, 0.5 average male earnings plus 0.66 average female earnings 
Case 5 - couple, average male earnings plus 0.66 average female earnings 
Case 6- couple, 1.5 average male earnings plus 0.66 average female earnings 
0 
73 
107 
29 
142 
61 
155 
88 
0 
249 
39 
156 
Case 6 
0 
73 
107 
29 
142 
107 
155 
109 
0 
249 
74 
156 
Where 0.66 average female earnings is Jess than the minimum wage figure, the minimum wage figure 
has been used. 
applies only to the employment of a nanny at home.  In Ireland, Germany and the 
UK, social security benefit rules contain provisions for lone parents returning to 
work which are aimed at assisting with child care costs and providing incentives. 
There is considerable evidence of segmentation in the child care market, with 
lower paid working class parents using family and childminders, whilst higher-
paid professionals opt for more expensive but higher quality care solutions (as in 
France, Italy and Ireland).  Fiscal  policies may exacerbate this tendency, as in 
France, where the tax allowance available to parents employing a nanny at home 
tends to favour the better-off.  In other countries, such as Belgium and Spain, the 
fact  that  tax  deductions  are  only  available  for  formal  care  has  the  effect  of 
subsidising middle-income rather than poor families.  In Portugal, day nurseries 
tend to be used by both the poorest families, who receive subsidised places, and 
by well-off families who are able to meet the full fee; families on average incomes 
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Increased rates of allowances for child-rearing, such as those available to women 
in France (for women with 2 or more children) and Germany (for mothers of 
children under 3)  tend  to  reduce  labour market participation by mothers of 
children in these groups, although part-time work is permitted in both countries. 
Benefit  is  reduced  pro  rata  in  France,  thus  reducing  the  scope  for  Allocation 
Parentale d'Enfance  (APE)  to represent a contribution to the costs of purchasing 
child  care. 
Current issues in child care 
Concern about the quality of care available was specifically highlighted in the 
report from Portugal.  In Denmark, the quality of care provided by public day 
centres is recognised as being the best available and places are therefore in high 
demand.  Municipal recruitment of childminders also acts as a monitor of quality. 
In Spain a variety of new measures, including educational provision for children 
in rural areas and nurseries linked to training schemes has aimed to both diversify 
the range of provision on offer and raise standards of care.  Measures to improve 
the quality of care have also been implemented in Italy.  There has been criticism 
of the lack of regulation of childminding in Ireland, where a person caring for up 
to three children of different families is exempt from the provisions of the Child 
Care Act 1991, particularly as such home-based care is the most prevalent form of 
child care in Ireland.  Regulations are expected in the future, but not before 1996. 
A consultation exercise for the European Commission Network on Childcare in 
1992  revealed  a  high  level  of  support  for  the  implementation  of minimum 
standards of quality in child care, combined with a recognition that the definition 
of quality is  a  dynamic process which needs to  involve parents, children and 
professionals.  Equality of access and the commitment of substantial government 
funding were seen as key factors necessary for the achievement of quality child 
care services. 
An  issue  which  has  been  debated  for  some  time,  but  which  is  gaining  in 
importance is that of care for children outside school hours.  Parents may find it 
more difficult to cope with employment once children reach school age, as nursery 
provision is often available for a full working day.  The labour supply of mothers 
with  school-age  children  is  particularly  restricted  in  countries  where  school 
attendance is only for half the day, as in Germany.  Even in countries with longer 
hours, such as the UK, holidays and training days can present major obstacles to 
employment.  In some countries,  such as Luxembourg and the Netherlands, 
supervised lunch-breaks and the provision of meals have only been introduced in 
recent years.  School canteens are still not generally available in Portugal, and 
there are long waiting lists for the 'leisure time centres' which provide after-school 
activities.  There  have  been  a  number  of  moves  to  improve  out-of-school 
provision.  In the UK £45  million is to be spent over the three years from April 
1993, to establish 50,000 out-of-school places, with the explicit aim of increasing 
labour market participation by mothers of children in this age group.  Greece has 
begun  implementation  of  a  four-year  programme  to  expand  out-of-school 
provision.  Luxembourg has begun to  create 'drop-in' centres but demand far 
exceeds supply at present.  There is a shortage of child care places, and waiting 
lists for services which are reasonably priced or of good quality, in all countries. 
In Denmark the Government has committed itself to a 'child care guarantee' by 
1996, for all children aged between 1 and 5 years of age.  At the same time, a 
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include raising the charges payable, providing an allowance for a parents to stay 
at home, and creating alternative forms of day care which would be cheaper and 
involved parents in their management.  Parents who were asked about their 
support for  these options were more likely to be in favour if they were not in 
employment; fewer than  a third favoured the first two options, but 43  per cent 
were  interested  in  cheaper  provision  (Danish  Ministry  of  Finance,  1994). 
Germany has also committed itself to guaranteed nursery places for all three year-
olds by the year 2000. 
Some countries, such as Denmark, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, reported a 
growth in child care provision during 1994.  In the majority of countries, however, 
the impression is of limited scope for development at the present time, whether 
because of expenditure constraints in the public sector, as in Italy, or a lack of new 
initiatives  by employers,  as  in  Ireland.  High  unemployment  rates  arguably 
reduce  the  need for  companies to  make child  care  provision,  as  there  is  no 
shortage of applicants for employment. The extension of periods of paid leave for 
parents may extend the provision of childcare without large increases in public 
expenditure.  Such  schemes  enable  parents  to  spend  more  time  with  their 
children, and reduce stress levels of working parents.  They allow more parents to 
benefit  from  existing  child  care  provision  and  provide  job  opportunities  for 
unemployed people.  Experience in Denmark, where parents are not allowed to 
use day-care services for children under three whilst on leave, and only part-time 
where  children  are  over  three,  has  demonstrated  a  substantial  reduction  in 
waiting lists for  places.  As job  vacancies are made available to unemployed 
people, the increase in public expenditure is estimated to be low. 
Care of older and disabled people 
Issues  relating  to  the  care  of  the  elderly  are  high  on  the  political  agenda 
throughout the EU.  This is the result of demographic change which has seen a 
significant increase in the number of people aged over eighty years  old and 
therefore most likely to require care.  In turn this has raised widespread concern 
about the provision and funding of care.  The family remains the primary source 
of care for elderly people in the Southern European countries. Around 90 per cent 
of care provided in Spain, for instance, is of this type, and 80 per cent of severely 
disabled  elderly  people  in  Italy  receive  assistance  from  relatives.  The 
undeveloped nature of residential care may have its  roots both in traditional 
values and in the less well developed public sector.  It is reported, for instance, 
that Greek families, particularly the elderly themselves, are resistant to the idea of 
residential care as an option, and less than one per cent of the elderly population 
are currently living in residential accommodation. The continuing economic crisis 
in Italy has resulted in a renewed focus on families as providers of care, especially 
in the poorer regions of the south.  Domiciliary assistance is estimated as being 
available to less than one per cent of the elderly population as a whole.  In 1989, 
there were 98  elderly people per residential bed in the south of the country, as 
compared to 32.4  in the north.  This extensive reliance on family care faces  a 
considerable challenge in the light of demographic projections, falling birthrates, 
increased labour force participation by married women and the growing numbers 
of older people.  (This issue is discussed at greater length in Chapter 3.)  The use 
of residential care is widespread in the other countries.  The private sector plays 
an important role in Portugal and Spain, where 70 per cent of residential care is 
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unusual in that residential care is  entirely the province of the public sector.  In 
Luxembourg, budget allocations in respect of older people were increased by 18.5 
per cent from 1993  to 1995, with the twin aims of both improving domiciliary 
services for  those who wish to  stay at home and increasing  the coverage  of 
residential care. 
Paying for care 
In the southern European countries, where residential care provision is sparse and 
financed by private individuals from their own means, costs have not become a 
political issue, despite the fact that there is considerable hardship at the individual 
level, with savings and property being drawn upon to finance the costs of care.  In 
the majority of other countries, residential care is subsidised by central or local 
government. The number of people in residential care has increased sharply over 
the past few years and public expenditure has risen accordingly.  There is concern 
that projected increases in the numbers of older people over the next 30 years may 
create a public expenditure burden which cannot be supported by the reduced 
number of people of working  age.  Different  countries  have reacted  to  this 
perceived crisis in contrasting ways.  In the UK policies which have emphasised 
the role of the private sector in care provision have lead to increasing costs in this 
sector.  Recent legislation (NHS and Community Care Act, 1990)  has imposed 
medical and financial criteria for subsidy and guidance issued by the Department 
of Health in 1994  attempts to  delineate more sharply the boundary between 
medical care (which is to be provided free by the National Health Service) and 
social care (which is means and asset tested).  In Ireland, new legislation in force 
from 1993 tightened medical and financial criteria for state subsidy of individuals 
in public welfare and private nursing homes.  Denmark is unusual in having all 
residential and nursing care provision in the public sector.  There is a means-test, 
but it is generous, and few people are obliged to pay fees in practice.  The costs of 
residential care are not currently perceived as an issue, although there is a policy 
of de-institutionalisation which has resulted in an increased emphasis on the 
provision  of  domiciliary  services.  Germany  passed  legislation  requiring 
insurance cover in respect of care during 1994,  after a  considerable period of 
controversy.  The legislation came into force  on the 1st of January 1995.  The 
scheme makes provision for various types of benefits in cash or in kind depending 
on the level of disability and whether it is temporary or permanent, and covers all 
but a small proportion of the population.  The amounts paid for residential care 
will be limited to DM 2,800 per month, and  the aim is to ensure that the majority 
of pensioners will be able to meet the costs of the care element (board and lodging 
being excluded) from the combination of pension and care insurance without the 
need  for  recourse  to  social  assistance.  It is  recognised,  however,  that some 
pensioners will continue to require social assistance.  Initially benefits will be paid 
without insurance periods, but these will gradually be introduced, so that it will 
be necessary to have been insured for five of the previous ten years by January 
2000.  Luxembourg established an inter-ministerial group to consider the costs 
and implications of introducing dependency insurance at the end of 1994.  The 
aim is  to draft legislation offering a  range of benefits for  care at home or in 
institutions, which like the German scheme, would expect individuals to meet the 
costs of board and lodging in an institution, whilst dependency insurance covered 
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Benefits payable to the disabled or elderly person to offset the costs of care are 
found in the UK, Belgium, Italy, Germany and Portugal.  There appear to be few 
formal controls on how the money is spent and whether it is passed on to a family 
carer.  Carers receive a benefit in their own right in the UK, Ireland, and Denmark 
(only to care for people who are terminally ill).  Payments are available in some 
regions of Italy and Spain, and to people taking career breaks for family reasons 
in Belgium.  The interface between cash benefits and services is not always clearly 
defined; in Italy and the UK allowances for care are withdrawn or taken into 
account as income when entering residential care.  In the UK, allowances for care 
are sometimes taken into account by local authorities charging for domiciliary 
care, whilst others ignore them. Germany's new care insurance legislation creates 
a framework in which cash and care are integrated; where a person is assessed as 
having a certain level of need they may receive a combination of services and 
cash.  Charging for domiciliary services is increasing in many countries, including 
the Netherlands and the UK.  There has been debate about the possibility of direct 
payments which would allow individuals to purchase their own care in the UK, 
and a scheme is expected to be announced before too long. The debate has largely 
centred around the care needs of disabled people of working age, but may be 
extended to elderly people. 
Models of care services for the elderly 
The increased costs of providing care for an ageing population are leading to a 
variety of responses.  Denmark stands alone in that the public sector remains the 
dominant provider of residential care and there are no plans to curtail expenditure 
at present.  Belgium, France, Germany, Portugal and the Netherlands all have a 
mixed welfare tradition, with a well-developed voluntary sector which is active in 
the provision of care for  the elderly.  To  date there is no evidence of either a 
shortage of residential care or funding problems.  The family is the main source of 
elderly care in Spain, Greece and Italy.  Residential care is scarce, expensive and 
provided  largely  in  the  private  sector.  The  remaining  countries  have  all 
experienced considerable growth in the costs of residential care.  Germany has 
sought to contain this by the creation of a  specific funding structure for  care, 
which  provides  strong  incentives  for  home-based  care,  and  also  regulates 
amounts paid to those in residential accommodation.  Luxembourg is intending 
to implement a  similar  scheme.  Ireland and the UK have responded rather 
differently.  Although there have been changes to funding arrangements, these 
have not been so radical.  Instead the emphasis has been on restricting individual 
access  by tightening financial  and medical criteria.  The aims and effects  are 
broadly similar, but the methods used appear to reflect a 'social insurance' versus 
'social assistance' approach to the problem.  Those countries where provision is 
currently undeveloped are  unlikely to  develop solutions based on large-scale 
funding of residential accommodation. 
Roles of men and women and the status of domestic work 
A  traditional  view  of  women's  domestic  duties  has  resulted  in  particular 
exemptions and privileges in the workplace which have been eroded as a result of 
a movement towards legal and formal equality.  These include such anomalies as 
a prohibition on nightwork in Belgium, and the availability of days off work to do 
housework in the former East Germany, which have now been abolished.  In 
Spain there is a campaign to secure wages for housework, but this is generally 
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Women's work in caring for children has arguably been recognised to a greater 
degree, with the payment of child care allowances in some countries such as 
France and Germany. These also tend to reinforce traditional roles by encouraging 
women to stay at home.  At the same time, the considerable burden of domestic 
duties, which continue to remain largely the province of women, has possibly 
been devalued. Whilst most countries report an increased involvement by fathers 
in the upbringing of their children, there is evidence of a preference for the more 
interesting  tasks  such  as  taking  children  on  outings,  attending  medical 
appointments and so on, rather than mundane activities such as feeding  and 
bathing.  Men are also much less likely to be involved in domestic work, except 
for repairs to the home.  The national informant for Greece expresses the situation 
starkly: 'Domestic work is clearly abhorrent to Greek men; to younger ones less so 
than to older, but nonetheless abhorrent'.  What is perhaps surprising is the lack 
of difference between the countries in this respect.  Debate about the changing 
roles of fathers appears to be most articulated in Denmark, with its strong focus 
on equality, and in Spain and Ireland, where low male employment rates are 
forcing a reappraisal of traditional roles.  A majority of those providing care for 
elderly and disabled people, both in the formal and informal sector, continue to be 
women.  Married women were reported as feeling  that they were obliged to 
choose between their elderly parents and partners in ways which had caused 
distress and damaged their personal relationships. 
The extent to which domestic and child care work is valued within the home is 
also reflected in the status and pay of workers in the formal economy who are 
employed in these fields, as in Spain and the UK where such workers are typically 
poorly trained and low paid.  In the Netherlands, by contrast, workers providing 
child care  or other domestic services are usually employed by an agency or 
organisation which provides full occupational benefits such as minimum wages 
and pension rights.  In Denmark, childminders who care for children in their own 
homes are recruited and paid by the municipality.  Whilst some argue for the 
extension of this type of management, both to secure the rights of employees and 
to monitor quality, countries with a  tradition of independent sector provision 
would be likely to resist such moves vigorously. 
A time to care? 
There is some (limited) evidence of convergence between the countries in that 
they face similar demographic issues, an ageing population, reduced fertility rates 
and  increased  labour  market  participation  by  women  of  childrearing  age. 
Measures to reconcile work and family obligation are increasingly geared towards 
simultaneous reconciliation of work and domestic responsibilities, rather than the 
accommodation of a 'family phase', reflecting the fact that both employment and 
childrearing are now compressed into fewer years than in previous generations. 
Germany and the Netherlands remain closest to the family phase model, with an 
attachment to a traditional division of domestic labour, and forms of benefit and 
childcare  which  discourage maternal employment.  Denmark and France,  in 
different ways, have sought to encourage high rates of both fertility and labour 
market  participation.  The  southern  European  countries  have  fewer  formal 
mechanisms for  the reconciliation of work and family  life,  and it is  in these 
countries where the fall  in the birth rate has been most dramatic.  Among the 
factors  influencing this may be the comparatively recent economic growth in 
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continuing strength of traditional gender divisions in domestic labour may also be 
relevant.  Whatever the causes, the demographic impact is  likely to  create an 
urgent demand for increased measures to reconcile work and family life over the 
next few years.  Where care for the elderly is concerned, countries have responded 
to similar problems in a  variety of ways, representing a  divergence in policy 
traditions. Countries which have created highly institutionalised forms of care for 
elderly and disabled people are currently re-negotiating the boundaries between 
the family and the state, as in Germany and the UK.  In the southern European 
countries, where the family has remained the dominant provider of care, forms of 
support  which  support  and  maintain  existing  traditions  may  need  to  be 
developed. 
The idea of a  'time account' from which workers could draw flexibly over the 
working life,  is  one which is  gaining currency, and which has the potential to 
accommodate the needs of parents and children, as well as allowing flexibility to 
care for elderly and disabled relatives (Demos, 1995).  The career breaks which are 
available  to  some employees in  Ireland  and  Belgium,  and  the  revised  leave 
scheme in Denmark, represent a movement in this direction.  Labour demand for 
women has tended to be a major factor influencing the policies to support workers 
with domestic  responsibilities.  This  may no longer be the case.  The  rising 
numbers of lone parents creates a pressure for increased employment to reduce 
spending on benefits.  Other demographic pressures may also prove crucial.  Low 
fertility rates may increase pro-natalist measures especially in the countries of 
southern Europe.  In addition, the growing numbers of older people will mean 
that an increasing numbers of workers, men as well as women, will have family 
obligations.  Whilst much of the debate about these issues has tended to use terms 
such as 'burden' and 'crisis', in reality there is an opportunity to re-appraise the 
role of paid employment, and to seek a new balance between the demands and the 
pleasures of work and family life in pursuit of enhanced quality of life for all 
concerned. CHAPTER SEVEN 
Data and Research on Families 
The aim of this chapter is to review the availability of data about changing family 
forms and family policies.  The past decade or so has seen a significant increase in 
the systematic collation of comparative information about families:  many data 
sets and sources are now well known and available from international agencies or 
the larger research centres.  In addition to describing some of the larger sources of 
(mostly)  quantitative  data,  this  chapter  also  describes  some  of  the  research 
currently being undertaken into aspects of European family policy.  It must be 
accepted that there is no possibility of this review being either comprehensive or 
detailed:  such a  task would be a  massive undertaking in its own right.  Our 
purpose is more modest: to indicate the diversity and vitality of research about 
family policies.  The chapter concludes by identifying some of the more obvious 
gaps in knowledge and research:  it is part of the Observatory's task to stimulate 
comparative  research  which  is  of  use  to  policy  makers,  practitioners  and 
representatives of family organisations. 
Central to the work of the Observatory, given its responsibility for monitoring 
family forms and policies in EU countries, are the statistical series and initiatives 
developed by Eurostat.  An increased commitment to social policy, articulated in 
the Social Action Programme of 1974, resulted in an enhanced commitment to 
social reporting: indeed,the two have developed hand in hand.  Over the years 
Eurostat  have  consolidated  their  reporting  into  a  regular  publication:  Social 
Portrait of Europe.  The latest edition was published in October 1995. 
One of the most exciting initiatives, and of immense potential value to students of 
family  policy,  is  the  European Community Household Panel on Income  and 
Living Conditions (ECHP).  The focus of the study is to investigate the changing 
living conditions in all member states of the Union.  The overall sample is in 
excess of 20,000 households and interviews are held with over 45,000 individuals. 
The  schedule  has  three  components:  a  household  register,  a  household 
questionnaire and an individual questionnaire.  Questions cover life  histories, 
household composition and family structure, housing circumstances, sources and 
levels of income, employment and health status. The preliminary reports from the 
first complete wave of interviews are due at the end of 1995. 
The Commission is giving further attention to the need for improved statistics on 
households and families.  In the context of the White Papers on Employment, 
Growth and Competitiveness (European Commission, 1994d) and on Social Policy 
(European Commission, 1994e), and the Maastricht Treaty there is a special need 
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for  enhanced  monitoring  of  trends  at  the  macro  and  micro  levels.  The 
Commission  has  justified  this  interest  because  households  and  families  are 
recognised as being the principal social formation providing economic security; 
that  decisions  made  by  individuals  are  influenced  by  family  context;  that 
standards  of  living  between  individuals,  families  and  households  are  inter-
dependent;  that  families  reflect  changes  in  the  wider  socio-economic  and 
demographic environment; and that social policies and public services  (social 
protection, housing, taxation, education) are directed at families. 
The changing social and policy environment requires that statistical series are not 
only  up-dated  but  that  the  definitions  and  categories  which  structure  the 
presentation  of  data  are  also  revised.  For  example,  the  growth  in  stable, 
consensual and cohabiting unions outside the legal framework of marriage is a 
major change but not one which is adequately captured in any statistical series. 
Four  variations  on  this  theme  are  worth  noting:  reconstituted  families  are 
increasingly common and are the inevitable consequence of new relationships 
being created in the context of relationship breakdown and instability.  As parents 
with dependent children establish new relationships, so they form new families 
with new forms of dependency and obligation between adults and children.  It is 
important  to  know  more  about  the  prevalence  of  such  families  and  the 
obligations, rights and risks that are associated with them.  A second family type, 
not common but clearly identifiable, are of people in a 'couple relationship' but 
who  choose  to  live  separately  (Deroure,  1992).  This  may  be  because  their 
employment forces them to live apart during the week or it may be because they 
each value independence and private space.  Against the background of the 
Union's long standing commitment to the mobility of labour it is important to 
know more about how many relationships  of this  kind exist,  their strengths, 
weaknesses and policy implications.  A third concern is  for homeless families. 
Even at a local level it is extremely difficult to estimate the number of homeless 
persons or families:  the challenge is all the greater at an international level.  But 
against  the  background  of  social  exclusion,  high  levels  of  long-term 
unemployment, asylum seekers and families that break-down due to  violence or 
deprivation this is an important subject.  Finally, there are an increasing number 
of stable, single sex, cohabiting relationships and these also pose a challenge to 
traditional conceptions of family life and family policy. 
There are more detailed but no less important difficulties  on the road  to  the 
production of harmonised statistics.  For example, there is inconsistency in the 
definition of a child within a family setting;  there are differences in the definition 
of a  household  (some  relating  to  housing and others  to  budgets);  there are 
differences in definitions of cohabitation. Eurostat has an important responsibility 
to seek a common and consensual approach (if not exact harmonisation) between 
the definitions used by the national statistical services. 
The availability of comprehensive and robust statistics makes possible the pursuit 
of comparative research projects.  Over the next year the Observatory will be 
examining the factors  which  impact on the  propensity to  form  and dissolve 
families:  inevitably these are complex questions and will require the bringing 
together  of  statistical  data  and  other information  from  a  variety  of  sources. 
Collating extensive data on household and family types, the distribution and ages 
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sets concerned with standards of living, health, education, housing, leisure time 
and social contacts, employment status, working hours, income and savings. 
The  EU  and  other international  organisations  have only  relatively  poor and 
inconsistent  data  on  families.  The  only  robust  data  of  a  continuous, 
comprehensive and detailed  kind  relate  to  the dynamics of family  formation 
(marriages  and  divorces).  In  contrast  some  data  on  family  and  household 
structures and characteristics are limited to census years.  However some data on 
family characteristics are  routinely collected  as part of the EU's Labour Force 
Survey.  Limitations due to sample design and response rate make disaggregation 
difficult in certain circumstances. 
During the 1970s there was considerable expansion and dedication of effort to the 
collation  of  broadly  based,  social  reporting  databases,  but  a  decline  in 
commitment and resources during the 1980s and 1990s.  There are,  however, 
notable  exceptions  and  the  EU  has  maintained  pressure  for  improved 
comparative social statistics. 
The  European  Union  is  not  the  only  organisation  with  an  interest  and 
responsibility  for  the  promotion  of  research.  The  Council  of  Europe  has 
sponsored a number of relevant studies.  A major and on-going (started in 1992 
and to be completed in 1996) commitment is the Project on Childhood Policies which 
seeks  to  identify  and  explore,  from  a  European  perspective,  the  policy 
implications of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.  The approach is 
holistic and child centred, monitoring policies and opportunities for children to 
express themselves and participate directly in decision-making processes which 
affect them.  A strong theme of the project is to examine the repercussions for 
children of the significant social, economic, political and environmental changes 
European countries are experiencing.  The underlying rationale for the project is 
to place children at the centre of public policy.  It is expected that the research will 
conclude with the publication of a set of studies and a draft Recommendation (or 
other  legal  instrument)  on  childhood  policies  to  be  considered  at  a  major 
European conference during 1996. 
The Council of Europe supports its political work by sponsoring and publishing 
a range of studies.  For example, the European Population Committee produces 
an annual report on population trends; the Steering Committee for Social Security 
publishes comparative social security tables and these are designed to extend and 
complement those emanating from MISSOC by including information about non 
EU countries.  In addition, and this also contains valuable information on family 
benefits, the Committee publishes an annual report on developments in national 
social security legislation, compiled from information supplied by member state 
governments. 
Within the Council of Europe portfolio, three specialised  research studies are 
either completed or at an advanced stage:  during 1994 a study group reported on 
the circumstances and needs of 'street children';  a  report on the 'interaction 
between providers of family services' is due in late 1995; finally, a study group 
was established in early 1995 to examine 'the social and family consequences of 
unemployment among young people'. 
In the  wider University  sector,  a  developing resource  committed  to  research 
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Centre for European Social Research (MZES).  At a general level it is conducting 
research into the comparative analysis of national social welfare systems and the 
social dimension of European integration.  Underpinning many of their projects is 
a  large  data  archive,  EURODATA.  It consists  of  a  statistical  library  with 
comprehensive data sets in a variety of machine readable forms.  Rothenbacher 
(1994)  has  provided  (both)  a  comprehensive  and  detailed  overview  of 
comparative social statistics. It is clear, however, that there is no single or entirely 
satisfactory database reporting on family structures, indicators or policies.  Those 
with an interest in such matters are obliged to trawl through several complementary 
statistical series developed variously by the UN, ILO, OECD and EU. 
In  the United Kingdom  the  semi-independent Economic and Social  Research 
Council (ESRC), funded by government to promote research and training in the 
social sciences, has sponsored two relevant and important research programmes. 
The first,  established  during 1994  and running until  1997,  is  concerned with 
Population  and  Household  Change  and is  directed by Susan McRae of the Policy 
Studies Institute, London.  The general aim of the programme is to stimulate new 
research on the inter-relationship between household living arrangements and 
broader  demographic  change  in  the  United  Kingdom.  There  is  an  explicit 
recognition of the international and comparative dimension to this work and links 
have been established to the work of the European Observatory.  There are four 
over-lapping levels within the research programme:  the changing demographic 
context; the changing structure of family;  household and living arrangements; 
wider kinship networks.  There are no less than 17 research projects, funded to in 
excess of £2  million.  Projects are concerned with the dynamics of household 
change, one person households, teenage mothers, step-families,  fathers  living 
apart from their children, lone parents, sexual attitudes and kinship, life-courses 
and livelihoods. The programme produces a regular Newsletter. The programme 
is committed to the effective dissemination of research findings and results. 
The  ESRC  has  also  announced  a  related  programme  of  research  into  the 
experiences  of  Children  5-16:  Growing  into  the  Twenty-First  Century.  This 
programme has been allocated a  budget of £2.9  million between the financial 
years 1995/96 and 2000/01.  The programme seeks to make a  contribution to 
knowledge of the changing conditions of childhood and children's everyday lives. 
It will be especially interested in children's hidden economic activity and their 
contribution  to  well-being  within the family  context  of family  networks  and 
relationships. The international and comparative context to the proposed research 
is firmly acknowledged and actively encouraged in the programme rationale.  In 
many respects this programme merely seeks to bring the UK into line with the 
centrality afforded to children by researchers in other European countries. For 
example,  the  European  Commission  in  conjunction  with  the  Luxembourg 
Presidency organised a major conference on the Child, Family and  Society during 
1992;  the  Council  of Europe  has  organised  no less  than  three  international 
conferences on children between 1989 and 1994,  the most recent being on the 
Evolution of the Role of Children in Family Life and held in Madrid in late 1994. 
Among possible research topics into children are studies which extend knowledge 
beyond the sociology of the classroom and the psychology of socialisation to 
include reviews of the implications and outcomes for children of living through a 
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inequality and poverty but much of the evidence relates to the experience of 
households or individuals; there is much less systematic data on the experience of 
children and the dynamics of intra-household transfers.  This is  an imbalance 
which must be redressed. 
One of the major programmes of research into family policy is being conducted in 
France by the Caisse Nationale des Allocation Familiales (CNAF).  During 1994 their 
research was organised around three priorities:  first, family policies in France and 
Europe:  using socio-economic, historical and statistical methods the objective is 
to  prepare an overview  of  French  family  policy  in  a  comparative  European 
context; second, the organisation and efficiency I effectiveness of family benefits; 
third, poverty and precarite and their implications for families. 
A CNAF project, of which Observatory member Jeanne Fagnani is a joint Director, 
is examining 'Concepts and Contexts in International Comparisons of Family Policies in 
Europe'.  The primary aim is  to identify specifically national characteristics in 
social science concepts and to explain and evaluate differences in relation to socio-
cultural context and population change.  The results of the research will help 
inform  understanding  of the  relevance  and  utility  of  convergence  theory  in 
relation to family and social policies in Europe.  The fundamental assumption 
behind  this  research  is  that  comparative  enquiry  is  not  only  difficult  but 
confounded by important conceptual, linguistic and methodological differences 
between  experts  from  different  countries:  all  too  often  there  is  insufficient 
attention paid to the historical and cultural context within which constructs and 
concepts are defined and articulated. The hypothesis which has been investigated 
is that the presumed trend towards universalism and convergence, often observed 
by macro-studies of social indicators, both conceals important national differences 
and exaggerates the extent of convergence.  The project has been conducted via a 
series of workshop meetings, many of which have been held at the European 
Research Centre, Loughborough University, UK.  The final seminar is to be held 
in October 1995  and several publications are already available.  (Hantrais and 
Mangen eds., 1993, 1994; Hantrais and Letablier, 1994). 
Members of the Observatory are all active participants in the research community 
interested  in  comparative  family  policy.  Some  research  interests  and 
commitments are worth noting in this context and give an indication of current 
priorities.  It must, however, be emphasised that this  presentation is  neither 
comprehensive nor detailed.  Ulla Bjornberg, of Sweden, is responsible for a large 
programme entitled: 'Family relations in modern society.  Developing theory and 
methods  in  sociological  research  on  families'.  One  of  her  projects  is  an 
international study of 'Parenthood, employment and social policy in Germany, Poland, 
Hungary,  Russia,  Netherlands  and  France'.  She  has recently started work on a 
project concerned with 'social reproduction and family commitments in modern 
society':  this is  an examination of conceptions of justice by reference  to  the 
allocation of money, time and love within families.  Bjornberg has an interest in 
the relationship between divorced fathers and their children; this is a qualitative 
study which is looking at the development of mutual identities.  Sweden has a 
long and distinguished record of both practice and research in the field of family 
policy and there are many other projects relevant to the work of the Observatory. 
Several  members  of  the  Observatory  (Badelt,  Wall  and  Bjornberg)  are 
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concerned with 'Defining Family Obligations in Europe'.  The project, which started 
in 1994 and concludes in late 1995,  covers all EU countries and Norway and has 
four key objectives: 
to analyse the way in which family responsibilities are defined within social 
security  systems,  including  both  social  insurance and  social  assistance 
benefits; 
to analyse the ways in which family responsibilities are defined in other 
areas of social policy (such as housing) and in family law, especially in 
relation to separated, divorced and unmarried parents;  and also in respect 
of parental responsibility for the behaviour of their children; 
to analyse the extent to which these definitions have changed in recent 
years and to identify the reasons for change; 
to compare definitions across countries and refine contrasting models of 
welfare state regimes. 
The project recruited national informants from each country and they completed 
an extensive pro forma questionnaire and subsequently participated in colloquia at 
which the draft findings  were extensively discussed.  A  comprehensive final 
report will be published early in 1996 and the national reports will also be made 
available. 
Other  members  of  the  Observatory  (Bahle,  Rothenbacher)  are  working  as 
members of a wider international team directed by Professors Peter Flora, Sheila 
Kamerman and Albert Kahn on a long term study of Family  Change and  Family 
Policy.  The aim of the project is to describe and analyse family structures, family 
policies and the 'politics' of family policy in 23 countries including western and 
central Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand between the 1960s 
and the 1990s.  Started during 1994 and to be completed in 1997, the project seeks 
to  identify  fundamental  characteristics  and  long-term  developments  of both 
family structures and family policy.  In addition to looking at micro changes in 
family structures, it will review aggregate social indicators and place the resulting 
analysis in a detailed historical context.  The output will include seven volumes of 
national reports; two comparative volumes and a data handbook including time-
series data of family benefits and services. 
Late  1993  saw the completion and publication of a  major comparative study 
(Neubauer,  1994)  commissioned by the  German Federal Ministry  for  Family 
Affairs and Senior Citizens.  In contrast to many other comparative studies of 
family policy this project did not make use of national informants and neither did 
it seek to  explore differing  welfare  state types.  The research  team, based in 
Germany,  collated data about family trends and policies and sought to validate 
their interpretation by means of visits to selected countries where they conducted 
semi-structured interviews with officials. A multi-stage methodology was used to 
review and evaluate family policies in each of the (then) 12 member states of the 
Union.  A priori,  a number of criteria were identified and used to structure the 
collation  of  data  about  each  country's  demography  and  socio-economic 
conditions;  secondly, country by country reviews of family support systems were 
prepared;  thirdly,  comparisons between countries were made on a  sector by 
sector basis to evaluate effectiveness.  Assessments were made by reference to the 
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impact  on  population  trends;  support  given  to  families  to  help  fulfil  their 
functions; assistance for families with children in education; compensation for the 
added financial burden on families; action to promote a reconciliation of family 
and working life; relief for lone parent families; assistance for families with higher 
care expenditures; safeguarding families subsistence.  The study concluded that 
despite much diversity between countries there was nevertheless an underlying 
bedrock of common or equivalent provision in support of families.  As Neubauer 
has written (1994, p.18) 
'  .. .in spite of the differences among the various family policy support 
systems, a considerable foundation of common policies has already 
been established,  evidence of the harmonization processes which 
have gradually begun, for  example within  the framework of the 
Social  Charter.  As the countries of Europe grow toward  greater 
social  union,  this  common  foundation  can  be  built  upon  and 
expanded.' 
We have already noted that there is a need for more detailed and systematic data 
on the structure and composition of families: this is an objective which is being 
addressed by Eurostat who are negotiating with member state statistical offices to 
generate the indicators which are required by policy makers and researchers alike. 
In addition,  however,  and  reflecting  wider gaps  in research  knowledge,  the 
Observatory has identified the need for more systematic research on a number of 
important subjects.  These were identified by a  process of consultation among 
Observatory members and close colleagues. 
Three broad themes emerged from this exercise:  work in the general area of social 
protection, demographic change and living standards should have a high priority. 
Specific  topics  include  the  need  for  a  systematic  and  comparative  study  of 
outcomes for children living in different family settings and at different income 
levels.  There is much debate but relatively little evidence about the health status, 
education standards, employment opportunities, family  formation practices of 
young people and their transition to adulthood.  Research on this topic would 
need to be empirical and large scale:  it is  possible, however, that secondary 
analysis of the European Household Panel Survey would be a suitable vehicle for 
preliminary  analysis.  A  second  project,  and  this  is  to  be  pursued  by  the 
Observatory over the next 12 months, will review debates about the structure and 
level of financial support for families. In many countries there is a robost debate 
about the future of universal child benefits.  Partly driven by a concern to contain 
public expenditure there is also concern about their effectiveness as a mechanism 
for the redistribution of resources in favour of poor families and a concern about 
their behavioural impacts on labour supply and family formation.  There is a need 
to know more about why some countries are re-examining the status and purpose 
of family benefits in relation to wider social and economic policies.  A third topic, 
and again this is one which the Observatory will review in the next cycle, concerns 
available evidence on the prevalence of cohabitation and its contrasting legal and 
other implications for  family  policy.  We  propose to  use the Model Families 
Matrix, secondary analysis of the European Household Panel Study and a  pro 
forma  questionnaire to explore this subject. 
A second general theme concerns work, employment and family life.  We believe 
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work patterns  for  children  is  something  which  has  not  previously  received 
systematic attention.  How do children experience living in a home which is also 
their parent's place of work?  Similarly, there is growing evidence of continued 
inequality in the distribution of household tasks and resources between men and 
women:  the age of the 'new man' appears to have been chimeric.  Underlying 
these  concerns  is  a  fundamental  interest  in  the  apparent  tensions  (even 
contradictions) between quality of working lives and the quality of lives more 
generally.  Much methodological work is needed before we are in a position to 
elaborate clearly the relationship between work, gender roles and quality of life. 
This is  an issue which is discussed at greater length in the conclusion to this 
report. 
The third, and final,  theme concerns individual and social rights in relation to 
family policy.  This is not a subject to which the European Union can find an easy 
juridical  or  treaty  justification.  But  in  many  European  countries  there  are 
important and challenging debates about divorce, abortion, contraception and 
aided fertility.  The referendum on divorce to be held in Ireland in November 1995 
may result in divorce being available in that country for  the first  time.  The 
opportunity exists for  some detailed policy analysis of substantive debates in 
several  countries.  These  are  important  subjects  but  not  ones  which  the 
Observatory feels able to pursue at the present time:  it is, however, happy, to lend 
encouragement and support to those better placed to respond. 
The  Observatory's  own  work  plan  for  the  forthcoming  year  will  include  a 
continued commitment to the collection of data profiling the structure and value 
of the 'child support package' for families of different composition and at different 
income  levels.  As  was shown in Chapter Five,  this  affords  opportunity for 
comparison between families of different types, at different income levels and in 
different countries.  A prospective departure for this methodology is a proposal 
that the exercise should be repeated on a retrospective basis.  In other words, the 
Model Families Matrix should be completed using data from 1990, 1985, 1980 and 
1975.  There are, it is acknowledged, both theoretical and practical problems to be 
overcome but the resulting data may be used to indicate trends of convergence or 
divergence over time.  Taken in conjunction with other historical data about the 
objectives of the policy systems, together with demographic and socio-economic 
statistics,  it  may be  possible  to  explore  more  systematically  the  relationship 
between policy objectives, inputs and outcomes. 
In addition to this commitment, the Observatory will collate information about 
cohabitation, the structure of policy options in relation to  family benefits and 
policies and services which exist to support families.  The emphasis in our work 
must, of necessity, be upon preparing coherent summaries of existing research 
literature and thereby identifying trends, knowledge gaps and opportunities for 
further research.  The task is important but without end. CHAPTER EIGHT 
Conclusions 
Families are important but family policies are contentious.  Across the European 
Union there is evidence that changing family forms and the role of social policy in 
relation to both material and emotional security are at, or near, the centre of 
political debate. Although it is almost impossible to delineate common, consistent 
or convergent trends in respect of families and family policies there are some 
emerging  similarities.  These  reflect  a  changing  balance  in  the  relationship 
between public and private spheres of influence and responsibility and they are 
associated with a changing perception of the relationship between government, 
social  partners  and  domestic  concerns.  Above  all,  there  is  a  pan-European 
concern with the relationship between work and family life. Comparative data on 
attitudes to the family affirm the continuing importance as an ideal, of what may 
be constructed as rather traditional images of two (married) parents living in 
stability and harmony with their children.  Similarly, one of the most traumatic 
concerns of children is fear that their parents will separate.  The reality is,  of 
course,  that  more  and  more  families  are  contradicting  the  image:  there  is 
widespread instability and untold hardship.  We need to know more about the 
dynamics of family formation and family dissolution so  that individuals may 
exercise choice, take decisions and be alert to the consequences of their actions.  It 
is not the role of governments or politicians to be moral arbiters in this process of 
social change and personal adaptation, but it is the responsibility of both public 
and  private  agencies  (governments,  employers  and  non-governmental 
organisations) to provide a context which minimises the stress, deprivation and 
role conflicts which can contribute to relationship breakdown. There are very few 
individuals who enter into personal partnerships (irrespective of status, either 
married or cohabiting) with the intention of them breaking down in violence, 
acrimony or boredom. The age of the 'serial relationship' is not yet upon us! 
In this  chapter,  after  a  brief review of emerging  policy  issues and available 
indicators of demographic, social and economic trends, there is a more detailed 
discussion of the relationship between family policy and the quality of life.  The 
chapter concludes by calling for a re-examination of the European Commission's 
responsibilities in the field  of family policy.  This can be achieved, against the 
background of the Inter-Governmental Conference, by reviewing and re-writing 
the Communication on the Family which was first adopted by the Council of 
Ministers in 1989 (European Commission, 1989). 
Changes in demography and family form were discussed in Chapter Three and 
although  it was  tempting  to  distinguish  northern  European  from  southern 
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European trends, this cannot be sustained. Whereas all countries are experiencing 
a decline in their Total Period Fertility Rate there is considerable variation in the 
structure of families.  It is too simple to assert that northern European trends are 
leading the way to  small, cohabiting families and that the southern European 
countries will catch up.  There are important differences within each of these 
notional blocs and Ireland fits comfortably into neither category.  For example, 
there is enormous variation in the percentage of live births outside of marriage: 
from 2.8 per cent in Greece to 50.4 per cent in Sweden in 1993. For example, there 
are also many more single person households than in the mid 1980s; but the trend 
is more pronounced in northern Europe than in the Mediterranean countries. 
Against this  background, and in the absence  of more detailed  and  sensitive 
indicators, it is not possible to establish clear trends of convergence.  Neither is it 
possible to  establish causal links between demographic indicators and policy 
objectives or initiatives. More work remains to be done, and it must use better 
indicators and more rigorous methodology, to review the relationship between 
process and outcome in relation to family policy.  In the context of the European 
Union it is almost too easy to believe that the exigencies of the Single Market will 
drive  social  processes  to  a  common destiny.  Indeed,  it  is  possible  that  an 
unthinking conflation already occurs for many observers between the designation 
of 'convergence' as an analytical category for which indicators might be ascribed 
and the acceptance of 'convergence' as a political value to be supported. 
Family policy is a means to an end:  in providing support or compensation for 
families of different types, the underlying rationale is to improve the quality of life 
experienced by those families.  However, there is uncertainty about what is meant 
by the term 'quality of life' and even greater uncertainty about the relationship 
between  what  might  be  called  the  material  (financial)  components  and 
determinants  of well-being  and  the  less  tangible  aspects  of  welfare  such as 
fulfilment,  happiness  and  contentment.  Policies  which  assume  a  direct 
correspondence  between  material  well-being  and  happiness  may be  as  mis-
conceived as those policies which disregard financial security as a basis for family 
functioning.  The pursuit of material well-being, in itself, may not be a sufficient 
basis for  family stability and happiness.  This section will explore some ideas 
about quality of life in relation to family policy in Europe. 
Quality of life is a term of relatively recent usage, having been used as an indicator 
of individual or collective well-being only since the mid-1960s.  It is a term which 
can mean different things to  different people or as Scanlon (1993)  puts it,  the 
concept 'suffers from an embarrassing richness of possibilities': individuals and 
families will have different visions of the good life; the conditions to achieve and 
the criteria to measure the 'good life'  will vary from  one person or family to 
another.  The  increasing  interest  in  the  concept  can  be  seen  as  part  of  the 
movement to develop social  indicators (see Chapter Seven) or it could be an 
example of the culture shift described by Inglehart (Inglehart, 1990), which he 
terms a movement from materialism to post-materialism. 
From a social policy perspective a shift from materialist to post-materialist values 
could be seen as a move away from viewing welfare purely in terms of financial 
adequacy and the level of benefit required for subsistence to an increasing focus 
on quality of life, happiness and family well-being, and including such issues as 
exclusion,  precarite, community and solidarity.  Inglehart's theory is  based on Conclusions  133 
Maslow's hierarchy of needs (Maslow, 1954) whereby individuals strive to satisfy 
the physical needs of food and shelter first.  Only when these needs are satisfied 
does the individual begin to focus on more aesthetic goals, such as belonging, self-
esteem and intellectual fulfilment.  Inglehart takes this theory and applies it to 
public needs and values.  His analysis of Euro-Barometer data suggests a shift in 
emphasis from material well-being and physical security toward greater emphasis 
on the quality of life (see Chapter Two). 
The shift in values is attributed to the relative prosperity in the Western World 
since  the  end of World  War  II  and the emergence of  welfare  states.  Young 
Europeans have (mostly) grown up in times of plenty and have experienced less 
need to be preoccupied with material and security needs so 'priority has shifted 
upward toward meeting non-material needs for belonging and self-actualization' 
(Kesselman, 1979).  This shift in values could explain why increasing economic 
growth no longer seems to result in increasing feelings of well-being. Since the 
early 1970s increasing output has led to a reduction in welfare in the USA and 
some Western European countries (see Mulgan, 1995 for an account of this trend). 
It could be that our focus  today is  on different  goals compared with earlier 
decades, reflecting a move away from the pursuit of wealth and economic growth 
as ends in themselves to seeing them as part of a wider picture. 
Mulgan (1995)  points out that an increase in a nation's wealth is translated into 
longer lives and better amenities as money is available for labour-saving devices 
in the home, for cleaning up cities and for the provision of health services.  This 
may result in increased well-being in the short-term but over time expectations 
increase such that there is always a gap between aspirations and reality.  This is 
what Inglehart and Rabier  (1986)  term 'happiness over the  next hill'.  Their 
argument is that satisfaction with a given aspect of life reflects the gap between an 
individual's aspirationallevel and their perceived situation with the aspirational 
level adjusting to individual circumstances over time.  Thus a recent change will 
have a greater impact on current feelings of well-being since the individual has 
had less time to adjust to the change.  Campbell et al  (1976)  found that levels of 
satisfaction increased with age.  This applied to virtually every aspect of life, 
except health.  Inglehart and Rabier attribute this finding to the attainment of a 
better fit  between aspirations and perceived situation as the individual moves 
through the life cycle. 
Income alone is not a reliable indicator of well-being.  The use of GNP as a welfare 
indicator has been criticised by many. As Scitvosky points out, 'Our economic 
welfare is forever rising, but we are no happier as a result' (1976: 135).  Access to 
income and wealth alone cannot guarantee happiness.  Other factors contributing 
to personal happiness include occupation, housing, friendships and family life. 
Arguments about the reconciliation of work and family life  are central to  the 
quality of life;  high salaries achieved at the cost  of long working days, long 
working  weeks,  or  high  levels  of  stress  risk  poor  personal  and  family 
relationships.  The challenge must be to enable and encourage the specification of 
'the good life' and facilitate policies which make its attainment possible. 
The policy agenda has been shifting, and this is  reflected in nomenclature, in 
favour of individuals (children, mothers, fathers, employees and workers, men 
and women) rather than aggregate categories such as families.  Within spheres as 
diverse as social protection and civil law there is increased emphasis on the rights 134  A Synthesis of National Family Policies 1994 
of individuals:  this trend, associated with women's rights, the rights of children 
and workers' rights, has been progressive and evolutionary. But there are tensions 
and there is a need for reconciliation and accommodation of different interests. 
Families are not infinitely elastic, they cannot always withstand or absorb the 
pressures and demands placed upon them.  Just as individuals need space and 
support to grow and develop, so too do families.  The challenge is to find an 
approach which simultaneously achieves two objectives: first, it must respect the 
integrity and individuality of family members and secondly it must recognise the 
inter-dependence of family relationships without prescribing their precise form. 
It is already the case that the European Union makes an important contribution to 
this developing challenge. 
The  European Union, or more particularly individual member states, provide 
endless examples of both good and not-so-good policy and practice in the family 
sphere.  By  observing and transferring  this  rich and  diverse experience it  is 
possible to  contribute to  enhanced quality of life.  There are, however, three 
matters that should be high on the policy agenda as a  contribution to further 
progress.  First,  the importance of reconciling the tensions (if not contradictions) 
between the spheres of work and family is recognised by all:  governments and 
social partners must, however, show even greater sensitivity (and consistency) in 
their responses  to  the  challenge.  Life  is  not  a  rehearsal  for  something else: 
employment and work are a necessary part of life but should not dominate all to 
the exclusion of well-being and happiness.  There is evidence that (while millions 
are unemployed) some people are working too hard and are seeing less of family 
and close friends than they used to: the balance needs to be adjusted.  Secondly, 
far too little attention is paid by Member States or the European Commission to 
the impact their policies and actions have upon families.  Each tier of authority 
should, as a matter of principle and routine, assess the family impact of their 
policies.  This should include a review of all public policy and not just family or 
social policy.  This will require that all tiers of government establish a mechanism 
for the co-ordination and evaluation of policy.  Each year a report on the family 
impact of public policy should be presented to  the Commission.  Finally,  the 
Commission should re-examine the Communication on the Family (COM[98] 363 
final) which has been the basis for subsequent actions in this field.  There have 
been great demographic, socio-economic and policy changes in the past six years: 
the time is right for review and a renewed affirmation of the importance of values 
and policies which are sensitive to families and their needs in the 21st century. References 
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